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Abstract
This thesis provides an historical analysis of changing ideas around coal and its
environmental impact. Special reference to the Witbank coalfield between 1906 and 1978
provides a unique representation of how South African coal mining was perceived in the
early twentieth century, particularly in revealing how these ideas were shaped by the
appearance of different manifestations of coal-based pollution in the region. Each chapter
provides a thematic representation of different aspects of coal-based pollution as they
manifested over the course of the twentieth century. The first chapter highlights how
early signs of environmental change were easily ignored by State and industry, owing to
limited understanding of the broader impact of pollution, as well as the localized impact
of early signs of pollution. The introduction of electricity by the early 1920s enabled the
growth of the Witbank coal industry. The impact of this development is assessed in the
second chapter, which explores how local industry was stimulated by the needs of the
Second World War. This resulted in greater signs of pollution, and signaled a shift in the
way pollution was understood in the region. National responses to intensified
atmospheric pollution between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s resulted in the
development of South Africa's first legislation related directly to the growing problem of
pollution, the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA) of 1965. The third
chapter provides insights into the way pollution was understood during this time by
assessing the ideas that influenced the nature of the Act. The final chapter of the thesis
reviews responses to the APPA by the Witbank coal industry. It also explores the way in
which water pollution was understood in light of the appearance of severe mine water
pollution. The central concern of this study is to demonstrate an evolution of the ideas
that shaped the way in which South African coal-based pollution has been conceived. The
study thus reflects how and why these ideas have changed over time.
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Introduction
In agony I cry!
Because of the state I am,
Being ugly on surface and underneath,
Despite the richdom I am filled with.
I am known as the Coal City
No other land can rival my production
But I remain poor and destitute and my
People suffer the wound inflicted by the
Greedy.1
This thesis examines changing ideas about the environment in light of new knowledge
arising from both scientific and environmental arenas. The ‘state’ of the Coal City
described in the poem above has provided physical evidence of the severe impact of coal-
based pollution in the Witbank district. This study explores the departure from positive
perspectives of coal as a source of wealth and comfort, to more current anxieties based on
knowledge of coal as a major polluter. This thesis provides an overview of changing
understandings of coal-based pollution between 1906 and 1978, when the increasing role
of opencast coal production led to the exponential growth of the coal industry. The
moment that drove the study in this direction took place in June 2007 at a public meeting
which I attended held at the Lake Chrissie Lodge in Lake Chrissie, the historic village
named after and founded on the shore of the largest fresh-water lake in southern Africa.
This large pan also forms part of the ecosystem of the Mpumalanga Lakes District,
threatened by the prospect of large-scale opencast coal mining in the Mpumalanga
province. The tensions between different members of the local community underscored
the political significance of issues around coal-based pollution, and sparked curiosity
about how these conflicts emerged.2
1 Komana, Lucas. ‘Emalahleni’, Witbank News, March 15, 2002, p. 11
2 Personal notes on discussion with Koos Pretorius, Lake Chrissie Lodge, Lake Chrissie, Mpumalanga,
June, 2007
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Witnessing the way in which the local politics of a community were affected by the
conflict of ideas around coal-based pollution inspired much of the research which took
place over the course of this study. Preliminary interviews explored the local
environmental politics and attempted to gauge perspectives on local attitudes towards
coal mining and its environmental impacts.3 This highlighted the need for a unit of study
that could reflect the historical evolution of ideas around coal-based pollution.
This thesis provides a critical study of changing conceptions of the environmental impact
of South African coal mining, with special reference to the Witbank coalfield in
Mpumalanga Province, in what was previously known as the Eastern Transvaal.4 The
choice of the Witbank region’s heavily mined seams as a case study, dating back to the
beginning of the twentieth century, was based on the extent to which mining activity has
contributed to long-term environmental damage in the region. The period of study is thus
framed by the long history of local coal mining activity in the region. This has also
served in providing insight to the changing views of pollution over time, as they
manifested in the region.
Responses to indications of severe coal-based pollution in the Witbank coalfields have
contributed to growing global interest in the environmental hazards of coal mining. Of all
fossil fuels, coal releases the most carbon dioxide emissions per unit of energy, posing a
“further threat to global climate, already warming alarmingly.” 5 Despite its significant
contribution to climate change, the demand for coal continues to grow worldwide.6
Ongoing coal production in the industrial ‘Coal City’ has resulted in the degradation of
local natural resources, including air, water and soil. The changing history of coal-based
pollution is thus crucial in the post-industrial age.
3 See Interview with Christelle Pauw, Lake Chrissie, June 26, 2007; Interview with Mohammed Dindar,
Lake Chrissie, June 26, 2007; Interview with Vusi Ngwenya, Kwachibikulu (Lake Chrissie), June 27, 2007;
Interview with Nico Steinberg and Ane Steinberg, Lake Chrissie, June 28, 2007; Interview with Hannes
Botha, Carolina, June 28, 2007
4 Minutes of Emalahleni Town Council Meeting, received from the Witbank News. The Witbank district is
known today as Emalahleni. It consists today of the sprawling Witbank municipal zone, as well as smaller
surrounding centres, including Ogies, Phola, Ga-Nala, Thubelihle and Rietspruit.
5 Appenzeller, Tim. ‘The Coal Paradox’, National Geographic, March, 2006
6 Interview with Mohammed Dindar, Kwachibikulu, Mpumalanga Lakes District, June 26, 2007
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The release of carbons from fossil fuels has been recently acknowledged as the central
cause of global warming, but this was not always the case. Over time, Witbank
experienced different kinds of coal-based pollution. Much of it stemmed from the actual
mining processes. Modes of production varied and relied on geophysical constraints such
as depth of coal seam and weight of the overburden. Processing coal involves digging up
layers of earth, blasting through rock ore, extracting waste and creating dumps. These
processes disrupted the landscape and triggered off more delayed processes such as acid
mine drainage and desiccation. Secondary implications of coal production have related to
the combustion of coal. Myriad chemicals have been released into the atmosphere,
specifically carbons, contributing to air pollution, and, more broadly, climate change.
This thesis demonstrates how broader understanding of environmental change has
evolved over time in line with ecological change and advances in scientific knowledge.
The impact of coal mining has been severe in the region, as a result of the neglect of the
environmental cost of coal extraction and combustion by the coal industry. One
consequence of this neglect has been the prevalence of lung disease in the region,
resulting in early calls for legislation around air pollution control. As Musemwa has
pointed out, localized problems related to environmental degradation are often left out of
the climate change debate, which constitutes the “macro-political and economic” side of
the environmental debate; this paradigm has “tended to efface the micro problems
through which the former have been poignantly manifested.”7 This thesis therefore charts
the ways in which coal-based pollution was first understood locally, and marks changes
in these conceptions as the growing visibility and physical impact of pollution was felt
more over time.
Historically, conceptions of pollution were based on observations of the way coal-related
activity affected nature. These understandings shifted with the emergence of related
scientific data, demonstrating the relationship between coal and pollution of natural
7 Musemwa, Muchaparara. ‘Early struggles over water: from private to public water utility in the city of
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, 1894-1924’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 34, Number 4,
December, 2008, p. 881
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resources. The more scientists could explain coal and its properties, the clearer the
process and impact of pollution became. This is reflected in the history of South African
environmental law, generally subject to the constraints of scientific understanding of
coal-based pollution.
The rise of an environmental consciousness of the impact of coal mining in the last three
decades has, in part, led to a more critical consideration of the costs of coal to the
environment by scientific and environmental bodies, local residents, state officials and
the coal mining industry. The development of these perspectives over time has not been
fully documented and explained. This study will address that omission.
Literature review
This study has drawn on existing literature which touches on ideas around coal-based
pollution. This literature review demonstrates the paucity of material on the way in which
South African coal-based pollution has been understood over time. Historical works on
South African coal mining, while useful, are limited regarding pollution. Katherine Aiken
has argued that historians have been “slow to analyse” the way in which the “heightened
interest” toward the environment has affected the development of environmental policy.8
The study highlights the value of environmental history as a way in which to speed up the
analysis of these issues, as well as including local environments “in historical
explanation.”9 According to Carruthers, environmental history also provides a way of
“returning the discipline to political and social relevance” by asking new questions
related to current concerns around climate change and sustainable energy.10 This idea and
many other perspectives were found in the literature on South African environmental
history, and helped to formulate the conceptual framework used within this study. Many
of these ideas were linked in South Africa’s Environmental History: Cases &
8 Aiken, Katherine. G. ‘”Not long ago a smoking chimney was a sign of prosperity’: corporate and
community response to pollution at the Bunker Hill Smelter in Kellogg, Idaho’, Environmental History
Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1994, p. 67
9 Carruthers, Jane. ‘Environmental history in southern Africa: an overview’, Dovers, S., Edgecombe, R. &
Guest, B. (eds.) South Africa’s Environmental History: Cases & Comparisons, David Philip Publishers,
Cape Town, 2002, p. 5
10 Ibid.
- 12 -
Comparisons, edited by Ruth Edgecombe.11 The importance of Edgecombe’s intellectual
influence on this work is shaped by her intimate knowledge of the coal industry. Her
work on the history of Hlobane Colliery in Natal provides a powerful case study of the
pattern of economic development of the coal mining industry.12 This is especially
valuable when assessing the impact of coal in Witbank and its surrounds. She provides an
important account of the workings of the early twentieth century coal industry, and her
work serves as a good example of how to translate technical knowledge into historical
narrative. Phia Steyn’s assessment of environmental historiography inspired the
conceptual formulation of this study.13 Jacklyn Cock’s critical assessment of the
formation of a South African environmental movement and its implicit challenges was an
important source of background knowledge for conducting field work.14 Without
reference to contemporary environmental literature, this study would have no bedrock.
The central argument of this thesis has considered the contents of existing material, but
seeks to develop further the way in which society has understood environmental changes,
particularly related to the mining industry.
Literature on the history of the South African mining industry was useful in establishing a
context for further research on the coal mining industry. This study has thus drawn on a
considerable body of literature on the history of the South African gold and diamond
industries. Particularly in older histories of the South African mining industry, the
emphasis has traditionally been on discovery, pioneering engineering and untold riches
attained through gold and diamond mining. The historiographical focus of most of these
works is autobiographical, depicting the challenges faced by the Randlords in building up
the industry. Kanfer’s Last Empire provides a biographical history of Ernest
11 See Dovers, S., Edgecombe, R. & Guest, B. (eds.) South Africa’s Environmental History: Cases &
Comparisons, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town, 2002
12 Edgecombe, R. The Constancy of Change: A History of Hlobane Colliery: 1898-1998, The Vryheid
(Natal) Railway, Coal and Iron Company, Ltd, Vryheid, 1998
13 Steyn, P. ‘The Greening of our Past? An Assessment of South African Environmental Historiography’,
New Contree, 46, November 1999
14 Cock, Jacklyn. ‘Connecting the red, brown and green: the environmental justice movement in South
Africa’, a case study for the UKZN project entitled: Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social
Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa, Centre for Civil Society, School of Development Studies,
University of KwaZulu-Natal
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Oppenheimer and the Anglo American Corporation.15 Richard Mendelsohn’s biography
of Sammy Marks provides some context for the establishment of the coal mining industry
in early twentieth century Transvaal, but focuses mainly on the personal and professional
challenges faced by Marks.16 Houghton and Dagut’s published selection of archival
excerpts on the South African economy provided useful, yet limited, reference to late
nineteenth and early twentieth century coal figures.17 This was useful in conceptualizing
the scale of coal production, enabling a more accurate vision of the economic conditions
of the coal industry in the early twentieth century. C.H. Feinstein provides the most
valuable critical analysis of South African economic development trends, taking into
account racially determined trends of economic growth.18 John Lang’s exhaustive study
on the South African coal industry was valuable in establishing a basis of understanding
for the study, particularly the role of coal in economic growth.
More recent literature on proletarianisation and the social impact of mining on coal
workers is extensive, and it has helped make sense of the living and working conditions
of early twentieth century migrant populations. Duncan’s assessment of labour conditions
between 1918 and 1948 highlights the attention drawn to labour conditions, but makes
little reference to Witbank.19 A critical assessment of the highly contested dynamic
between mine owners and labourers is well addressed in Bozzoli’s edited volume, Town
and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Responses, even
though the selected studies found in this work provided little direct reference to coal
mining and pollution.20 One exception to this is Peter Alexander’s work on labour in
Witbank which has provided valuable insight into the way the coal industry functioned in
15 Kanfer, S. The Last Empire, Coronet Books, Hodder & Stoughton, 1993
16 Mendelsohn, R. Sammy Marks: ‘The Uncrowned King of the Transvaal’, David Philip, Cape Town, 1991
17 Houghton, H. and Dagut, J. (eds.) Source Material on the South African Economy: 1860-1970, Volume
3, 1920-1970, (eds.) Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1973
18 Feinstein, C.H. An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005
19 Duncan, D. The Mills of God: The State and African Labour in South Africa: 1918-1948, Witwatersrand
University Press, Johannesburg, 1995
20 Bozzoli, B. (ed.), Town and Countryside in the Transvaal: Capitalist Penetration and Popular Response,
Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1983
- 14 -
the first half of the twentieth century.21 Alexander’s study details the poor working and
living conditions endured by African migrant workers in the Witbank coal industry, but
little attention is placed on either the appearance of coal-based pollution, or responses to
it.
Some references to coal mining are to be found amidst detailed unrelated analyses which
assist in establishing a general context of the coal mining industry. Elaine Katz’s study of
silicosis on the South African gold mines provides an interesting parallel in popular
understandings of mining, pollution and disease.22 Literature on asbestos mining and its
social health implications has provided useful comparative perspectives for the critical
study of coal-based pollution, both in revealing the extent to which mining companies
engaged in irresponsible mining practices, as well as reflecting the social impact of
irreversible environmental degradation. The work of Jock McCulloch highlighted the
way in which mid-twentieth century British-based asbestos mining companies withheld
extensive knowledge of the carcinogenic qualities of asbestos and related dangers of
exposure to both their employees and the general public.23 The impact of the mining
industry in this instance raised questions about the extent to which Witbank experienced
similar exploration and exploitation. It brought to the fore the question of industry
liability, as well as the state’s role in the assessment, monitoring and amelioration of
coal-based pollution. Renfrew Christie’s history of energy politics was very influential as
a comprehensive intellectual study of energy in South Africa.24 It demonstrated the
relevant stakeholders in the history of South African energy production, particularly the
coal industry, and also contextualized the bid for coal within the broader framework of
Apartheid.
21 Alexander, P. ‘Culture and Conflicts – Witbank Colliery Life: 1900-1950’, Unpublished paper presented
on Wednesday 14 May 2008 at the Centre for Sociological Research with the Department of Sociology and
the Department of Anthropology and Development Studies
22 Katz, E. The White Death: Silicosis on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines: 1886-1910, Witwatersrand
University Press, 1994
23 McCulloch, J. Asbestos Blues: Labour, Capital, Physicians and the State in South Africa, James Currey,
Oxford, 2002
24 Christie, R. Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa, State University of New York Press, Albany,
1984
- 15 -
The historical analysis of coal mining and consequent pollution required an
interdisciplinary approach, and close reference was made to the sciences of mining
engineering, ecology, geology, and power production. This necessitated spending time on
becoming familiar with these processes, and ample reference has been made to journal
articles. Witcomb and Baxter’s case study of abandoned coal land in South Africa
provided crucial technical information related to the specific nature of coal-based
pollution.25 Perspective on the full impact of environmental changes induced by long-
term coal mining activity was shaped by Limpitlaw, Aken, Lodewijks, and Viljoen’s
study on post-mining rehabilitation.26 The value of the technical reports was multi-
faceted, as it was not only the facts and figures represented that facilitated the research,
but also the way in which this knowledge was represented. It helped in understanding the
actual impacts of coal mining, thus enabling the process of assessing historical changes in
how pollution was conceived.
The Coals of the Witbank District (Transvaal), published in 1931 by the Collieries
Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, is a rare early published source
specifically related to the Witbank coalfields.27 It provided a solid understanding of the
geology and chemistry of the Witbank coalfield. More recent studies supplemented
representations of coal and pollution, but most useful was Terence McCarthy’s paper on
the ‘Conservation of the Mpumalanga Lakes District’, in which he predicted
environmental changes which would likely be triggered by intensive mining activity.28
Anthony Turton’s assessment of water pollution, specifically the dire long-term
implications of acid mine drainage, reinforced the need for this study, which hopes to
contextualize the reality of mining and pollution in South Africa.29
25 Witcomb, A. & Baxter, B. ‘Case Study: Abandoned Coal Mine Lands in South Africa’, Mining
Environmental Management, July 200
26 Limpitlaw, D. Aken, M., Lodewijks, H. & Viljoen, J. ‘Post-Mining Rehabilitation, Land Use and
Pollution at Collieries in South Africa,’ The South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, July, 2005
27 Graham, A.C. & Lategan P.N. The Coals of the Witbank District (Transvaal), The Transvaal Chamber of
Mines, Collieries Committee, 1931
28 McCarthy, T, Cairncross, B., Huizenga, J. & Batchelor, A. ‘Conservation of the Mpumalanga Lakes
District’, 2007, Copy received from author.
29 See Turton, A. ‘SA water and mining policy: a study of strategies for transition management’, April 20,
2009, received draft copy from author
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There remains a dearth of historical material dealing with the environmental implications
of coal. Barbara Freese’s social history of coal examines the growth and impact of the
coal industry within a global context, but there is little focus on South Africa.30 One
exception is James Clarke’s Our Fragile Land: South Africa’s Environmental Crisis,
published in 1974, whose critique of the problems related to pollution is presented in an
accessible, non-technical style.31 While crucial for the purposes of the thesis, Clarke’s
study does not provide a critical assessment of conceptions around coal-based pollution.
The literature review has highlighted a significant body of material demonstrating the
many problems around coal-based pollution, but none address the key issues dealt with in
this thesis. This study forms the first attempt to assess ideas revolving around the broader
impact of coal-based pollution, and how these changed over time.
Methodology
Reference to published material was an important preliminary part of this process, as
described in the literature review above. It helped establish the strengths, gaps and
silences in the field of environmental history, and specifically on the subject of this study.
Close reference to sources of background and technical information opened up a range of
debates around environmental concerns, paving the way for a clearer research focus.
Additional research conducted for an undergraduate project on the environmental impact
of asbestos mining, as well as participation in a research product conducted by the Centre
for Sustainability in Mining and Industry for Asbestos Relief Trust to assess the socio-
economic implications of long-term exposure to asbestos dust provided valuable
comparative insight into the relationship between mining practices and pollution.32 The
range of sources in this thesis demonstrates an attempt to apply critical awareness of
changing ideas around coal-based pollution. The research process was undertaken with
certain assumptions about the contents and availability of relevant sources.  Numerous
30 Freese, B. Coal: A Human History, Arrow Books, Random House, 2003
31 Clarke, J. Our Fragile Land: South Africa’s Environmental Crisis, Macmillan, Johannesburg, 1974
32 See Singer, M. ‘A Social History of Rural Neglect: Mafefe in the 20th Century’, Honours Dissertation,
Department of History, University of the Witwatersrand, 2005; The Future of Penge: Prospects for People
and the Environment, Project Report and Guidelines, Final Report, Centre for Sustainability in Mining and
Industry, University of the Witwatersrand, July 2008
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challenges were experienced, including the inability to access certain archival records,
particularly the Chamber of Mines and Witbank’s town records.
A major source for this study was the Witbank News. Exhaustive reference was made to
all weekly publications between 1923 and 1965, selected editions between 1980 and
1981, as well as weekly editions between 2000 and 2008. This source is imbued with a
comprehensive knowledge of the town – its culture, politics, economy – and specifically
its coal industry. The Witbank News also demonstrated an evolving culture of
understanding the environmental implications of industrial activity stimulated before and
during the Second World War to produce more coal and manufacture steel. Particularly
interesting was the role of the media in the construction of knowledge related to
pollution. Direct references to coal-based pollution did not appear until the 1940s and
1950s, when air pollution became a major problem for the town. The level of bias
implicit in the perspective of the Witbank News was taken into account during the
analysis of this source, highlighting the source as only partial representation of the local
views, with racially determined exclusion of the experiences of thousands of residents in
Kwa Guqa and other townships.
A number of visits were made to the National Archives of South Africa (NASA) in
Pretoria, where archival evidence of coal trade stretched back to the mid-nineteenth
century. Detailed minutes, inspectors’ reports, parliamentary debates, correspondence,
legal documentation, amongst other primary sources provided important information on
the establishment of the Witbank Colliery, and how it affected the town’s growth. The
most useful and explicit set of archival material included extensive documentation around
the passing of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA) of 1965, which is dealt
with closely in the latter half of the thesis. This spoke directly to the task of evaluating
changing conceptions of coal-based pollution. These archives were valuable, particularly
after a frustrating attempt to access Witbank’s local municipal records, which proved not
to predate the 1990s.
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This study relies strongly on the findings of archival research, but the heart of the study is
based on oral sources produced during the course of field visits to Witbank in June and
September 2008. The interview process provided insight into contemporary conceptions
of coal-based pollution. Respondents were selected because of their expertise and
experience of coal-based pollution. The interviews provided relevant insight for the
period after the promulgation of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA) of
1965, making it necessary to rely on archival findings for the majority of the thesis.
Interviews were held in conjunction with a number of site visits to active and abandoned
workings, dumps, underground fires and communities throughout the Witbank coalfield,
as well as other affected coalfields throughout Mpumalanga, including the Mpumalanga
Lakes District. This has also included several site visits to asbestos, platinum and coal
mining districts throughout Mpumalanga and Limpopo, enabling a more accurate context
of pollution and its role in shaping the history of Witbank and South Africa. The subject
of the study was the local environment of the Witbank coalfield. The trips were made to
places of intensive coal-based pollution, including abandoned mines, mine dumps and
sites of mine water pollution. These field visits were invaluable, enabling a more accurate
vision of pollution and its role in shaping the history of Witbank and South Africa.
Chapter Outline
This thesis depicts the shaping of ideas around coal-based pollution, relying heavily on
the interplay of theme and chronology. Each chapter focuses on how different
manifestations of pollution were received by the South African state, the industry and
civil sector. The chapters are linked to the central question of the study by their
exploration of specific environmental impacts that affected the Witbank district over
time. Witbank’s pollution did not relate to any specific part of the process of coal mining,
and this needed to be reflected both in the structure of the argument and the content of the
narrative. The nexus of chronology and thematic structure has reflected the evolving
nature of pollution itself, considerably influenced by the way in which coal-based
pollution was understood.
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The first chapter explores the initial period of coal mining in Witbank. It focuses on
early understandings around coal-based pollution by tracing the history of the local
industry, town and surrounding areas. The introductory chapter depicts the limitations of
early conceptions of coal mining, and demonstrates how physical evidence of
environmental changes, specifically as a result of coal mining, was ignored. Reference is
made to evidence of early twentieth century legislation related to the prevention and
control of pollution. By the 1930s, demand for Witbank coal grew, with infrastructural
development and capital investment making it possible for the local industry to expand
dramatically. This also had the effect of setting in motion long-term processes of
environmental degradation.
The second chapter assesses understanding of coal-based pollution in light of processes
of industrial transformation set in motion by the Second World War. The period between
1930 and 1947 is conceived as an ecological-economic turning point for Witbank coal.
The chapter thus depicts the process of change leading to the significant changes in
perceptions realized during this time. Post-war reconstruction involved a committee of
inquiry into the nature of pollution, yielding findings which profoundly changed the way
in which the environmental repercussions of the war were seen. This was significant in
the politicization of issues related to pollution. Reference is made to State findings about
the environmental impact of industry and mining, demonstrating how few measures were
taken to monitor and prevent pollution. This was not a priority, particularly during the
war, when pressure was placed upon the South African state and industry to increase coal
production for the war effort.
The process leading to the promulgation of South Africa’s first major environmental law,
the APPA, is addressed in the third chapter. This involved significant research and
analysis of coal-based pollution. A scheduled list of industrial pollutants was compiled
for the APPA, with coal listed as a chief polluter. This meant that the coal industry was
now subject to inspection and monitoring. The Act also expected the coal industry to
introduce internal pollution monitoring devices. This dramatically changed the way in
which the coal industry functioned. The chapter also provides an overview of responses
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to air pollution in Witbank, from early records of the appearance of air pollution, to
community mobilization against the smoke emissions of local industries such as the
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Company. The APPA was significant in setting a new
legal precedent around coal-based pollution, forcing State and industry to pay more
attention to pollution control measures.
The implications of South Africa’s first major environmental legislation are addressed in
this final chapter. The fourth chapter begins with the implementation of the APPA,
demonstrating a considerable shift in the way pollution was understood and addressed by
the South African state and coal industry. It provides an assessment of the relative
efficiency of measures taken to implement the APPA, reflecting the increased awareness
of the implications of coal-based pollution. It describes the period between the
introduction of the APPA and the exponential growth of industry with the introduction of
large-scale modes of opencast production by the late 1970s. As evidence of pollution was
observed over time, more attention was drawn to the relative uncertainty of its full
impact, but this did little to change the tide of unforeseen growth that transformed
Witbank and its coal industry by the late 1970s. Responses of government, industry and
civil society stakeholders to new protective legislation such as the APPA and the
amended Water Act of 1966 reflected new conceptions of pollution and highlighted the
need for new ways of monitoring pollution.
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Chapter One
‘Undermining’ the land: a history of coal mining and environmental changes in the
Witbank Coalfield:  1838 – 1930
Introduction
…it’s an underground mine, and (at) any time they are afraid that it can sink.33 (My italics)
Understanding the gravity of coal-based pollution involves exploring the environmental
legacy of Witbank’s coal-based economy. This chapter explores the early conceptions
around coal-based pollution by tracing the history of the local industry, town and
surrounding areas. Coal-related pollution is widespread in this region, but the full
intensity of ecological degradation in areas where mining has taken place in the Witbank
coalfield has taken almost a century to be fully felt. This has resulted in long-term
ecological damage throughout the district.
The ability of the environment to withstand long-term pollution has delayed reactions of
the environment to changes set in motion by intensive coal mining and power production
activity. Without visible evidence of pollution, the capacity of intensive mining activity
to pollute was historically not known. Conceptions of coal and pollution were thus based
on contemporary notions of industrial growth and urban development. This involved a
tacit acceptance of the changing face of the local environment and its influence over the
spatial planning of the new coal town.
33 Interview with Isaac Mampane, Witbank, June 2, 2008
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The Witbank Coalfield: A Geological Account
…if coal were not so plentiful one could imagine it lovingly displayed in museums. 34
Within the Witbank coalfields there are five known coal seams, horizontally formed, and
labelled No. 1 to No. 5 from the deepest to the shallowest. Other than the No. 3 seam,
which is too thin to be of any commercial value, all seams have been worked. The main
seam is No. 2, whose thickness rarely exceeds 120 metres. While the coal is not always
of a high quality, it has carried “consistent high values over large areas.”35 Although
partially workable, the other three seams have either been denuded or present greater
difficulties in mining. Thousands of boreholes have been sunk over the years to prospect
the underlying seams.36
The coalfields are contained beneath the expansive grasslands and ancient rocky outcrops
of South Africa’s Mpumalanga province, in what was previously known as the Eastern
Transvaal. These are arguably the most important coalfields in South Africa, and have
provided billions of tons of coal for energy production over the past century. The
relatively unfaulted seams extend over a distance of 180 kilometres from Brakpan in the
west to Belfast in the east, with a north-south width of approximately 40 kilometres.37
They are contained within a much larger series of sandstone, shale and grit layers known
as the Karoo System, which runs beneath the Western Cape, the Free State, northern
34 Freese, B. Coal: A Human History, p. 3
35 Graham, A.C. & Lategan P.N. The Coals of the Witbank District (Transvaal), The Transvaal Chamber of
Mines, Collieries Committee, 1931, p. 11
36 Ibid.
37 Smith, D.A.M. & Whittaker, R.L.G. The Springs-Witbank Coalfields, Anhaeusser, C.R. & Maske, S.
(eds) Mineral Deposits of South Africa, 1986, Geological Society of South Africa, Johannesburg, p. 1969
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Kwazulu-Natal and Mpumalanga.38 A 1931 geological survey argued that in the Witbank
coalfields “alone (were) found the coal measures… of any economic importance to South
Africa.”39 The success of these coalfields was also based on their proximity to the
Witwatersrand, the locus of gold mining in the Union of South Africa during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The coal from these fields was bituminous,
easily combustible, and worked well for energy production to support sustained economic
activity in the region.
The way coal was formed had become common knowledge by the 1930s, but during the
late nineteenth century, the cause of high carbon content in coal was largely unexplored.
The capacity for coal to burn, and even to sustain combustion, reflected the unique nature
of its composition. Understanding of coal was based more on observation than scientific
knowledge.
Witbank coal became the subject of early scientific inquiry when large-scale gold mining
in Johannesburg stimulated interest in the “microscopic examination” of particular coal
samples.40 Coal came to be understood as a volatile organic substance, formed from the
fossilized vegetation of prehistoric forests. The high carbon content of coal was the result
of photosynthesis by ancient vegetation, stored and concentrated over millions of years.
The rising impetus for coal research was driven, for the most part, by the energy
requirements of the gold industry.
Settlement and mining in Witbank: 1838 – 1906
The areas now being mined must have been inhabited by wild animals…reports have it that, in the very
early days, elephants and lions roamed the countryside. 41
38 Graham, A.C. p. 1
39 Coal and Other Fuels’, Wagner P.A. & Reinecke, L. (eds), Mineral Deposits of the Union of South
Africa, Third (Triennial) Empire Mining and Metallurgical Congress, 1931, p. 233
40 ‘Witbank Coalfields’, Witbank News, August 18, 1933
41 Witbank News, October 16, 1981
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The modern discovery of coal in the Witbank district was precipitated by the relatively
shallow nature of seams. Numerous coal outcroppings appeared along hillsides and in the
beds of streams.42 Written historical accounts of South African coal mining date back to
as early as 1838. There is evidence, discovered through early twentieth century surveys,
recording signs of pre-historic extraction. Slag heaps discovered alongside outcroppings
suggested that coal was used by indigenous hunter gatherers or Late Iron Age groups to
heat furnaces for smelting iron ore into workable tools and weapons. Extraction was
limited to seams of black coal running to the surface of rocky outcrops. Before the
establishment of the local coal industry, the most popular land activity in the rural
Witbank district was agriculture, including maize and corn.
The first recorded coal sale in the Transvaal dates back to the Natal colony in 1842. This
coal was mined and transported by wagon to markets in Pietermaritzburg. By the 1850s,
prospectors had gravitated to the Highveld, following reports of “considerable quantities”
of coal in the Middelburg district.43 By 1868, Transvaal coal was described by the
explorer, Thomas Baines, as looking “tolerably well – black, with a moderate gloss, and
clean fracture.”44
On one of his treks from the Transvaal to Natal in 1872, Baines witnessed shallow
digging on the farm of Daniel Kruyger, situated along the banks of the Steenkoolspruit.
Despite ready access to water, energy resources were scarce. Baines reported that “the
family was using coal as its only fuel.”45 This fossil fuel was cheap, readily available –
and a useful alternative to dried dung or firewood. He empathized with Kruyger, referring
to the “bleak heights” of the area as being “so absolutely destitute of wood” that Baines
had servants collect “cakes of partially dried cattle dung” that they found along the road
to use for fires to cook their meals and “keep them warm at night.”46 Another traveller
42 ‘The Stored Wealth of the Transvaal: History & Progress of Mining – Mr James McPhee’s Address to
the Metallurgical Congress’, Witbank News, May 8, 1930, p. 4
43 Lecture, Mr. E. Soar, Witbank News, 1930, p. 6.
44 Civil engineer Thomas Baines is remembered as the “artist who in his spare time became the father of
South African geology.’ See ‘Electrical Engineers Visit Witbank’, Witbank News, August 16, 1935, p. 5
45 Ibid.
46 ‘Electrical Engineers Visit Witbank’, Witbank News, August 16, 1935, p. 5
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compared the local coal’s quality to that “known in Lancashire as the ‘Arley Main’.”47
While comparisons to the British coal seams were made, there is little to indicate that the
expansion of trade markets was seen as a possibility in the Transvaal.
Local trade, where it existed, was small-scale and subsistence-oriented. First-hand
accounts reported that wagons were backed into coal seams nine metres thick. The
wagons were loaded with high grade coal with “the same ease that a wagon might be
filled with rock from an ordinary mountain.”48 This coal would be transported and sold to
the dispersed rural community for approximately fifteen shillings per ton.
The first few mines in the Middelburg District included the Crown Douglas and Maggies
Mine.49 The Brugspruit Mine was named after one of the tributaries of the Olifants River
system, a particularly sensitive water system which encompassed the area in a catchment
of heavy industrial and mining use.50 Early small-scale coal mining targeted adits, or
shallow horizontal shafts, where blasting and coal extraction was most simple. Once
these seams were exploited it became more difficult to mine, as the majority of the coal
was located beneath a thick layer of solid rock and earth, and required vertical shafts
which went underground, through layers of rock. Shafts such as these had been used from
as early as 1908, with relatively shallow coal faces being mined from underground.
The most popular method of underground mining in the Witbank coalfields was known
commonly as ‘pillar and bord’ mining.51 According to a 1918 Glossary of Certain Words
Used in Collieries, this was the “usual way of working a South African colliery, in which
two series of parallel excavations were made at right angles to each other, and by which
approximately three quarters of the coal (was) extracted and one quarter left standing in
47 Duncan Campbell Francis Moodie, quoted in article. Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Lecture, Mr. E. Soar, p. 6
50 Asmal, Kader. ‘Speech by the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Member of Parliament at the
official opening of the Brugspruit Water Pollution Control Works as well as the official launch of Water
Week 1997’, Witbank, March 17, 1997
51 This method was also known as ‘pillar and stall.’
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rectangular pillars to support the roof.”52 Following initial extraction, workings were
usually sealed off and abandoned.
The popularization of the pillar and bord method of underground mining was an
economic windfall for the region. It increased local coal production enough to make it
able to compete with other industries in the Cape and Natal. Still, efforts to expand coal
markets were held back by numerous obstacles. The first involved finding high quality
coal that would suit markets. Before contracts could be negotiated, coal properties had to
be tested. Methods used to test the coal were rudimentary and generally relied on
assessments based on visual results – reflecting limited scientific knowledge and
understanding of coal and its properties. This was evident in a number of tests done in
1902, where several Transvaal coal “specimens” were tested for the naval and railway
markets.53 An engineer officer of the British naval ship ‘H.M.S. Thrush’ compared two
samples by burning them simultaneously. Placing the samples on the front of a fire, he
observed that they would ignite and then crumble rapidly, “giving a fierce heat for a short
period.”54 After receiving two firings in the front the coal would then be spread
throughout the furnace. An iron pricker would be used to prod the coal, spreading ash.
Hard, burnt pieces, known as “clinker”, were “easily broken” by the fire iron, so that they
collected with the ash through the bars.55 High quantities of ash and clinker were signs of
poor quality. Another measure of quality was calorific content – established through units
of water turned into steam by a single unit of coal.56 Calorific content requirements
52 National Archives of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as NASA), Government Native Labour
Bureau, 1904-1950 (GNLB) 304/427/18, ‘Glossary of Certain Words Used in Collieries and Mentioned in
this Report,’ December 18, 1918
53 NASA, Governor of the Transvaal (GOV) 588/PS/290/01 Ibid. Report on Two Specimens of Transvaal
Coal, Trials of Transvaal Coal for Use on British Ships, by R. Hingston, Engineer Officer of H.M.S.
Thrush, August 9, 1902
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Calories are commonly used to derive the energy content of carbon, such that when combustion takes
place, the energy that is released may be measured in units. A 1933 study defined calorific value as the
measurement “in units that refer to the number of pounds of water that can be transformed into steam by a
pound of the special coal in question” See Witbank News, 18th August, 1933, p. 3
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depended on the specific needs of consumers, resulting in considerable insecurity for
prospective Transvaal colliers.57
A second obstacle in the development of the Witbank coal industry was the lack of
adequate transport infrastructure. This began to change in 1895 with the construction of a
railway from Pretoria to the port of Lourenço Marques along Delagoa Bay in Portuguese
East Africa.58 The establishment of the Witbank station sped up industrial development.
As the cost of transport decreased, Witbank coal was absorbed into the bunker trade.
Transvaal coal was now more easily marketable to international trade networks. Early
commercial trade of coal between the Transvaal-based coal companies relied on varied
export markets and public tenders. Standard practices indicated specifications for coal
composition, including size, presence of rock, shale or foreign matter.59 The chemical
properties of coal were an important consideration for consumers, particularly sulphur
content, which could not be removed from the coal through existing methods.60 The
organic sulphur content, infused “fairly uniformly”61 through chemical bond with
hydrocarbons in the coal, was often too high to meet export standards. With time, and
rapid industrial advances, larger chunks of coal referred to as ‘nuts’ or ‘peas’ were sold.
Profits were still curtailed by the rejection of enormous amounts at the pithead. Quality of
coal was only determined once it was brought to the surface, resulting in the dumping of
large quantities of rejected coal. Colliery dumps of this time “rivaled those of the gold
mines,” permanently altering the landscape of the rapidly transforming district.62
The South African war temporarily halted the growth of the new coal industry. Post-war
figures by 1902 were a mere quarter of 1898 figures of approximately two million tons,
57 Naval and railway markets demanded high quality coal, but use for poorer quality coal, or ‘duff’ coal,
would arise over time.
58 Jewish Life in the South African Country Communities, Vol. 1, SA Friends of Beth Hatefutsoth,
Johannesburg, 2002, p. 102
59 11.19 Kilojoules per kilogram (kJ/kg) was the average calorific value of bituminous coal in Witbank, but
12.5 Kilojoules per kilogram was the minimum accepted value for railway or naval use, posing early
challenges to the marketing of Witbank coal.
60 NASA, Colonial Treasurer (1900 - 1910) (CT) 150/T33/441 ‘Miscellaneous: Supply of Coal to
Mauritius’, Mauritius Government Gazette, No 1., January 4, 1909
61 Camm, A, ‘Sulphur in Coal and its Removal’, Mining Engineer, 151, 361, October 1991, Institute of
Mining Engineers, p. 118
62 ‘Miscellaneous’, Mauritius Government Gazette, No 1
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but the industry recovered quickly. Early twentieth century fortune seekers flocked into
the district. When it became clear that the elusive gold seams simply did not exist, many
prospectors turned to coal. This seemed a secure investment; the Highveld plains
provided ample and affordable coal-bearing ground. Thick, shallow and unfaulted seams,
coupled with cheap labour, meant that coal could be cheaply mined.63
By the turn of the century, production of coal had slightly increased. The urban
settlement began to grow with “about 60 or 70 people (who) had built their homes – very
haphazardly – around the original hostelry.”64 The shanty town came to be known as
Witbank - ‘wit’ referring to the characteristic white sandstone outcroppings of the
district.65 The township of Witbank was established in 1903 by Samuel Stanford, who
had originally arrived in the Middelburg district as a trader in the 1880s. He spent time
setting up a trading store near the farm, Zeraatsfontein, and surveying it for coal. The
farm owner, Jacob Taljaard, let Stanford survey the farm property, where he found a
thick seam of coal. The existence of coal in the district was “anything but a secret” but
Stanford was the first to “enlarge the scale of mining from the mere picking up of stray
pieces to systematic exploitation.” 66
Through investment from the Neumann Group, Stanford founded the Witbank Colliery.
Soon after, the town was laid out in 1903, within relatively close proximity of the
numerous workings. While the Witbank Colliery exerted an inordinate influence over the
new settlement, colliery management showed little consideration for the adverse effects
of the underground mining within the town boundaries. In July 1904, Mr. Tamplin-
Lewis, acting manager of the colliery, made an application to the Office of the
Commissioner of Mines in Johannesburg to “obtain permission to carry on ordinary
Mining operations under the proposed Township of Witbank.”67 Even with little official
63 Mendelsohn, R. Sammy Marks, p. 119
64 Ibid.
65 ‘Farming – In Witbank’, Witbank News, November 20, 1931
66 ‘Electrical Engineers Visit Witbank”, Witbank News, August 16, 1935, p. 5
67 NASA, Secretary to the Law Department, 1900-1925 (LD) 380/AG 1323/03 Letter from H.W. Smith,
Secretary to the Mines Department, to Office of the Commissioner of Mines, Johannesburg, July 9, 1904
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regulation over mining practices during this time, this application was rejected. The
Government Mining Engineer argued that
in view of the shallow depth at which mining is carried on at Witbank it is considered…that subsidences of
the surface (would) sooner or later take place which would endanger the safety of the persons residing in a
township built over such workings.68
H.W. Smith, Secretary to the Mines Department, argued that under Article 2, Section 2,
of the Mines and Works Regulations, mining “beneath the township in question should be
prohibited.”69 Tamplin-Lewis’s application was rejected on the basis that mining under a
built environment – namely, the town of Witbank – could compromise the structural
integrity of roads and buildings in the town, which would then become prone to
subsidence. This would endanger residents of the town. This legal exchange reflects
caution about the inherent dangers of underground mining. The environmental risk to the
town’s future was recognized, but only insofar as it threatened potential future capital
investment.
Mining remained a staple economic activity in the region - eclipsing alternative land uses
– especially agriculture. This is illustrated in the case between the Witbank Colliery and
Daniel Jacobus Malan, a local Witbank farmer. In November, 1904, Malan appeared at
the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of the Transvaal. The plaintiff, Witbank
Colliery, had concerns over the terms of their contract with Malan, who had ceded the
mineral rights to his farm ‘Blesboklaagte’ in 1898, “without restriction and in
perpetuity,”70 while coal operations were still taking place on the adjoining farm. In the
interim, Malan had constructed several buildings upon his land, violating the terms of his
contract. As a result, the Mining Department, “acting under their duly promulgated
Mining Regulations,” refused to allow the Witbank Colliery to continue mining
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 NASA, Registrar of the Supreme Court of the South African Republic and of the Transvaal Colony,
1877-1910(ZTPD) 5/590/150/1905 Illiquid Case – Declaration – Witbank Colliery Ltd vs. Daniel Jacobus
Malan’, 1905
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operations under the buildings which Malan had constructed.71 The plaintiff thus argued
that the farmer had interfered with their “Mining Rights.” This particularly related to a
clause granting the Witbank Colliery
the right to sufficient ground for the sinking of shafts and wells, the making of excavation and other
facilities… together with a piece of ground sufficient for a siding on the railway… ‘minerals and mineral
rights’ (would)  include and comprehend the right to mine, dig and win gold, silver, diamonds, coal and
other minerals and metals of what nature soever.72
Was Malan even aware of the permanent changes to his agricultural land? Without his
testimony, this is impossible to prove. The nature of his contract with the Witbank
Colliery revealed early industry knowledge of the immediate environmental impacts of
coal mining. It serves as historic evidence of the accepted fact that building construction
could affect, or restrict, mining operations. It also revealed some indication of
preferential treatment of mining over agriculture as a national economic activity.
Finally, Malan’s case reflects the environmental challenges encountered by companies in
mining the Witbank coalfields. The industry had begun to cultivate economic growth for
the local district far more effectively than local agricultural markets. The distinction
between town growth and industry growth was thus often blurred; this had the result of
compromising legal decision making processes around continued mining in a rapidly
developing regional centre.
Environment and labour: twin costs of coal mining in Witbank: 1906 -1920
With intensified industrial transformation throughout the Transvaal, the ‘coal city’ of
Witbank rapidly emerged. An assessment of the town’s development provides
remarkable insight into the way energy was produced and consumed in the first two
decades of the twentieth century. In 1907 the Transvaal Coal Owners’ Association
(TCOA) further formalized the emerging coal industry. In the same year, an economic
71 NASA, ZTPD/5/590/150/1905 Summons from Registrar of Supreme Court to Sheriff of the Transvaal  to
‘command’ D.J. Malan to appear at the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of the Transvaal
72 Ibid.
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study conducted on the effect of power supply schemes in the Transvaal revealed far-
reaching obstacles in the process of energy production, particularly how difficult it was
for the coal industry to make ends meet. The study showed that the railways benefited
more from transporting the heavy cargo than the colliery owners of the pits benefited
from the sale of coal, especially “when one (took) into account the sale price of the
product at the pit head, as compared with the heavy rate per ton…for its conveyance to
the market.”73 The irregular supply and availability of railway trucks used to transport
coal to markets also held back production, frustrating Witbank’s colliery managers.
According to P. Dickson, manager of the Coronation Colliery in 1911, halting the steady
output of coal had ripple effects felt throughout the industry. According to his estimate,
being “idle” for 38 hours during July, 1911 had
represented a loss of about 3500 tons…and 30 hours during August which gave… a drop of over 3000
tons…these shortages had to be made up by overtime. Assuming that the other collieries in this district lost
to the same amount in proportion to their allotment, this would mean, without overtime, a loss of about 35
000 tons per month, approximately. The result would mean the closing of several of the gold mines for a
few days… if the administration could supply trucks regularly as requisitioned for, it would be a great relief
to the various colliery managers.74
In many cases, the burden of intermittent stoppages of coal loading fell upon the
labourers, whose long hours were often extended into overtime in order to minimize the
loss of productivity caused by lack of available transportation. The medical officer of the
Coronation Colliery had argued that the high number of labourers being admitted for
medical attention was directly related to the “amount of overtime worked,”75 but that it
was “difficult to avoid this”76 because of the need for continued output of coal to meet
contractual agreements with consumers when trucks were available.77
73 ‘Mr. Dalrymple on Power Supply Schemes and their effect on Transvaal Collieries’, SAE, April 1907, p.
60. Quoted in Christie, Renfrew, Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa, p. 40
74 NASA, GNLB/25/2288/11 Letter from P. Dickson, Manager, Coronation Collieries, Limited, to
Inspector, Department of Native Affairs, Witbank, October 5, 1911
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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Colliery owners were obliged to maintain strong relations with the South African
Railways. In a 1907 letter to the prime minister of the Transvaal, the secretary of one
company recognized the
...importance of the Railways as consumers at any rate assisting and encouraging within all reasonable
limits the Coal Mines and Coal Industries of the two Colonies concerned.78
Each colliery had to enter into a ‘Private Sidings Agreement’ in order to be able to
construct railway sidings at the station.79 Without this, they would be cut off from the
loading stations where bunker coal was loaded to be transported to the coast. In addition,
there was consensus amongst local colliery owners that the “shortsighted policy of
imposing railway rates (on the coal industry)… (had) successfully stifled any hope of
…building up or even maintaining the bunker trade.” 80
Despite restrictions, coal output in the Transvaal grew exponentially during this period. 2
345 427 tons of coal were sold in 1910. The Power Act was promulgated in 1910, and
under Section 27 the prime minister was given authority to grant licenses for the supply
of local municipal power. Market expansion thus rested largely on the electrification of
the town of Witbank itself.
By 1918, the Witbank Colliery was granted permission by the Governor-General-in-
Council to supply “electric current for lighting purposes” to the compound of
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association situated on the farm Blesboklaagte, previously
owned by Daniel Jacobus Malan.81 By 1920, permission had been granted by the Minister
of Mines under Section 27 for the Witbank Colliery to supply electric current to the
78 NASA, CT/146/T33/212 Correspondence between Secretary, Vereeniging Estates, Ltd, to the Prime
Minister of the Transvaal, Pretoria, July 25, 1907
79 Coals of the Witbank District, p. 25
80 ‘Coal – High S.A.R. Charges’ – South African Coal Estates (Witbank) Ltd, Annual General Report,
December 14, 1928, p. 7
81 NASA, Decisions of the Executive Council, 1910-1985 (URU) 367/1676 ‘Grant of permission’, Prime
Minister’s Office, Pretoria, 1918
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municipality of Witbank “for lighting and other purposes.”82 By 1921 the annual output
of the Witbank coalfield had increased to 6 947 362 tons.83.
Prior to the establishment of the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) in 1922, the
Witbank Colliery provided power generation through its ‘Main Generating Station.’84
The Witbank Power Station was built by Escom in 1926, but was staffed and operated by
the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company.85 At the time of its construction, the
Witbank Power Station was the largest in the Southern Hemisphere, stripped of its title
only with the later construction of the Klip Power Station in Vereeniging. It represented a
revolution not only in the way coal was marketed, but fundamentally in the methods used
to produce energy. The Witbank scheme would serve as an example to other towns of
how light and power should be supplied.86 A newly electrified Witbank would be
marketed as a model town in an attempt to draw the attention of industrialists,
representing “a landmark in the history of electricity in this country.”87
82 NASA, URU/367/1676 Memorandum, ‘Grant of permission’, Prime Minister’s Office, Pretoria, March
30, 1920
83 ‘Progressive Coal Totals,’ Witbank News, September 25, 1925
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid. Most of the electrical units were bought by the VFTPC to be resold, at a profit, to the gold mines.
With costs being subsidized through government funding, capital accumulation and profiteering by the
VFTPC was exorbitant.
86 ‘The Electricity Question’, Witbank News, August 27, 1926
87 Editorial, Witbank News, July 1, 1927
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Image 1: The regional offices of the Electricity Supply Commission in Witbank, Witbank News Collection,
undated (c. 1933)
Electricity was an amenity not extended to the hostels that housed the local migrant
labour force. Those residing in the local hostels worked for some of the largest collieries
in the district, including the Transvaal & Delagoa Bay, Cassel Coal Company and
Witbank Colliery.
Living conditions were generally poor. The cramped conditions in compounds were made
worse by poor sanitation and diet; the proximity of compounds to mining activity further
exacerbated public health conditions. Underground conditions were restricted by the
environmental constraints of the labour intensive pillar and bord method. Workers were
- 35 -
thus exposed to a number of impacts of coal-based pollution in both occupational and
living environments, including smoke, dust and chemical fumes.
Consisting mostly of migrant workers from rural South African districts, as well as
seasonal workers from across the national borders, the African workforce existed in a
“state of drudging toil, and wearing poverty.”88 The poor living and working conditions,
exposure to coal-based pollution and general lack of rights and long hours was
considered by the secretary of the regional Industrial and Commercial Union to be a
“horrible state of affairs…contrary to justice.”89 The message of this ‘dissident’ voice
was largely silenced by the pressure placed on managers to push workers to produce
more and more coal in line with growing markets.
The “unhealthy state of the coal mines” did not affect only African workers. Despite the
fact that white mine workers, mostly British or European skilled miners deployed by
companies to the region, earned up to nine times as much as the average African worker,
this placed them at no lesser risk to occupational exposure. If miners complained, they
would generally “get the sack.”90
88 Published letter from Thomas Mbeki, Secretary of Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU),
Middelburg branch, to Editor, Witbank News, May 7, 1926
89 Ibid.
90 NASA, GOV/1027/PS76/18/06 Correspondence, Anonymous, Cornelia Colliery, Viljoensdrift, Orange
River Colony, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 31, 1906
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Image 2: This undated, unlabelled photograph, found in the collection of the Witbank News, depicts a gang
of coal miners in the early years of Witbank’s coal mining industry. The notable inclusion of children
amongst the visibly impoverished group highlights the role of child labour on the coal mines. Witbank
News Collection, c. 1930s
Regulations around working hours were outlined in the Mines and Works Act of 1911,
but this did little to improve overall conditions. The causal relationship between coal-
based pollution and poor general health amongst coal workers was also poorly defined;
Herbert Payne, a local Inspector for Native Affairs in Witbank complained to the Native
Affairs Department in 1912 that workers were “overdriven”, given little time to “wash
themselves and to sleep.”91 Most collieries in the district still maintained twelve hour
shifts. Besides, the implementation of the regulations defined by the Mines and Works
91 NASA, GNLB/25/2288/11 Correspondence between Inspector of Native Affairs and the Director of
Native Affairs, May 21, 1912
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Act of 1911 was obstructed by the need to fulfil orders. Another factor was the high
demand for workers, and their ability to move from one colliery to another. Short-term
contracts made it more difficult to assess long-term health implications of intensive
exposure to coal-based pollution, including the ingestion of coal dust, the effects of
chemical exposure, as well as higher prevalence of tuberculosis and silicosis. By 1912,
tuberculosis had become a major health problem in the region, and a Tuberculosis
Commission was appointed to examine conditions.92 Colliery owners generally avoided
taking care of the sick, and workers affected by tuberculosis were generally
“repatriated.”93 Living conditions in the compounds did not improve.
A visit by the regional Medical Officer in November, 1916, revealed that the residences
attached to the Witbank Colliery were in many ways “defective and contrary to the
Regulations.” One response to the poor conditions in compounds, as well as the growing
pollution problem, was the emergence of an off-mine African community in locations on
the verges of the urban settlement.
The theory and practice of environmental legislation
Early twentieth century legislation recognized coal mining and combustion as a chief
pollutant. In fact, the problem was not restricted to a lack of legislation; it also extended
to the lack of enforcement of existing regulations. Legislation that complicated or
obstructed the advancement of profit within the coal industry was conveniently sidelined.
This section interrogates some of this legislation, particularly in relation to the production
of pollution, with the aim of establishing legal conceptions of coal-based pollution during
the early decades of the twentieth century.
The most immediately felt form of pollution related to coal mining involved the
displacement of the earth – however, this was not understood in terms of pollution, but
rather in terms of financial convenience. The risk of pillar collapse, with concomitant
92 ‘Notes on Basis of Approach to Appeal’, South African National Tuberculosis Association (SANTA),
National Appeal, 1962-1963, Johannesburg, p. 1
93 NASA, GNLB/304/427/18 Report of Committee Appointed to Enquire into Colliery Conditions, 1919
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outbreak of uncontrollable underground fires, was a constant threat to colliery owners. In
1906 the Witbank Colliery’s Secretary, H.G.L. Panchaud had written to the Acting
Government Mining Engineer in Johannesburg because of a controversy between them
and their neighbouring colliery. The Landau Colliery had requested the reduction of
pillars bordering the two separate workings.
Panchaud was opposed to this – he even described it as posing a significant threat for the
Witbank Colliery. This referred to the risk of pillar collapse as a result of weakened
integrity of the pillars. He also recognized that
in a coal mine there (was) always more or less danger of an outbreak of fire and that in case of such an
outbreak a 30` pillar would probably not be sufficiently thick to prevent the spread of the fire from one
colliery to another, whereas the 100` pillar might keep such a fire from spreading.94
Industry officials recognized the risk of underground fires breaking out, but there was
little knowledge of how to control them, and the conception that a 30` pillar was not
‘sufficiently thick,’ as opposed to a 100` pillar, was intuitive rather than scientific.
Another “objection” involved waste water “percolating through… from a neighbouring
mine in which mining and pumping operations” had been suspended.95 With no joint
application between the competing collieries, the discretion fell upon the Government
Mining Engineer, who referred to the Crown Law under Regulation 17.
Panchaud, speaking on behalf of the colliery’s Board of Directors, had argued that if the
Cassel Coal Company was granted permission to reduce the boundary pillars on their
side, their own potential output capacity would be reduced as they “would consider it
their duty to leave on this Company’s side of the boundary, a pillar of 85 feet, which
would mean sacrificing by this Company of 35` of coal through out the length of their
boundary.”96 While the Witbank Colliery reflected some concern over determining the
precise boundary pillars, these concerns were based primarily on economic expedience.
94 NASA, GM/5480/06 Correspondence between H.G.L. Panchaud, Secretary, Witbank Colliery, Ltd and
the Acting Government Mining Engineer, Johannesburg, November 27, 1906
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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The collapse of an underground mine ceiling as a result of compromised pillars would
have amounted to an enormous loss for the company. Water ‘percolating’ into the mine
was not understood in terms of the potential build-up of acid mine drainage, but rather as
an added cost in the production of coal for a market with extremely narrow profit
margins.
Early twentieth century archival records reflect some indication of government attempts
to control sources of pollution. A brief examination of some of the earliest South African
legislation has yielded evidence of consciousness of environmental constraints by policy
makers, as well as an acknowledgement of the role of the mining industry as a source of
pollution, particularly with regard to water resources. Regulation 22 of the Gold Law Act
(No 35) of 1908 stipulated that
no holder of a water right or mining title shall allow the refuse from battery or mining plant to flow or fall
into, pollute or make turbid the water of any stream, river or water course.97
While this legislation may have taken into account the potential of mining to pollute,
revealing a very specific knowledge and conception of the environmental impact of
industry, including coal mining, it did not specify how this could be prevented.
Regulation 7 (Part 1 and 2) of the Mines and Works Regulations Act (No 12) of 1911
attempted to deal with the fact that pollution of water sources was happening, in an
attempt to control the extent of the problem. Under no circumstances was it acceptable
for polluted water to “escape without having been previously rendered innocuous.”98 The
Act went on to define measures which should be taken to prevent consumption of
polluted water, including fencing off contaminated sites to prevent “inadvertent access”,
as well as posting notice boards “in suitable places to warn persons from making use of
such water.”99
97 NASA, Department of Health, 1900 – 1973 (GES) 2069/107/33 ‘Report of the Departmental Committee
of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies, 1943-1948
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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There are clear indications in the early legislation that it was understood that coal mining
contributed to the pollution of water and land sources, adversely affecting surface land
activities such as irrigation. A stipulation in the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters
Act No. 8 of 1912 also clearly reflected the extent to which the state prioritized mining.
Section 137 of this act appeased mining industry officials by asserting that “nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed as derogating from any powers or jurisdiction
conferred upon the Minister of Mines or any Mining Commissioner by any law relating
to mining for precious or base metals.”100 The jurisdiction of the Witbank coal industry
was thus protected by the state, often compromising alternate sources of land-based
economic output such as irrigation for agriculture.
In 1921 this Act was amended, citing coal mining and washing as a significant
contributor towards the creation of waste water contaminating rivers and streams. As
industrialization in the Transvaal progressed, there was a growing recognition of “the
large number of industrial processes in which problems of treatment and disposal of
polluting waste waters have to be considered, if river and stream pollution is to be
avoided.”101 The legal conception of industry-based pollution thus reflects considerable
appreciation of environmental risks of mining, but did little to disseminate standardized
practices for local authorities to utilize in the prevention or remedy of these inevitable
impacts. This can also be seen in government’s response to growing complaints of water
pollution in Section III of the Public Health Act (No 36) of 1919, where the responsibility
of water resource management was placed upon local authorities
for preventing the pollution so as not to endanger health of any supply of water which the public within its
district, has a right to use and does use for drinking purposes (whether such supply is derived from sources
within or beyond its district) …and for purifying any such supply which has become so polluted, and to
take measures (including, if necessary, proceedings at law) against any person so polluting any such supply
or polluting any stream so as to be a nuisance to health.102
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. See Section 137, Irrigation (Amendment) Act (No 8) of 1921.
102 Ibid.
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Witbank had been declared a local municipality in 1914, through significant financial
support from the Witbank Colliery. For the first decade of its existence, the Witbank
Colliery had, in effect, served as the local authority for the town. Hence, a very deeply
entrenched conflict of interest may be cited as a hindrance for the effective
implementation of the Public Health Act in Witbank. This was also constrained by a
limited comprehension of the extent to which coal mining actually polluted local natural
resources.
Changing conceptions of the ‘Coal City’: 1921-1933
Following the electrification of the town, and particularly after the establishment of the
Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) in 1923, with offices in Witbank, the Witbank
municipality began a campaign to attract further industry to the emerging industrial
centre.103 With an average annual output of six million tons, the basis of this campaign
was that Witbank was the ‘model’ town for Escom.104 This resulted in the up-scaling of
mining and levels of output throughout this decade. Local residents felt that the
government had a duty to support continued expansion through the “extension of the
lives of existing mines by a reduction in working costs, and the opening up of new
mines.”105 In 1927, Witbank became the “most efficiently and adequately lit town in the
Union”106 when the Mayor’s wife was called upon to switch on Escom’s ‘Electric
Lighting System.’107
With the rapid expansion of the gold industry, coupled with the steady growth of
secondary industry throughout the Transvaal, the demand for electricity had become a
matter of national priority. The Electricity Act of 1922 resulted in the formation of the
Electricity Supply Commission under Dr. van der Bijl in March the following year.108
103 The popular acronym for the Electricity Supply Commission was used until 1987 when it became
known as Escom. To ensure historical accuracy the anglicized version is used.
104 ‘Advert – Witbank Municipality’, Witbank News, May 14, 1926, p. 8
105 ‘State Aid for Mines’, Witbank News, June 5, 1925, p. 4
106 ‘Model Town – Lighting’, Witbank News, August 5, 1927, p. 4
107 ‘Official Opening of Electric Lighting System’, Witbank News, August 5, 1927, p. 5
108 Much of the early literature refers to the Electricity Supply Commission with an English acronym –
Escom – this changed when the term ‘Eskom’ passed into law in 1987.
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Escom was the outcome of recognition by government officials that electricity was both
“a public utility and an instrument of industry.”109 It was not a private company, and in its
creation “it was not intended to create an electricity supply monopoly.”110 As a public
works utility, Escom would function at cost.111 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Escom
worked according to these principles. This provided a sense of security to Witbank
authorities, presumably preventing any conflict of interest between various community
stakeholders.112 Escom provided new incentive for economic growth, and the local
industry was supported by the community, such that its establishment in the district was
almost certain. When Escom was taxed £600 for machinery in 1927, local debate ensued
about why this company was being treated differently to the coal companies, who were
not taxed, but were “engaged in what (was) practically equivalent to the operations of the
Electricity Supply Co., that is, the wresting of potential power from Nature.”113 This
impression of the coal industry and Escom reflects a common battle between industry and
the natural environment to harness its energy potential for economic growth. Whether or
not environmental impacts were understood, or felt, by residents, was secondary to the
perceived role of the coal industry, which defined Witbank’s very existence.
The Fuel Research Act of 1925 demonstrated increased control over natural resources by
the state by the mid-1920s. This Act made it mandatory for prospectors and miners to
submit information to the relevant state departments; it thus became easier to trace the
growth of the industry from this point, revealing key indicators of local conceptions
around coal use and resultant pollution.114
109 Merz, C.H., ‘Electric Power Supply’,(1920) Witbank News, January 20, 1933
110 Ibid.
111 ‘Cheap Electric Power: Work of the Electricity Supply Commission’, Witbank News, August 3, 1928, p.
5; While these principles guided Escom at this point, market forces precipitated political pressure over
time. This led to amendments, particularly regarding foreign investment and state support of local industry
and agriculture. The first amendment was made in 1947.
112 ‘The Electricity Question’, Witbank News, August 27, 1926, p. 4
113 ‘Attracting Industry’, Witbank News, September 23, 1927, p. 4
114 ‘The Springs-Witbank Coalfield’, Anhaeusser, C.R. & Maske, S. (eds), Mineral Deposits of Southern
Africa, 1969-1984, 1986, p. 1971
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The power company claimed that all poisonous gases, “such as the deadly carbon
monoxide,” were destroyed through the super-heated and rapid burning of the fuel.115
This total combustion prevented the atmosphere from becoming “unhealthy.”116
Remaining ash and clinker from the furnaces were transported to dumps, while the
massive amount of water used to produce steam was condensed and cooled in a pond
daily. These processes were cheap and convenient, and provided a supposedly safe way
of burning coal without poisoning the atmosphere.
While manual recording and later mechanical recording devices measured carbon dioxide
levels of coal combustion, these were not seen in terms of long-term atmospheric
pollution. Claims about improved burning processes, resulting in the safe consumption of
carbon monoxide, cannot be proven through such tests, neither are they likely. A lack of
environmental impact assessments from this time reflects how pollution was generally
measured at face value in the establishment of energy processes related to economic
growth. Did a smokeless power station really equal safe carbon emission? Claims
regarding public health not only reveal that industry officials acknowledged the potential
public health (and, indirectly, environmental) implications of coal mining, but also
marketed supposedly ‘cleaner’ processes as a means by which to placate general opinion.
By the mid-1930s, geology, along with chemistry, had become crucial for industrial
development. A geological study of the Witbank Coalfield was published, entitled Coals
of the Witbank District. The work was welcomed by the coal industry. The foreword was
written by John Roy, then-Chairman of the Collieries Committee of the Transvaal
Chamber of Mines.117 He boasted that “the collieries working in this area alone (were)
capable of producing all the coal required to fulfil the entire demands of the coal
trade.”118 Thirteen active collieries were recorded, including the Witbank Southern Area,
Witbank Central Area, Transvaal & Delagoa Bay, Landau, Anglo-French Navigation,
Schoongezicht, Middelburg Steam, Douglas (Witbank), Coronation (Kromdraai),
115 Light and the Municipality’, Witbank News, November 6, 1925
116 Ibid.
117 ‘Foreword’, Roy, John. Coals of the Witbank District. p. iii
118 Graham, Coals of the Witbank District, p. 3
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Clydesdale, Tweefontein & Waterpan, Minnaar and Kendal. The Witbank News
published extracts, and readers were urged to refer to the book itself for “proofs of these
interesting and surprising statements.”119
Conclusion
By the 1930s, the Witbank coal industry had grown into a significant producer of coal, as
well as a range of other mineral and chemical products. The coal market developed in
spite of numerous obstacles, including the absence of railways, truck shortages,
competition and poor coal quality. The economic activity stimulated by the successful
marketing of coal stimulated rapid urban expansion, as coal stimulated further growth.
The environment of the Witbank coalfield was severely compromised in the growth of
coal market. What legislation did exist was barely implemented, and generally placed the
onus on the industry, as well as the local municipal authorities, to deal with issues of
pollution from industrial waste – with few enforcement measures implemented. After all,
the local coal industry carried enormous political and economic leverage. Local
conceptions towards coal mining, and its environmental implications, were strongly
influenced by these power structures. The jurisdiction of the Witbank coal industry was
thus protected by the State, often compromising alternate sources of land-based economic
output. The following chapter deals with the impact of the Second World War as a
stimulus for industrial growth and expansion of coal mining production, as well as the
impact that this had on coal-based pollution in the Witbank district.
119 ‘The Coals of the Witbank District,’ Witbank News, January 22, 1932, p. 2
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Image 3: As the scale of production grew in Witbank, the transport of coal to markets became increasingly
important, and challenging. This image depicts a locomotor of the Witbank Colliery Ltd, where coal would
be loaded. Witbank News collection, undated
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Chapter Two
The effect of war: Witbank’s changing environment in a growing energy market:
1930-1947
Introduction
By 1930, the Witbank coal industry was a major producer of bituminous coal in South
Africa. Over the decade, the State began to prioritize industrial expansion, especially
immediately before and during the war years. It focused on building up its twin
parastatals, the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom), and the Iron and Steel
Corporation (Iscor). Coal thus experienced an increase in demand, with significant
development in mine engineering technology to yield greater quantities. This chapter will
assess conceptions of coal-based pollution in light of this industrial transformation,
particularly within the context of the Second World War. The rapid expansion of industry
stimulated more intensive forms of coal extraction, placing increasing pressure on
available natural resources in the Witbank district. This chapter explores how ideas
around coal-based pollution changed as a result of trends directly related to the war,
especially the use of unorthodox methods of underground mining to complement coal
production for the war effort. The contribution of the industry to the war industry was
celebrated during this time, and little emphasis was placed on the potential environmental
cost of intensified levels of production. Pollution was viewed as an unavoidable
consequence of industrial development and economic growth. Worsening environmental
conditions in Witbank by the end of the war rapidly changed perceptions of the gravity of
coal-based pollution.
Towards a ‘different’ kind of beauty
The continued industrial transformation of the Witbank coalfield, coupled with the
marketing of the town for other kinds of industry, resulted in largely positive perspectives
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of coal.  During the 1930s, with the steady expansion of the coal market Witbank gained
international recognition as providing the “principal coal beds” in South Africa.120 Many
investors now explored opportunities in the region with renewed interest. This included a
delegation of the Third Empire Mining and Metallurgical Congress, which toured the
region in April, 1930. The group was welcomed by John Roy, Governor-General of the
Transvaal Coal Owners Association (TCOA). Roy assured the visitors and their wives
that while the district was “possibly not (as) attractive as places previously visited,” it
was crucial for the “development of all other industries and the requirements of
mankind.”121 Roy made reference to the loveliness of the sunlit Transvaal highveld, with
its variety of flora and fauna, riverbeds teaming with wildlife, and tall grasses swaying
under an expansive blue sky. Witbank was clearly an unusual stopping point for the
pleasure-seeking traveller – but the town had appropriated its industrial accoutrement as a
new form of attraction. Witbank was appealing because of, and not in spite of, early
appearances of coal-based pollution.
Coal was seen as essential for sustained industrial transformation in the Witbank district.
This amounted to an aesthetic re-configuration of the natural environment. Coal-based
pollution was sublimated by the idealization of local environmental changes, including
the increasingly common appearance of a smoky horizon, dotted with smoke stacks and
black mountains of coal waste. In this sense, Witbank retained its status as an ideal
location for industrial development, despite having “very little claim to beautiful
scenery.”122 The town took on the qualities of “a different kind of beauty…in its dark
clouds of smoke which (could) be seen in every direction.”123 Conceiving the haze in
such a way was seen to be a symbol of progress - rather than the steady build-up of
atmospheric pollution. Signs of coal-based pollution were culturally linked to progress
and development for the region. Witbank Colliery was even featured in a picture postcard
advertising the town. The ‘Approach to Witbank Colliery’ featured power lines, smoke
120 Quoted by Governor General and representative of the Transvaal Coal Owners’ Association, John Roy,
to a delegation of the Third (Triennial) Empire Mining & Metallurgical Congress, ‘Empire Mining Visitors
– Inspect Witbank Mines & Industries’ Witbank News, April 25, 1930, p. 4
121 Ibid.
122 ‘Witbank: the Industrial Centre’, Witbank News, June 17, 1932, p. 8
123 Ibid.
- 48 -
stacks and dark smoke emissions alongside neatly planted wattle trees in the picture
framing the pathway leading to the colliery. Pollution was central to this aesthetic
construct, with dark, billowing fumes demonstrative of the wealth of the city. Not only
was pollution acknowledged as a distinguishing feature of the region, it was a way to
market the town. This resulted in the idiosyncratic ideological construction of the natural
landscape in line with the rapid industrial changes of the region.
Image 4: Postcard depicting ‘Approach to Witbank Colliery Co. Witbank’
Witbank News collection, undated
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Not everyone accepted the overwhelmingly positive perception of coal mining. Some
dissent could be seen in the pages of the Witbank News. For many, the place stood out not
because of the “beneficial employment afforded, nor… because of the trade advantages,”
but rather because of the “smoke nuisance.”124 The unprecedented growth of the coal
industry, coupled with the lack of state regulation over industrial emissions, during these
decades meant that opposition to coal-based pollution would go unheard for decades to
come. The appearance of severe localized evidence of coal-based pollution had a direct
impact of the daily lives of local residents, but even “the silent curses of housewives,
residents and visitors… must… have nearly blasted the smoke stack.”125
A ‘superhuman’ battle against spontaneous combustion
One of Witbank’s biggest headaches…126
Witbank’s underground coal mines would regularly burst into flame. The appearance of
fires was a significant challenge for colliery management. Once underground fires broke
out, they were largely inextinguishable. The typical coal face in an early twentieth
century underground mine was crudely exposed, with no preventive measures to ensure
safety. Fine coal particles were strewn around the mine, and few measures were taken to
ventilate the working area or wet the coal. This had the effect of exposing a large surface
area of coal to oxidation. The layer of soil above the mine tended to dry out and subside,
allowing “continuous free entry of air into the workings.”127 The high pyrite content of
the coal made the coal more susceptible to combustion and constant self-generation.128
Flames could be doused, but the subterranean coals would continue to smoulder. Fires
also had the effect of compromising the stability of the surface above the mine, with
widespread subsidence. The fragmented surface, with “crown holes” and “deep tension
cracks” thus allowed oxygen in, facilitating combustion.129 Once burning, coal could no
124 ‘Witbank Colliery’, Witbank News, January 21, 1927
125 Ibid.
126 ‘Paxton Road Safe from Flames’, Witbank News, October 2, 1981, p. 64
127 Bullock, S.E.T. Bell, F.G. ‘Some problems associated with past mining at a mine in the Witbank
coalfield, South Africa’, Environmental Geology, 33, 1, December, 1997, p. 68
128 Ibid. p. 65
129 Ibid. p. 68
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longer be used. Land affected by underground fires was usually abandoned, resulting in
significant financial losses for the coal company.130
In July 1926 a fire erupted in the main shaft of the Witbank Colliery. Representing
millions of pounds of losses for a company which largely controlled the town, a blaze in
the colliery was breaking news. The fire was reported and debated in both the media and
company meetings. It was described as representing “a terrific battle…waged with the
forces of nature on one hand, and really superhuman efforts by the mine staff and
employees on the other.”131 That the experience of dousing the flames was analogous to a
‘battle’ reveals an understanding of the natural environment held to the coal mining
industry. ‘Nature’ was seen as a realm to be dominated, controlled – and even defeated.
Within this paradigm, man was elevated to a ‘superhuman’ realm, suddenly able to wage
a ‘battle’ against the ‘forces of nature’ which held him back from his objectives. No
mention was made of the cause of the fire – and later reference to the underground fires
would argue that although “nobody (was) quite sure as to how the fires originally began,
it (was) thought that they (were) a result of the old coal seams catching alight by
spontaneous combustion.”132
Six months later, the underground fire still smouldered. The battle to extinguish it was
abandoned. Mining operations had to continue, and shareholders now focused on ways to
contain the fire. The coal face was isolated “by means of sand and water lowered through
boreholes sunk from the surface around the affected area.”133 The company gained some
recompense through an insurance settlement of £30 000. Within a year, operations around
the sealed off section continued to extract coal not affected by combustion. New shafts
were sunk on the Central section of the Witbank coal property.134 This reflected the
importance of continued and regular output of quality coal.
130 Ibid.
131 ‘Fire at Colliery’, Witbank News, July 9, 1926, p. 5
132 ‘Paxton Road Safe from Flames’, Witbank News, October 9, 1981, p. 3
133 ‘Witbank Colliery, Ltd. AGM: Witbank Colliery’s Prosperous Outlook’, Witbank News, January 14,
1927
134 ‘Witbank Colliery, Ltd. AGM: Bad Setback Last Year’, Witbank News, January 28, 1928
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This experience proved that while the dangers of coal mining did exist, they were
controllable – and, besides, the need for continued mining outweighed its risks. This
example of what could go wrong in a coal mine was soon forgotten. By the early 1930s,
electric coal cutters and centrifugal pumps had increased the potential output of the
workable coal seams. Owing to the relative dryness of the mines, these pumps were often
“excessively corroded” by acidic mine water which would then be released into
surrounding river and ground water catchments.135 The colliery assured the public that
even though instances of gas had been found in the Central area, ventilation was
“(e)specially efficient.”136 Measures such as safety lamps were “obligatory,” but there
was an assurance that “no explosions (had) ever taken place in the history of the
district.”137 The Witbank Colliery declared that Witbank coal was “specially noted for its
freedom from any tendency towards spontaneous combustion.”138 Such claims could be
made, in spite of the July 1926 fire, as the cause of the fire had never been established.
Still, there was no certainty that such incidents would not recur. In spite of the visible
risks of coal mining, the industry continued to develop and expand into the 1930s.
Marketing energy
The influence of the Witbank Colliery had long been the basis for Witbank’s economic
growth and expansion. This was consolidated throughout the 1920s, as the company
began to expand its scope in the production of electricity. In 1920, under Section 27 of
the Power Act of 1910 of the Transvaal, the company was granted permission to “supply
electric power to the Town Council and Municipality of Witbank.”139 Signed by the
Minister of Mines and Industries, this permission was granted for ten years, with rates not
exceeding 3 pence per unit. The electric power would be supplied on a “3-phase
alternating system of 50 cycles per second… and the point of delivery… in the
135 Ibid.
136 ‘Witbank Coalfields’, Witbank News, August 18, 1933, p. 3
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 NASA, URU/444/1015 Memorandum, ‘Grant of permission to Witbank Colliery to supply electric
current to the municipality of Witbank’, April 22, 1920
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Company’s Main Generating Station at its Colliery.”140 The company had also arranged
to sell most of its generated power to the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company
(VFTPC).141 Coal was readily available in Witbank, but a central concern of the VFTPC
was the availability of water for the station. In January, 1924, the VFTPC appealed to the
Water Court in Pretoria for permission to impound water from the Olifants River for the
Witbank Station.142 The present license of the VFTPC did not allow them to supply
power outside of the Rand, but they sold most of their power to Escom, who, in turn,
supplied power to the South African Railways. A representative of the VFTPC argued to
the Water Court that as Escom expanded, “their demand for water (would) increase.”143
Image 5: Advertisement for Witbank, Witbank News, December 12, 1930
140 Ibid.141 Christie, Renfrew, Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa, p. 56
142 NASA, Secretary of the Department of Mines and Industries, 1902-1950 (MNW) 711/MM/1172/24
‘Application for the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company’, Water Court, Pretoria, January 7, 1920
143 Ibid.
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By 1927, Escom’s national grid was complete. This was referred to as its first ‘Electric
Lighting System.’144 Soon, more power stations were constructed near known reserves of
coal, allowing for reduced capital expenditure. Their proximity to coal and water helped
reduce the costs involved in coal production. These included the Klip, Wilge and
Vierfontein power stations, all providing coal-fired power to the national electricity grid
serviced by Escom.
A rapidly expanding energy market required cheap and abundant supplies of coal.
Transvaal power stations of the 1920s were designed accordingly. Where coal quality
was poor, carbon concentration was reduced, and the existence of impurities was greater.
Stacks were constructed with the capacity to burn at higher or lower temperatures,
enabling the consumption of low quality coal. The Witbank Colliery saw this as the
“commencement of an assured market for… duff coal.”145 The creation of such a market
for duff coal was met with mixed responses from the coal industry. Despite the certainty
of markets, the selling price for duff coal remained extremely low, and could “scarcely be
reckoned a profitable part of the work of any colliery.”146 This was countered with the
argument that the benefits of the power stations would result in further investment in the
Witbank area, leading to greater consumer markets for coal. The Power Companies
Commission had argued that the use of duff coal would conserve coal resources,
preventing the build-up of coal waste sites.147 In fact, the coal dumps continued to grow.
At least one of these was situated in the central business district of Witbank.148
Duff coal may have aided the economic ‘conservation’ of coal resources, but its
consumption exacerbated environmental conditions. Burning low quality coal released
significantly more fly ash into the atmosphere than higher quality stock. Fly ash,
previously referred to as clinker, was the ashen residue of coal combustion. The chemical
composition of fly ash was complex, and often retained the sulphur, magnesium and
144 ‘Official Opening of Electric Lighting System’, Witbank News, August 5, 1927, p. 5
145 ‘Witbank Colliery Ltd. Annual Meeting, January 8, 1926’, Witbank News, January 22, 1926,  p. 2
146 ‘Coal and the Immediate Danger’, Witbank News, October 30, 1931
147 Christie, Renfrew. Electricity, Industry and Class, p. 41
148 The coal dump in the centre of the town was eventually ‘packed’ underground, supposedly making the
ground solid enough to endure the weight of building on the surface. See Interview with Malcolm Suttill,
De Heuwel, Witbank, June 3, 2008
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mercury, amongst other minerals, found in the fossil fuel. Coal combustion at higher
temperatures in the numerous power stations further reduced the emission of sulphur into
the atmosphere. This gave some credence to the public conception that household
silverware would not “tarnish so easily” in the era of domestic electrical power “for there
(was) much less sulphur in the air.149 South African coal was typically low in sulphur
content. Still, at least half of the sulphur remained in the pervasive fly ash. This was
spread by wind and rain throughout the district, gradually polluting land resources of the
district, and shifting perceptions of coal-based pollution.150
Responsibility for tackling concerns around pollution was retained by the Department of
Mines and Industries. This was emphasized in a 1931 letter by then-Minister of External
Affairs J.B.M. Hertzog, advising the British Water Pollution Research Organization to
contact the Secretary of the Department of Mines and Industries “for any information it
may desire on the subject of the pollution of rivers in the Union of South Africa.”151 The
Department of Mines and Industries acknowledged the existence of pollution as a
consequence of coal mining and combustion, but little was done to ameliorate conditions.
Monitoring and preventing industrial pollution was not a priority, particularly in light of
the value of electricity in speeding up industrialization. Witbank had been elevated from
the “poverty of a sparsely populated veld to the wealth of a populous and progressive
town.”152 The environmental costs of this were thus seen as unavoidable.
Before electricity, energy creation for domestic cooking and heating had involved the
onerous use and maintenance of coal. One housewife quoted in an Escom publication
argued that even those who missed the romantic “crackle and traditional appeal” of a coal
fire were “willing to concede the immense usefulness of the electric heater.”153 On the
surface, coal-fired electrical energy appeared to be entirely safe, clean and economical.
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This type of maneouvring typified Escom’s marketing strategy. The power company
aimed at creating further need for electricity, and encouraged the higher purchase of
numerous household electric appliances. It emphasized the new convenience, and even
luxury, attained by those on the power grid. This early marketing strategy entrenched the
association between electricity and modernity. A 1933 engineering publication described
electricity as providing salvation from the “dirt, depression and disease” and “oppression
of the smoke pall.”154 These would be eradicated and replaced with “cleanliness,
brightness and health… as the work done by the steam engine and the coal fire (was)
taken over by electric motors and electric radiators and cookers.”155 Escom played on a
moral panic that emphasized access to energy as the only way of preventing an atavistic
throw-back to pre-industrial conditions where housewives would be reliant on dirty,
onerous coal fires to get their work done. Without power, the progress of industry and
urban development would be lost, but the potential costs of this were not discussed.
Escom’s domestic consumer market was thus stimulated through altering the general
perception of an acceptable standard of living. In part, pressure to conform to this new
lifestyle resulted in the production of an energy market.156 While the grid already existed,
the marketing of coal-fired power was geared towards the production of a new domestic
consumer, firmly establishing Escom’s political and economic importance.
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Coal: 1000 uses for man
(The) power stations are here… the mines are here… we have coal. You look at industry – there is steel – it
is here.157
The emergence of a local steel industry was a major turning point for coal expansion.
This was illustrated in early 1927, when the Iron and Steel Industry Bill was read in
parliament twice, reflecting the political significance of industrial growth at the time.
Addressing parliament, the Minister of Defense, Colonel F.H. Creswell, argued that “the
whole material” of modern civilization had emerged “from the discovery… that the heat
energy locked up in coal could, by the intervention of suitable machines made of iron, be
converted to a 1000 uses for man.”158 Industrial growth and moral enlightenment were
enmeshed within this understanding of coal-fired power. The Iron and Steel Industry Bill
passed quickly through parliament. The Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor) was
established in 1928, chaired by Dr Hendrick van der Bijl. The parastatal would stimulate
the local production of steel to ease over-reliance on imported steel.
In 1928 the Minister of Justice, Tielman Roos, argued that the great abundance of easily
obtainable, high-quality coal could “never mean a great export trade by itself.”159 This
resonated within the Witbank coal industry, particularly with the discovery of abundant
coal measures suitable for use in the process of steel production. Coking coal was
generally of a higher quality than most bituminous coal. This made it possible for it to
undergo a distillation process to remove its volatile components. The solid-fuel product
could then be used, with iron, in the production of steel. Suitable coking coal was found
in the Navigation Colliery of the SA Coal Estates (Witbank).160 Iscor negotiated a
157 Interview with Kaizer Mabena, representative of the Emalahleni South African National Civic
Organisation (SANCO), SANCO Offices, Thushanang, June 4, 2008158 Houghton, H. and Dagut, J. (eds.) Source Material on the South African Economy: 1860-1970, Volume
3, 1920-1970, (eds.) Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1973, p. 92
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Feltham and Ford, Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyances, and the Minister of Justice in Pretoria, re:
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contract for a provisional 25 000 raw tons of good coking coal per month to be delivered
to the Pretoria steel works.161 This resulted in broader recognition of Witbank as a site for
industrial development, and by 1934, the first South African steel was tapped.162 A 1936
marketing brochure of Witbank, introduced by Dr van der Bijl, highlighted the town as
ideal for “the industrialist seeking a location for his activities.”163 Escom had been
successful in its efforts to crystallize the domestic market for electricity. Energy
requirements had steadily grown over the decade, and by 1939, general electricity
consumption had increased over 17 per cent from the previous year.164
The modernity heralded by domestic electrification did not extend to the separated
African locations which, by the end of the war, had thousands of residents. Thushanang
was incorporated into a greater area known as Kwa-Guqa; other areas included Vosman
and Hlahlanikahle. These areas had been constructed specifically to fall outside of
Witbank’s municipal boundary.165
Industrial growth and ecological effects during the Second World War
The rapidity of South Africa’s war-era economic growth was unprecedented, with
concomitant implications for Witbank’s environment. Sudden demand from a range of
both domestic and foreign buyers required quick increases of output. Industrial expansion
grew exponentially, owing largely to foreign geo-political uncertainties which stimulated
foreign demand for local coal. Geological surveys done in the Witbank coalfields placed
the extractive potential of the entire district at “roughly” 4 ½ trillion tons. The global total
output estimate at this point was just under 1 ½ trillion tons.166 Foreign investors looked
towards Witbank more closely than ever before for cheap raw and coking coal. The
Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd, the company had been floated in 1920 to take over the assets
liabilities of the pre-existing Transvaal Navigation Coal Estates and Cassel Coal Company Ltd.
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extractive capacity of most coal mines was thus stretched to the limit. Railways were
equally hard-pushed to transport the bulky commodity. Witbank’s numerous collieries
were overwhelmed with orders, and mine expansion was necessary to meet demands.
Politician and industrialist, Dr Hendrik van der Bijl, became the Director-General of War
Supplies in 1938. He headed the construction of forty new factories, and the conversion
of over six hundred factories to support the war effort. This included Iscor, which had
expanded its ingot steel capacity, effectively becoming a war factory.167 Industrial
activity was sped up to meet the needs of the war-oriented state. This placed heavy
demands upon the coal industry, whose profit margins were narrow. Instead of raising
capital for new mining companies, Dr van der Bijl suggested that “the balance of the
requirements” of coal orders could be provided by the existing collieries. This would
involve extracting the “millions of tons of coal… left either on the floor or roof of their
miles of workings.”168 The coal had been left behind in adherence to the safety
requirements of environmental engineering design to ensure the structural integrity of the
ceiling, as well as for its relatively low calorific value. At a time when industry needed it
most, the “low cost would more than compensate for its admitted low grade.”169 With war
time inflation, and narrow profit margins, it was more economically viable to return to
abandoned mining sites to extract the remaining coal from pillars left to hold up the
ground. This secondary extraction violated fundamental principles of environmental
engineering employed in the initial design of the underground mines.170
Also known as ‘pillar robbing’, this method “had a marked effect on the environment.”171
Pillar and bord mines had been designed according to a “chequer-board” system of
pillars, generally six square metres thick.172 In light of the demands of a voracious
167 Ibid.
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economy, these spherical pillars were “whittled down to the narrowest possible safety
margin.”173 While the original rate of extraction was approximately 75 per cent of
underground coal, subsequent pillar robbing resulted in only 25 per cent of the original
pillars being left behind. This created a higher likelihood of collapse.174 When the pillars
were robbed, what remained of them had to hold up the weight of the mine ceiling,
placing tremendous pressure on the strata above and below the mine.175 If the
compression was too great, subsidence would occur. This meant that the surface layer of
compressed topsoil would drop down to the floor level of the underground workings. The
release of oxygen into the workings through crevices, or crown-holes, would feed
smouldering underground fires, increasing the density of steam and toxic smoke visible at
the surface.
Even as closed mines in the Witbank coalfield were robbed of pillars during the war
years, up to two thousand tons of duff and low grade coal were dumped daily at
Witbank’s numerous waste sites. Despite “the immense tonnage of good coal that (was)
dumped as waste in Witbank,” it was neither economically viable nor technically feasible
to rehabilitate the dumps.176 While ‘recycling’ waste coal for local markets may have
sufficed, the quality required for foreign markets was generally higher, and the technique
was not put into place.
The influence of the war on the steel industry was noted by Dr. van der Bijl in 1940. He
argued that “no special steels” had been produced prior to the war.177 The war had
stimulated economic conditions for the production of “steels considered by experts to be
equal in quality to the finest steels produced in any part of the world.”178 The “destruction
of plant and equipment” in Britain had resulted in pressure placed on the South African
Union to “supply a very wide area” with steel.179 Iron and steel showed the greatest
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174 Bell, F.G. et al. ‘Environmental Impacts’, p. 1
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expansion in the manufacturing sector, doubling net output from 9 to 18 per cent of total
industrial output during the war years.180 In light of this, the SA Coal Estates (Witbank),
whose contract with Iscor had been successfully maintained, was exhorted to speed up
production. To ease pressure at the Pretoria steel works, the company erected a crushing
and washing plant for preparing coking coal on site. This plant was, at the time, “the
largest of its kind in the southern continent.”181 By December, 1940, “the largest
particular increase” in the supply of coking coal was to Iscor, which had passed the ½
million tons mark.182 The Navigation pit was worked extensively, yielding an annual
output of ¾ of a million tons - apparently “without strain.”183 The new Iscor contract
came into effect in 1942, increasing output expectations “to capacity of about one million
tons, all of which (would) be coking coal for the steel works in Pretoria.”184 Between
1940 and 1942, total annual output grew at an average of 556 423 tons per annum.
The Witbank Colliery more than doubled the yield from its reserves between the mid
1930s and the mid 1940s. While 68 934 tons were produced in February, 1935,
representing an average monthly output figure, by April, 1943, the average monthly
output figure was just over 108 000 tons.185 The available monthly average output figures
for the Coronation Colliery reveal a similar rapid expansion during this decade,
coinciding with war-related economic expansion. Coal output for February, 1935, was 48
563. This more than doubled to 103 018 tons by December, 1943. By the early 1940s,
both collieries of the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Company, including the
Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Colliery and the Douglas Colliery, were worked to their
maximum capacity.186 Increased demand for coal related to the war-time economic
conditions did not always result in accumulated profits for the coal companies. The
Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Company complained that working at maximum
180 Feinstein, C.H., Economic History of South Africa, p. 124
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pressure had incurred “considerable capital expenditure."187 As far as the shareholders
were concerned, colliery owners had responded to government calls for increased
production. They had delivered on their responsibility, but received “no benefit whatever
in the way of additional profits” and sensed that they were “depleting (their) reserve of
coal entirely in the interests of the state.”188 Colliery owners also complained about heavy
taxation, and the extent to which it was “wise or equitable to tax so heavily a company…
which (was) exploiting a wasting asset.”189 According to the available coal figures, the
height of wartime coal production took place between 1942 and 1944, after which it
began to tail off. Out of the four coal companies presented, only the South African Coal
Estates (Witbank) experienced sustained growth during the years immediately following
the war.
The end of the war signaled a shift in the industry. Many collieries had exhausted their
reserves. While some underground fires continued to burn, coal companies systematically
exhausted the available coal reserves on their expansive land holdings. Mounting
pressure during the war to produce coal, irrespective of economic or environmental
constraints, had resulted in severe environmental implications.
This included underground fires, water pollution and the collapse of the ground surface at
exhausted mines, including Middelburg Steam, Station, Uitspan, Apex, Transvaal and
Delagoa Bay Colliery and Coronation Colliery.190 Where it was observed, collieries had
little space or incentive to remedy coal-based pollution. The demands of the war had
taken a toll on the natural resources of the Witbank district.
Post-war conceptions of coal-based pollution
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The political significance of the Witbank coalfields during the war meant new threats of
military attack by Italian or German forces from the north of Africa.191 Security officials
argued that there would be at most thirty minutes warning of enemy planes approaching
from the coast before the town was “plunged into inky blackness.”192 Fears existed that
the Witbank blackout would be rendered futile because of the self-sustaining mine dump
fires. They became “beacons…not only to Witbank, but Pretoria and the
Witwatersrand.”193 The Axis powers never did invade Witbank, but a trial thirty minute
blackout took place in 1942.194 This attempt to make Witbank disappear – and, with it,
the fruits of rapid industrial progress - was wholly disorienting. One pilot witnessed the
attempt to hide the town in the countryside. He later described seeing the town “popping
out here and there like bursting bubbles…there was the last section of street lights in
Witbank off and – absolute blackness.”195 His account provides insight into the way
electricity was conceived by the mid-twentieth century: a return to wilderness, through
the removal of power sources like electricity, seemed surreal, and “for a moment, (he)
was assailed with the erie (sic) feeling of having lost the world.”196 After having
momentarily lost the world, the pilot was “comforted by the mine dumps glowing cozily,
seemingly flirting with one another as the flames winked in the breeze.”197 From an aerial
vantage point, the dumps took on an ethereal dimension, ‘cozily’ framing the product of
their own making: the coal town of Witbank.
The harsh socio-economic conditions of the war popularized the idea of economizing
resources. Rations existed for everything from petrol to paper. Natural resources, and
their relative scarcity, were reconceived. The reclamation of abandoned workings for
alternate land uses was never enforced by government, even when agricultural interests
were compromised. The gravity of the pollution, which involved loss of arable land,
clean air and potable water for sustainable urban development, was only partially
understood. The immediate impact of coal-based pollution was evident in the aging coal
191 ‘Blackout: Witbank’s Next Trial Announced’, Witbank News, June 5, 1942, p. 2
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dumps and smoky Witbank horizon, but the diffusion of pollution was not as extensive as
it would later become.198 A silent process of acid mine drainage (AMD) had been
triggered by the extensive mining of the war years: the oxidation of pyrite from displaced
strata within the coalfields gradually altered the pH balance of the water, resulting in
highly acidic polluted waters entering the streams and catchments supplying the town. In
turn, acidic surface water would enter river catchments, leaching particles out of the soil,
including various heavy metals like iron, aluminium and magnesium. Abandoned shallow
underground coal shafts were often recharged as a result of rain water, affecting water
tables in the district. The collapse of underground structures were contributing factors in
the rising occurrence of acid mine drainage into river catchments leading into the town
and surrounding district.
With the war-time growth of urban settlements, the severity of pollution increased. One
resident later associated a “time when there (were) not so many companies” with a “good
environment.”199 The danger of subsidence was not restricted to the remote industrial
outskirts of the town – but also affected the town itself. By the mid-1940s, new
regulations were established regarding land “which would have been of great value for
building on.”200 Buildings were not allowed because they were undermined, posing the
risk of subsidence “several feet below the surrounding level.”201 By 1944, the town had
the atmosphere of a city of as many tens of thousands of people…it (was) closely packed and congested to
the point of bursting in the place where there should be room to breathe.202
The war had accelerated the gradual build up of pollution which could no longer be
ignored. Government Notice No. 871, dated the 2nd of June, 1944, constituted a
significant shift in State conceptions of coal-based pollution. The notice announced the
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establishment of the inter-departmental Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and
Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies. It was appointed by the Minister of Welfare and
Demobilization
to enquire into, report upon and make recommendations…in connection with the incidence throughout the
Union of bacterial and chemical pollution of water supplies used or which may be used for domestic
purposes, including livestock, both in urban and rural areas.203
Chaired by Dr. A.J. van der Spuy of the Health Department, this committee included a
team of experts from the Departments of Health, Public Works, Irrigation and
Agriculture. This research body made use of extensive “oral evidence tendered by the
Government Mining Engineer.”204 Existing legislation was analyzed – revealing that
while “wide legislative powers exist(ed) for the prevention of pollution… there (was)
little machinery to implement these powers.”205 In particular, the Public Health Act of
1919 placed the onus of preventing pollution of local water supplies upon local
authorities for purifying supplies which had become polluted, and for taking legal
measures against “any person polluting any such supply…so as to be a nuisance or
danger to health.”206 No regulations existed to guide local authorities on how they could
both prevent and mitigate waste water pollution of streams and rivers. None of this was
made public - an undated letter from the Secretary of Health to the Deputy Chief Health
Officer confirmed that this concern was being treated “as strictly confidential” as the
government had “not yet considered it fully.”207 By 1948, the Report of the Committee of
Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies was presented
in parliament.208 This report was the first to tackle the difficulty of implementing existing
legislation dealing with mining and industry-based pollution. It constituted an official
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state recognition of the inability of local authorities to control the effects of industrial
waste, particularly mining.
The report listed industries culpable in the production of waste water. Gold and coal
mining were notably placed at the top of this rather lengthy list of polluters. The pollution
was linked to a wide range of industrial production, revealing to the Committee the “large
number of industrial processes in which problems of treatment and disposal of polluting
waste waters have to be considered.”209 Contributing factors towards water pollution
were classified under three headings, including chemical, bacteriological/organic, and
mechanical. This did much to emphasize the relationship between coal mining and
pollution, but the rather narrow formulation of categories of pollution only partially
grappled with the multifarious, largely hidden, environmental implications of coal
production processes. Coal was cited in two out of the three technical classifications,
including ‘chemical’ and ‘mechanical’. While mechanical pollution was attributed to the
process of coal washing, the Committee argued that this could be “obviated by the simple
method of sedimentation.”210 Chemical pollution was defined as the
discharge of industrial effluents into rivers or streams, either directly or indirectly and in addition many
underground sources of supply (were) naturally polluted by an excess of chemical salts which render the
water unfit for consumption by man or beast or agricultural purposes. The discharge of such effluents,
especially those from gold and coal mines, (had) caused acute and chronic poisoning in stock and has also
rendered excellent arable land totally unsuitable for agricultural purposes.211
The report did not provide guidelines for resolving the problem, but it was an ecological
turning point in state conceptions of the environmental impact of the South African coal
industry. For the first time, the state fully acknowledged the adverse influence of mining
over alternate forms of resource management, such as agriculture. This provided some
agency to farmers, both black and white, whose livelihood had been devastated through
poisoned water sources and diminished land quality. The process of urbanization was
accelerated as farmers recognized the long-term implications of ceding mineral rights to
209 Ibid.
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companies like the Witbank Colliery – after all, their land had become ‘totally unsuitable’
for anything other than mining. With the loss of land use, a growing contingent of
Witbank residents, especially farmers, began to seriously question the viability of coal
mining in the district.
The relative impotence of agricultural bodies in preventing water pollution is reflected in
a 1946 Memorandum on the Irrigation Amendment Bill which was sent from the Director
of Irrigation to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department of Irrigation complained
that it was “hampered in its operations by a lack of certain legislative powers” despite
recognition “that the conservation of water (was) an undertaking of national
importance.”212 This had the effect of disempowering the Department from assisting in
the maintenance of irrigation works on riparian land affected by mining.
As collieries such as the SA Coal Estates and the Witbank Colliery exhausted their
existing reserves during the war, they abandoned shafts, either before or after extracting
the remaining reserves. By the late 1940s, many of these sites began to decant acid water
onto the surface, with the result that the Committee recognized that “many rivers and
streams, particularly those flowing through industrial areas, (were) badly polluted.”213
The Committee cited Section 137 of the Irrigation Act (No 8) of 1921, in an attempt to
“draw particular attention to the immunity enjoyed by the mines in discharging
chemically contaminated water into streams.”214 With continued industrial growth, and
the “provision of more houses with modern conveniences… there (was) certain to be an
appreciable increase in the next few years in the quantity of water of good quality
required.”215 Local authorities, particularly in Witbank, were neither politically nor
financially equipped to take on the dual responsibility of facilitating urban growth and
ameliorating coal-based pollution. The Witbank coal industry was largely unwilling to do
so, as the cost of rectifying water sources would be large and time-consuming. The
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compilers of the Report had sensed “general apprehension” from the coal industry, which
had come to regard the pollution as an inevitable opportunity cost of coal production.
While the report conceded that “absolute prevention of pollution” was not realistic, it
maintained that “by tightening up the present powers,” it was possible to reduce pollution
“down to reasonable limits without a serious additional charge on industry.”216
By accepting that pollution, on some level, was an inevitable part of industry, the
Committee abated the criticism of pro-mining government officials. At the same time, the
discussion introduced the complicated task of reducing and regulating pollution. In a
district with ongoing industrial activity, and widespread environmental damage, the
polluter was often tricky to isolate. It was not possible to blame the TCOA or Chamber of
Mines, and expect these representative organizations to deal with the accumulated
pollution that had begun to spread throughout the district.
Individual collieries were hardly ever held liable, even if the relationship could be
proven, as this was generally “impossible to do after the impact occurred, the mine had
been closed or the company was dismantled.”217 The Committee argued that “the average
member of the community hardly realize(d) the problems of water supply and the
precautions necessary in protecting gathering grounds and wells from being polluted.”218
The reason for lack of interest in urban areas was attributed to the reliable supply of clean
water from local authorities. This argument suggested that there was little incentive for
urban dwellers to question the availability of water, especially in a town like Witbank,
where most industry – and employment – was somehow connected to the coal industry.
With only limited impact on natural resources, many chose not to notice the gradual
changes in their environmental conditions.
The ‘tightening up of power’, as suggested by the Committee to reduce the risk of water
pollution, included setting up regional water control boards which would represent
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populations. This proposal was aimed at creating “a greater interest being taken by the
people.”219 One of the main duties of the water control boards would be to enforce
existing legislation in the prevention of “undue pollution of water sources.”220 The
Committee did not outline what constituted a ‘reasonable’ level of pollution,
demonstrating limited scientific conceptions of the capacity of coal mining to pollute.
Future generations would bear the brunt of this invisible scourge.
By the time the pollution became noticeable, the mines had “typically closed or become
insolvent.”221 There was, in fact, no one to be held accountable. They could not be
impelled to “contribute to remediation, either financially or through other actions.”222
Mine closure meant little more than abandoning shafts. These sites effectively became
waste lands, whose potential for productive use was compromised, and ultimately
destroyed, by unchecked pollution. The industry thus “took advantage of weak
governmental regulations by externalizing costs.”223 Environmental factors played a very
significant role in determining the “bio-physical limits”224 of economic growth, but these
were largely hidden from the public, and obscured in the balance sheets of the Witbank
coal companies. The absence of regulation in the selection of land to be mined – resulting
in indiscriminate mining - reflects the failure of the government to recognize long-term
ecological damage, and the strength of public perception that the benefits of coal
outweighed its costs.
Conclusion
Remnants of abandoned mines had become a regular feature of the town by the mid
1940s. Smoke stacks and massive conveyer belts worked in tandem to create a uniquely
industrialized vista. This was celebrated as a part of the financial windfall of coal mining
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid. p. 35
223 Adler, R.A., Claassen, M, Godfrey, L, Turton, A.R., ‘Water, Mining and Waste: an Historical and
Economic Perspective on Conflict Management in South Africa’, The Economics of Peace and Security
Journal, 2, 2, 2007, p. 34
224 Omo-Fadaka, J, ‘Economic Growth and Sustainable Development’, p. 227
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activity between the early 1930s and late 1940s, with little focus on the growing
phenomenon of localized coal-based pollution, including underground fires, subsidence
and coal dumps. Evidence of pollution did little to persuade views related to the benefits
of intensified coal production and combustion in the district. The Report of the
Departmental Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of
Water Supplies reflected changing views which saw the need to control and monitor coal-
based pollution. However, its existence in the industrial region was seen as impossible.
The Report highlighted a list of major polluters, including the coal industry. Post-war
reconstruction thus involved research to develop policies which would assist in the
monitoring and control of pollution. The next chapter will assess debates around these
decision-making processes, which ultimately led to the emergence of South Africa’s first
legislation aimed at minimizing pollution.
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Tables and graphs
Tables No 1, 2 and 3 reflect monthly output figures using published data from the Witbank News between
1930 and 1947. The graphs complement the tables, providing evidence of the dramatic rise of coal figures
during the 1930s and 1940s, reflecting specific surges in coal production during the Second World War.
Table No 1
South African Coal Estates (Witbank) monthly output figures
Monthly totals Monthly Output Figures (tons)
January, 1930 63 126
July, 1930 71 841
May, 1931 56 211
April, 1933 48 796
February, 1935 75 253
December, 1937 100 659
February, 1940 95 054
March, 1940 106 258
August, 1942 172 875
January, 1943 146 872
April, 1943 155 307
May, 1943 163 877
December, 1943 176 509
February, 1944 174 875
March, 1944 187 166
August, 1944 194 320
April, 1945 178 234
May, 1945 180 537
July, 1945 174 864
November, 1945 165 363
December, 1946 159 217
January, 1946 184 602
March, 1947 164 437
June, 1947 165 880
July, 1947 165 880
The table shows output figures for some but not all monthly output figures based on
available published sources.
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Graph No. 1
South African Coal Estates (Witbank) monthly output figures
This graph demonstrates a dramatic rise in monthly coal output figures between January 1930 and 1947. As
the official supplier of coal to Iscor, the SA Coal Estates was especially hard-pressed to maintain and
improve upon production figures during the war.
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Table No. 2
Witbank Colliery monthly output figures
Monthly totals Monthly Output Figures
(tons)
January, 1930 71 472
July, 1930 77 377
May, 1931 59 681
April, 1933 53 457
February, 1935 68 934
December,
1937
90 643
February, 1940 72 954
March, 1940 84 115
August, 1942 102 330
January, 1943 79 933
April, 1943 108 081
May, 1943 108 443
December,
1943
136 768
February, 1944 138 494
March, 1944 159 336
August, 1944 149 143
April, 1945 136 697
May, 1945 148 941
July, 1945 136 571
November,
1945
137 506
December,
1945
136 240
January, 1946 148 064
March, 1947 128 954
June, 1947 114 677
As the oldest, most established colliery in the region, Witbank Colliery experienced dramatic growth
during the war years. This had positive financial spillover effects, leading to further expansion of the town
and industry.
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Graph No. 2
Witbank Colliery, Ltd. monthly output figures
The coal output figures of the Witbank Colliery reflect a similar trend of rising coal output figures during
the height of the Second World War. This did not necessarily correlate with the capital expenditure of
sinking new shafts. Costs were generally reduced through the wartime practice of pillar robbing in
abandoned underground mines.
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Table No. 3
Coronation Colliery monthly output figures
Monthly totals Monthly Output Figures (tons)
January, 1930 71 472
July, 1930 77 377
May, 1931 59681
April, 1933 53 457
February, 1935 68 934
December, 1937 90 643
February, 1940 72 954
March, 1940 84 115
August, 1942 102 330
January, 1943 79 933
April, 1943 108 081
May, 1943 108 443
December, 1943 136 768
February, 1944 138 494
March, 1944 159 336
August, 1944 149 143
April, 1945 136 697
May, 1945 148 941
July, 1945 136 571
November, 1945 137 506
December, 1945 136 240
January, 1946 148 064
March, 1947 128 954
June, 1947 114 677
Evidence of coal-based pollution was still apparent in 2008, reflecting the profound long-term implications
of coal dumps and ash pits. Since the early 1990s, informal settlements have encroached on the abandoned
dumps, often constructed on the subsided surface of pre-war coal mines. (See images p. 129 and 133)
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Graph No. 3
Coronation Colliery monthly output figures
The Coronation Colliery’s coal output figures rose dramatically, reaching almost 200 000 thousand tons by
1945.
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Chapter Three
Responses to the changing atmosphere of post-war Witbank: 1948-1965
Introduction
Post-war reconstruction involved significant shifts in the way pollution was understood.
The evolving systems of knowledge related to the coal industry now expanded in both
general scope and depth of understanding. This interest was no coincidence in the post-
war economy, which continued to experience growth on a massive scale. Pollution had
become widespread after the war. The profusion of air pollution in cities throughout the
world had pushed local scientists to interrogate the relationship between the mining
industry and its contribution to air pollution. This chapter will evaluate debates around
pollution that took place in the decades immediately following the Second World War,
resulting in the emergence of South Africa’s first legislation aimed at minimizing
pollution.
Witbank simultaneously experienced loss - with the abandonment of exhausted coal
shafts - and gain - with the injection of new capital investment into mining and industry.
New factories opened, and several state-funded power stations were built to support the
national grid that delivered electricity to towns throughout the country. With its
sprawling expansion of urban and peri-urban residential and industrial development, the
large population of the Witbank coalfield had become plagued by atmospheric pollution,
contributing to high rates of lung disease, particularly bronchitis, asthma and
tuberculosis. This chapter will outline the findings of the national committees, scientists
and task teams who worked towards passing of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act
in 1965. The research conducted before any parliamentary decision could be made
regarding its promulgation was pivotal in changing conceptions of coal-based pollution.
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Growth, prosperity and environmental change in the post-war coal town: 1948 -
1952
By the late 1940s, coal-based pollution had become a regular part of life in industrial
Witbank. Soon after the war ended, several Johannesburg-based journalists from the Star
newspaper drove to Witbank to investigate rumours of an underground fire which had
broken to the surface near a public road en route to the town. The fire had raged for a
week, with “flames shooting up out of the earth.”225 The arrival of the journalists was met
with surprise by residents, who found it difficult to comprehend “why any fuss was being
made of the latest blaze.”226 Sites such as the Apex mine described in the national daily
were common throughout the district. They were isolated, and thus did not disrupt growth
of the town. The visit of these journalists was thus significant in demonstrating the
complacency of both the industry and residents of the coal town to localized signs of
coal-based pollution.
Demand for Witbank’s coal had been largely uninterrupted after the Second World War
ended. Bunker trade was adversely affected by the fuel-conversion of ships from coal to
oil, but local demand continued to grow.227 The local industry was thus largely protected
from a post-war slump that hindered other economic activity, and maintained a
competitive advantage after the war. The state relaxed numerous restrictions that had held
back capital expansion during the war, thus stimulating a new era of coal exploration.
New shafts were sunk throughout the coalfield, and by the end of the decade, over two
thirds of the Transvaal’s collieries were situated in Witbank.228
A number of chemical processing plants emerged along the edge of the town, often
bordering long-abandoned mining areas. This new economic activity helped secure
Witbank’s emergence as a regional manufacturing centre.229 These plants often served the
225 ‘Mine Fire’, Witbank News, 9 August, 1946 p. 5
226 Ibid.
227 Sealey, A. ‘The Coal mining Industry of South Africa’, Mining Engineer, 151, 361, October 1991, p. 1228Lang, J. Power Base: Coal Mining in the Life of South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg,
1995, p. 128
229 ‘All Coal Records Broken,’ Witbank News, August 27, 1943
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mines. One notable example was Rand Carbide, which had been built “out in the sticks,”
away from residential areas.230 The factory produced carbide, a compound fusion of
carbon and metal used in the headlamps of miners. The Cynamid factory was also
established in the district, producing cyanide, a poisonous acid used to extract gold from
ore in refineries. Another notable plant was Ferrometals, built close to the old Transvaal
and Delagoa Bay Colliery.
Escom had grown significantly during the war years. As the nature of coal production
changed, so did that of energy, thus affecting the relationship between the energy
parastatal and the state. By 1947 the Electricity Act of 1922 was amended to suit the
changing policies of an increasingly protectionist state. It soon monopolized South
African energy, such that pre-existing bodies such as the Victoria Falls Power Company
were outmoded. Domestic and industrial sale of units of electricity had finally grown
large enough to warrant a national grid – serviced by Escom, and largely powered by
Witbank coal. The massive demand for munitions during the war had also increased steel
demand. Production thus expanded to facilitate further output. Several Iscor plants
emerged throughout the district as the company grew. Witbank coal, as part of the ever-
growing Transvaal coal industry, was one of the few coal centres able to increase output
to meet the demand of local and foreign consumers after the war. The greatest problem at
this point was not the availability of coal, but rather the lack of adequate transportation to
carry coal to markets. By 1951, shortages were experienced as the railways were unable
to deliver coal to markets. The state responded during the winter of 1951 by placing an
embargo on the export of coal, temporarily relieving local markets.231 This embargo was
short-lived, but transport problems would continue to plague the Witbank coal industry
for decades to come.232
New corporate structuring characterized the growth of Witbank’s coal trade in the second
half of the century. A major economic turning point for local industrial growth was the
230 ‘Rand Carbide Sets the Record Straight’, Witbank News, July 14, 2000231 Lang, J. Power Base, p. 131
232 The greatest development in transport of coal to markets took place in 1976, with the opening up of the
Richard’s Bay Coal Terminal on the east coast of South Africa.
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involvement of the Anglo American Corporation in Witbank after it experienced a
massive financial windfall with the discovery of gold in the Orange Free State in 1949.
The mining finance house soon amassed enormous profits, allowing it to dabble in other
mineral interests, purchasing land throughout the coalfield. At least three collieries had
opened since the middle of the war to supply Iscor with coking coal, including the
Springbok Colliery.233 The company also took over several pre-existing coal companies,
including the SA Coal Estates. Many other collieries closed down as they exhausted their
reserves. Damage to mined land was written off by both the companies and the local
municipality. General industrial practice was to level the cost against capital gain; public
officials thus had little choice but to regard such land as ‘undermined.’ The term soon
took on several layers of meaning: not only did it allude to the subterranean pillar and
bord mining methods widely employed, but also implied the loss of land use as a result of
the advancing signs of surface degradation. Signs of this included the hardening and
subsidence of the land, which had become too dry and desiccated to sustain life, as well
as acid mine pollution of varying intensities. Areas where coal mining had taken place
were usually affected in some way, and thus long-term localized coal-based pollution
played a significant role in the urban development of Witbank and its surrounding
areas.234
Growth of the town – and informal townships – was thus determined by the bio-physical
limitations of this unusable land. These sites had become desiccated blights of brown
patchy terrain, “woefully short of trees” in a place that was already “generally drab.”235
Locations surrounding the town had started emerging in the 1920s, but their size and
population density was notably greater after the war.236 These included Thushanang,
Vosman and Lynnville, amongst others.237 In these bustling working class townships
233 Witbank News, November 20, 1964
234 Bullock, S.E.T. & Bell, F.G. ‘Some Problems Associated With Past Mining at a Mine in the Witbank
Coalfield, South Africa’, Environmental Geology, 33, 1, December 1997
235 Witbank News, February 18, 1949
236 Notes on discussion with Isaac Mampane, Witbank, Emalahleni, June 2, 2008
237 NASA, Department of Native Administration and Development (1924 - 1976); (Archives of the
Departments of Bantu Administration and Development, Co-operation and Development, Plural Relations
and Development Aid) (1958 - 1993) (BAO) 3/544/A2/17/4/1/K120 The informal settlements verging on
the town of Witbank were granted separate town status in 1982, under Section 2 of the Black Local
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built on the verge of underground fires and dumps, and down-wind from factories and
power stations, the lives of African, Indian and foreign temporary and permanent
migrants coalesced. The eclectic population included the families of the African miners
living in long brown brick mine compounds built relatively close to accessible coal
seams. As the locations developed, they verged dangerously closer to mining sites. The
physical separateness enshrined in the Group (Urban) Areas act of 1952 was entrenched
by the insurmountable borders created by these relics of pre-war mining activity.
Pollution, or disruption, thus took on a political nature. Apartheid thus entrenched the
racialized “geographical isolation” of these locations.238
Witbank prospered after the war, providing both industrial and agricultural output to a
growing economy. The two economic enterprises simultaneously made use of available
natural resources, but it soon became apparent that these two activities were
incompatible, particularly when it came to the pollution of natural water sources. In its
ecologically monumental report of 1948, the Departmental Committee of Enquiry on the
Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies had argued that the welfare of
the South African economy was “bound up” with the health of her natural resources.239
Without access to potable water, post-war urban expansion would be severely
compromised. Evidence linking mining and mine-based water pollution already existed.
These included reports that rivers such as the Komati, which formed part of the
catchment entering the Loskop Dam, were being “badly polluted” by “mining going on in
the upper regions.”240 Despite this, further investigation was necessary, with emphasis on
the coordination of research into the full arena of environmental problems related to “the
purity and suitability of surface and underground water.”241 The need for coordination of
policy planning around natural resources had already been realized by 1947, with the
Authorities Act of 1982. See ‘Establishment of the town council of Kwa Guqa’, Government Notice,
Department of Cooperation and Development
238 ‘Abandoned coal mine lands in South Africa: Case Study’, Mining Environmental Management, July
2000
239 NASA, GES/2069/107/33 ‘Report of the Departmental Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological
and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies, 1943-1948’
240 NASA, Native Affairs Commissioner, Johannesburg, 1924-1978 (KJB) 466/N3/12/2/15 (16) Letter from
C.A. Rawe, Assistant Native Commissioner, Barberton, to Mining Commissioner, Barberton, re: Pollution
of the Komati River, 1940-1941, August 20, 1940
241 Ibid.
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formation of the national Natural Resources Development Board (NRDB).242 This
directorate was preoccupied with South Africa’s natural resources, but its intent was not
to prevent pollution or conserve resources for posterity. The NRDB was formed to
investigate the most effective means of exploiting and developing natural resources, and
was largely concerned with small town growth planning to attract more industry and thus
balance out the distribution of enterprise throughout the country.243
A regional NRDB was formed in Witbank in 1949. This representative body reflected a
new consciousness concerned with better utilization and control of local resources,
particularly in light of the vast demand for South African natural resources during post-
war reconstruction in Europe, Britain and the USA. In 1953, F.G.J. Du Toit, chairman of
the council, argued that South Africa should “not be so eager to sell all its raw
materials.”244 This included coal, which had gained value amid global shortages. The
efforts of both regional and national bodies thus changed public conceptions of raw
materials.
Conceptions around natural resource conservation related to the war-time mentality of
scarcity. Conservation was thus understood to be based on the need to conserve in case of
future conflict, which would adversely affect access to resources. The notion that coal
was super-abundant was thus replaced with a mentality bent on resource conservation for
local use. However, even as conceptions changed, little attention was given to the
pollution of resources affected by the extraction of raw materials, particularly coal, which
had been listed in the 1948 Report of Enquiry as a chief pollutant. The question of coal-
based pollution remained secondary, and largely ignored, but this period did see some
change in attitudes towards natural resources as the relative scarcity of this valuable fossil
fuel was brought to the fore.
242 ‘Development-Regional Planning of Natural Resources’ Witbank News, July 22, 1949
243 ‘Natural Resources’, Witbank News, November 11, 1949
244 ‘Conserving Raw Materials’, Witbank News, September 4, 1953
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Public health and coal-based pollution in the industrial age: 1946 - 1955
Soon after the war the Government Mining Engineer (GME) reported that almost 42 per
cent of deaths on mines were a result of exposure to fumes in accidental explosions.245
The frequency of gas-related fatalities forced the mining industry to pay greater attention
to its occupational health policies. The pre-existing structure tasked with training selected
miners in fire-fighting and underground rescue operations was first centralized under a
management committee, and taken over by the Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber
of Mines in 1946.246 This Central Rescue Training Station trained selected underground
mine workers to deal with the fumes encountered during operations. These included
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and methane, amongst others.
These revelations irrefutably debunked earlier conceptions that the Witbank coal seams
were free from spontaneous combustion. Not only were these fumes responsible for many
unprecedented and deadly underground explosions, but mere inhalation could have dire
health implications. Coal workers were constantly at risk of damaging their lungs through
dust inhalation. The health risk of exposure included a host of coal-dust-related diseases,
whose relative severity depended on the chemical composition of the coal dust itself.247
Considerable inhalation of dust over an extended period was likely to result in common
pneumoconiosis, a relatively mild condition. The more intensive version of this was
known as coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, which could develop into progressive massive
fibrosis, where a “dense mass of fibrous tissue (could) occupy much of, if not the entire,
lung.”248 Less debilitating was athrocosis, a black deposit of carbon particles on the
lungs. Coal and rock dust containing considerable volumes of free silica caused
anthrocosilicosis, a condition resulting in “extensive fibrosis with associated functional
changes.”249 With over fifty thousand coal miners in South Africa, the risk of fatal or
debilitating occupational exposure had become a major concern.250
245 Annual Report of the Government Mining Engineer, Mining Year Book, 1947
246 Rescue Training Station Handbook (Revised), Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 1972, p. 1
247 ‘Coal dust: hazards, control’, Coal Age, March 1970, p. 86
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Annual Report of the Government Mining Engineer, Mining Year Book, 1947
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South Africa’s post-war industrial era was, in part, characterized by the image of smoke
billowing out of smoke stacks situated within its numerous industrial complexes. These
were often engulfed by a haze of smoke and airborne chemical compounds released from
any number of industrial and chemical processes. Hence, the risk of exposure to harmful
smoke and gases was not restricted to those employed in mining. Although not as
intensive as experienced by workers underground, environmental exposure was
widespread. The increase of air pollution heightened the risk of lung cancer for residents,
and also had deleterious effects on those suffering from ailments such as asthma. By
1953, tuberculosis had escalated to the level of a national epidemic – with a daily death
rate of fifty five for all races. Air pollution had a particularly harmful effect on sufferers
of tuberculosis, whose lung capacity was gravely compromised within a context of
diffuse smoke and harmful airborne chemicals.251 The high altitude of the Highveld
region exacerbated the rapid degeneration of air quality in Witbank, where particularly
harmful particles released from power stations, factories and chemical plants had affected
local air quality.
Local experiences and responses to atmospheric pollution were likely influenced by the
international wave of scrutiny to this problem. In fact, the topic of atmospheric pollution
had grabbed the attention of scientists worldwide. The problem was underscored after it
became apparent that smog - and its dangers – was becoming an international pandemic.
The most noted incident of ‘fatal’ smog had occurred in December of 1952, when the city
of London was struck by smog whose toxicity was unprecedented. According to a
subsequent report, inert weather conditions had “held the city’s air close to the ground
and…prevented the formation of winds which would have dispersed the pollutants that
were accumulating heavily at ground level.”252 In a city where coal had been a staple
energy source for over a century, the impact of the five-day-long ‘pea-soup’ smog was
pivotal in changing conceptions of coal-based pollution. The changes were not merely
those of perception, but directly affected the consumption of coal in the city. By 1956, the
251 ‘Notes on Basis of Approach to Appeal’, South African National Tuberculosis Association, 1962, p. 1
252 ‘Pollution and Your Health’ (published report), US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Office of
Public Affairs, 1976, p. 5
- 84 -
Clean Air Act had been passed, banning the burning of coal in the city of London. It also
removed “much of the visible pollution from Britain’s skies.”253 The Clean Air Act set a
global precedent in the fight against atmospheric pollution.
The mid-1950s presaged a turning point in environmental consciousness. The
calculations of one scientist had even begun to surmise the possibility of global warming
through continued consumption of fossil fuels, particularly coal.254 During this time,
scientist Charles David Keeling developed the technology to measure global carbon
dioxide levels. His measurements showed that these levels were steadily rising.255
According to Kolbert, the fact that the rise in carbon dioxide levels was measured so long
ago lends credence to the notion that “the changes that can be seen lag behind the
changes that have been set in motion.”256 With over one century of rising global
consumption of fossil fuels, it was only by the mid-twentieth century that the visible
changes began to garner government attention. In South Africa, the stimulus for radical
legislative reform was rooted in the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR).  One CSIR liaison officer, Mr. Masson, based then in Washington DC, began to
study the effects of air pollution in the United States. He was motivated by the belief that
“something should be done.”257 The preliminary research conducted by the CSIR was
emphasized in 1953, when the port city of Durban experienced a severe bout of smog
related to industrial emissions. The ability of the council to mobilize was limited under
existing legislation. The Durban Town Council had little legal influence other than the
Health Act. This Act was limited, as it gave local authorities powers to act only when
dealing with a distinct health “nuisance.”258 This excluded ameliorating the exigent
conditions of “general smokiness” plaguing Durban’s environment. This dealt a
significant blow to the municipality, as it was almost impossible for them to isolate
253 NASA, Secretary of Foreign Affairs (191901944) (BTS) 79/107 Letter by W. Malan, South African
Ambassador in London, ‘Congress on the Pollution of the Atmosphere’
254 Joubert, L.S. Scorched: South Africa’s Changing Climate, Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2006,
p. 4
255 Kolbert, Elizabeth, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature and Climate Change, p. 163
256 Ibid.
257 NASA, GES/1642 116/26/D ‘Minutes of Evidence from the Select Committee on the Subject of the Air
Pollution Prevention Bill’, March 8, 1961
258 Ibid.
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industries in a complex where any number of companies could be the “causer of the
nuisance.”259 This case embodied the air problem throughout the country. The CSIR had
been the first national body to recognize that the problem was only getting worse, and
began to lobby the Ministry of Health.
The Minister of Health was receptive to these calls for state action, and appointed the first
National Air Pollution Committee in 1955 to “investigate…and to make
recommendations regarding the steps to ameliorate and, ultimately, eliminate the
problem.”260 The committee was made up of numerous relevant government department
representatives, the CSIR, provincial administrative representatives, local authorities and
industrial representatives. After conducting the research, the committee reported that
smoke had become a major problem in residential areas. It recommended that legislation
be swiftly introduced “for the effective prevention and elimination of air pollution.”261
The Committee’s main achievement was the preparation of a draft bill largely influenced
by measures applied in England and the United States. The report presented dealt with
various kinds of air pollution, including coal and asbestos. The reference to asbestos
reflected an awareness of the dangers of environmental exposure – “not only for persons
working in mines and industries, but also for those in the vicinity.”262
Smoke was seen by the State as a local problem which could be dealt with by local
authorities. However, the Committee argued that emission of gases and fumes from
myriad industrial processes was beyond the capacity of local authorities, and could only
be dealt with at a national level. The draft bill was presented to a Select Committee,
whose task it was to “take evidence and call for documents.”263 This committee was
unable to complete its work before parliament went into recess. It thus recommended that
a commission be formed to deal with the continued implementation of findings related to
atmospheric pollution.
259 Ibid.
260 NASA, GES/1642/116/26/D ‘Report on the Commission of Enquiry into the Air Pollution Prevention
Bill’
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The newly formed Commission of Inquiry into the Air Pollution Prevention Bill was
crucial in the debate around air pollution that ensued over the following decade. It would
be small, and the process of implementation gradual, as the problem was not yet
considered to have “assumed such proportions” as to justify the participation of “a large
number of officials.”264 Most vocal in the deputation was Dr. E.C. Halliday, a prominent
scientist belonging to the National Physical Research Laboratory of the CSIR. It also
included several notable members, including representatives of the South African
Railways, the City Council of Durban, the Department of Mines, as well as the
Government Mining Engineer. The inclusion of industrial representatives, who were the
main polluters, in the Commission was significant. It seemingly overrode the potential
conflict of interest created by such a move. Nonetheless, the draft bill provided “for the
recognition of the interests of industries, the mining industry and local authorities in
connection with the administration of the Act.”265 This had the result of creating
tremendous mistrust between state and civil society as the Department of Health gave
“the impression of protecting bad polluters from the public rather than the other way
about (sic).”266
Nonetheless, the report defended this move. It saw joint discussion between state and
industry to be the only way to avoid “conflicting instructions of various pieces of
legislation.”267 After all, private industry was “saddled with a burden” in having to gain
approval from several authorities when embarking upon endeavours that could pollute.268
The sphere of the prospective legislation was broad, affecting a range of legislation
dealing with factories and mines, as well as local and municipal by-laws. Under existing
legislation, the simultaneous enactment of different laws resulted in conflicting
instructions, often holding back any form of resolution. It was thus desirable to
implement “effective correlation” between the different forms of legislation as they all
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Clarke, J. Our Fragile Land: South Africa’s Environmental Crisis, MacMillan South Africa,
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267 Ibid.
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had “a bearing on the operation of the same industrial processes.”269 The realm of industry
and mining in the process of enacting legislation was thus an accepted, and presumably
important, part of dealing with the problem of air pollution.
In spite of the considerable evidence of water pollution as a result of industrial activity,
little attempt was made to minimize the damage of water pollution.
Securing against the pollution of South Africa’s ‘wholesome’ water supply
The Report of the Departmental Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and
Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies had also granted special attention to the sustenance
of “wholesome” water supplies.270 The Committee was influenced by the growing
international interest in water quality, as well as water quantity, citing “similar
bodies…constituted in countries overseas for administering the Rivers Pollution
Prevention Acts.”271 The “purity of water supplies” was “generally recognized” as a
“major factor” in public health – and lack of knowledge was seen as the common
obstacle to any policy implementation and the “precautions necessary in protecting
gathering grounds and wells from being polluted.”272
Regional water boards were recommended in the report: their key feature would be “to
see that…undue pollution of water courses (was) not taking place in the regional areas
under their respective control.”273 The report went on to argue that there was “certain to
be an appreciable increase in the next few years in the quantity of water of good quality
required in this country.”274 The report challenged how this “increase in demand” would
be met, and recognized that “unfortunately many rivers and streams, particularly those
flowing through industrial areas, (were) badly polluted.”275 The proliferation of “small”
269 Ibid.
270 NASA, GEN/2069/107/33 Provision of Wholesome Water Supplies’, Report of the Departmental
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acts related to water resource management between the 1930s and 1940s had gradually
increased state control over water resources, “culminating in the promulgation of the
1956 Water Act.”276 Not only did the Act give rise to the Department of Water Affairs,
but Section 23 of the Act empowered the Minister of Water Affairs to take preventive
measures against pollution “as a result of seepage or drainage from any area on which
mining operations have been carried on after such operations have been abandoned.”277
The United Municipal Executive of South Africa argued that water be “divided” between
agriculture, industry, municipal use and mining such that “a balanced development”
could take place.”278 The Minister of Irrigation argued that pre-existing bodies such as the
Natural Resources Development Council be used to implement new water management
policies, despite the fact that the structure was not originally constituted for this purpose.
This reflected a rapidly changing set of conceptions around water conservation and
management, and that “in future specific provision… (is) made for the important aim of
balanced development in the domain of water.” Nonetheless, the 1956 legislation failed
to conceive of the long-term incompatibility of simultaneous land practices.
Changing conceptions of the post-war environment: 1956 - 1960
Someone once remarked to me that ‘once the coal dust gets into your hair, you never get it out.’ How true!
It seems if you are born on a coal mine, or have lived a number of years on one or near one, you usually die
in the same vicinity.279
The first half of the 1950s saw unprecedented expansion in Witbank’s industry. The
region continued to produce approximately half of the national output of bituminous coal
destined for both local and foreign markets. A new trend in coal stockpiling developed
amongst local consumers. These were geared towards protecting against backlogs from
railway truck shortages, particularly over the winter months. The problem of inland coal
276 Burns, M., Findlater, K., Funke, N., Hattingh, H., Nortje, K., Turton, A., Weaver, A. ‘Redressing
inequality, South Africa’s new water policy’, Environment, January 4, 2007, p. 2
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Prevention Bill by Collieries Committee of the Chamber of Mines, 1965
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transportation had affected coal supply so badly that by 1956 the state had placed an
embargo on coal export that lasted until late 1958. Despite the relative self-sufficiency of
local industry, no power station equipment was manufactured in South Africa. Escom
thus still had to rely on foreign suppliers. With the construction of the Wilge Power
Station near Kendal, Witbank coal now fed at least two power stations in the growing
industrial complex.280 This had a hugely disruptive effect on the balance of the local
atmosphere.
Air pollution involved both aesthetic and chemical changes. The pale horizon was now
laced together by outlines of jutting cement smoke stacks and faded ash-black clouds of
smoke. The proximity of these power stations to the town now hastened the quick-step of
general environmental degradation within an already-compromised natural environment.
Smoke was a definite concern amongst local residents, but it merely contributed to the
growing list of local problems related to coal mining and coal-based pollution. Since
1948, the clout of the coal industry had been challenged by the implementation of new
racially-oriented land policies. It retained strength in places like Witbank where
thousands of land plots were owned by mining companies. In spite of state attempts at
regulation and control, informal locations had amassed upon private mine company
holdings, beyond the control of regional land policy makers. These locations were spread
out around a relatively uncontained urban sprawl, interspersed with mining wasteland,
pristine grassland, residential development and industrial sites.
Local authorities, tasked with removing these locations and implementing the Group
(Urban) Areas Act, had thus encountered numerous difficulties, to the annoyance of local
farmers for whom private mine land already posed a threat. One disgruntled white
farmer, Sgd. H.J. Stevens, wrote his complaints to the Department of Native Affairs in
Pretoria.281 He was frustrated with the lack of regulation over mushrooming locations on
privately owned land. He implored the state to take action, asking “why make a law if
280 During the 1950s, other power stations were built throughout the Eastern Transvaal, including Taaibos,
Hendrina, Arnot and Kriel. These were not all necessarily fed by Witbank coal. Many had contracts with
associated collieries in the Vaal Triangle and Natal.
281 NASA, Secretary of Native Affairs, 1880-1975 (NTS) 7151/971/323/5(G) Handwritten letter from H.J.
Stevens, Witbank, to Department of Native Affairs, Pretoria, December 8, 1954
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you have no control over it?”282 He had spent years trying to secure labour for his farm,
to no avail. He could not compete with private land owners who charged workers far less
for accommodation on a so-called “private location,” as opposed to farm land.283 The
relative autonomy of the mining industry in determining land use was demonstrated by
this case. Local authorities had little control over the use of mine-owned terra firma - and
even less control over the use of the carboniferous wealth that lay beneath the surface.
Undermined land continued to restrain development in an expanding settlement, and this
was only further complicated by the implementation of Apartheid. Five decades of
migrancy to and from the labour district had invariably led to a more permanent state of
African settlement, resulting in higher mortality rates in situ. Not only did this complicate
the implementation of the Group Areas Act, but it raised the matter of establishing
separate burial sites for this marginalized yet populous grouping. By mid-1955, the
Witbank town council was adamant that no more municipal land be used for the burial of
“deceased non-European employees” of the Witbank Colliery.284 The Witbank Colliery
and regional Native Affairs Department were thus jointly tasked with resolving this
gloomy problem. Under strict regulations of racial separation, the chosen site had to
conform to “the stipulated distance of 1000 yards” from “the nearest European
dwelling.”285 To further complicate matters, the responsible parties were forced to take
into account the ensuing problem of undermined land. It would have been physically
impossible to establish a burial site out of the subsided sections of the Witbank Colliery
land holdings. Pollution was understood in racial terms, and served as a powerful
metaphor around white fears of being ‘contaminated’ by Africans, in spite of both races
living in the same ecologically polluted region.
The difficult experience of establishing the cemetery clearly demonstrated the rigidity
and deep inhumanity of racial separation in Witbank. It was also a revelation of the long-
term effects of pillar robbing, which had destroyed the possibility of alternative use of the
282 Ibid.
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‘Cemetery – Witbank Colliery Ltd’ Wolwekrans, July 21, 1955
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land after mining. By July, the Wolwekrans section of the company’s property was
offered for burial purposes. It was “situated on ground which (had) not been undermined,
and under which no mining (would) take place in the future.”286 The local Director of
Native Labour wrote to the Chief Native Commissioner the following month, suggesting
that one morgen of ground should be granted for every 1000 burials “for every 20 years
of estimated existence of the colliery.”287 The required distance of ‘1000 yards’ from any
‘European dwelling’ could not be met - thus limiting options for both the municipality
and the coal company. Witbank Colliery’s manager, G. Sowry, asked for this condition to
be waived. He argued that “considerable difficulty would be experienced in selecting an
alternative site on ground which (was) not undermined, or likely to be undermined in the
future.”288 Eventually, a representative of the Peri-Urban Areas Health Board confirmed
that the chosen site was “satisfactory from a health point of view and (was) not likely to
detract from the amenities of the neighbourhood.”289 The cemetery plan could thus go
forward, as it was not in conflict with any town planning scheme or health by-laws.
The growing demand for graveyards reflected the high level of mortality in post-war
industrial Witbank. The region had transformed into an industrial network with a
burgeoning population. The environmental impact of intensive industrial production,
particularly coal consumption in the two power stations, was undeniable. It had the effect
of exacerbating conditions of the lung, particularly tuberculosis, which had, by the time
the war ended, become a national epidemic. Tuberculosis was later described as being the
“product of socio-economic conditions, poverty, over-crowding (and) malnutrition.”290 It
has thus been termed a “social disease…intrinsically linked to industrialization.”291
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According to Tremblay, it is the disease “most closely associated with World War II.”292
In Witbank this related to the arrival, en masse, of a migrant work force seeking
employment in the coal mines and factories of the coalfield. The needs of the war had
taken precedence, giving “no time” for the development of “housing schemes and social
services generally, increas(ing) the problem to a very great extent.”293 Witbank and its
surrounding locations showed no exception in the presence of tuberculosis. The Southern
Transvaal Tuberculosis Association, an early public health body, had complained in 1950
that there was “almost complete lack of facilities for the treatment of our tuberculotics
(sic).”294 This began to change in 1952 with the establishment of the South African
National Tuberculosis Association (SANTA) “as a result of the generosity of the public
in response to an appeal for £1 000000.”295 The formation of this early non-governmental
body was the culmination of a form of loose networks of voluntary community-based
organizations around the country.296 SANTA thus saw itself not only as a charitable
public health organization, but as a “social movement in the field of health.”297 In
practice, however, it mainly owed its origins to the work of volunteers in the Natal Anti-
Tuberculosis Association.
The SANTA branch in Witbank was formed at a public meeting held on March 9th,
1955, with the election of Dr. H.J.E. Schultz as the chairman. Its main goal was the
establishment of a SANTA clinic for “non-Europeans” in order to “alleviate the serious
local TB problem.”298 Progress was slow. Initial efforts saw the local Rotary Club of
Witbank negotiating with SA Coal Estates and its principal, the Anglo American
Corporation, to secure the compound buildings of their Schoongezicht Colliery. Despite
cooperation from the industry, a permit for occupation from the Native Affairs
292 Ibid. The link between tuberculosis and coal-based pollution – specifically, atmospheric pollution, was
not scientifically proven, but the prevalence of the disease in Witbank during this time supports later claims
arguing that “carbon monoxide in lung macrophages promote the reactivation of Mycobacterium
tuberculosis”, as well as the concept that “a specific workplace pollutant is involved in the reactivation of
the disease.” Ibid, p. 728
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Department and the Land Tenure Board was officially refused in 1957. A site was only
found in 1958 when the municipality of Witbank offered the use of “suitable ground
south of the Non-European hospital and a fresh application for a Group Areas Permit was
made.”299 This permit was eventually granted the following year. The first patients were
only admitted in November 1959. The new H.J.E. Schultz SANTA Centre no doubt
brought comfort to many sufferers of tuberculosis, but it is possible to question the
suitability of the ground granted by the municipality for use by non-Europeans. The
brown-brick building complex could be found on the left driving into Witbank, situated
on the Ferro Metals Road. It was also adjacent to the barren site of the defunct Transvaal
& Delagoa Bay Colliery.
The hospital was a place of refuge for terminally ill patients, but this was compromised
by its proximity to industry. Depending on weather conditions, smoke and airborne
chemicals floated around the local atmosphere, often landing up in the airways of those
who could least afford it.300 It soon became apparent that “you (couldn’t) put people near
the… industries.”301 These areas were “full of dust… and this smoke (sic) … every night,
after about six, seven o’ clock.”302 Dust entering lungs infected by the bacilli of
tuberculosis was relentless. Nonetheless, the organization sought to affect positive
change. The case of this hospice thus highlights the relationship between coal-based air
pollution and tuberculosis, and begs the question of SANTA’s value in an area affected
by severe air pollution.
By the end of the decade, concerns over coal-based pollution had begun to infiltrate the
local press. More information was provided about the dangers of mining to safety and
wellbeing. In 1960, one local columnist went as far as asking his readers if they had
ever seen anyone affected by carbon monoxide, the deadly gas given off from coal? …the real danger lies
in it being so difficult to detect, for the gas is colourless, tasteless and odourless. Frequent symptoms are
headache, weakness, nausea, paralysis of the nervous system, and slowing down of pulse and
299 Ibid.
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respiration…in spite of numerous warnings that are issued each winter, it would be surprising to learn the
exact number of non-Europeans…who perish through carbon monoxide poisoning.303
The dangers of carbon monoxide had been well-known to industry insiders, and even
workers, but it was only at this point that such discourse infiltrated the public arena. The
problem continued to grow with the increasing rate of coal consumption. Generation of
electricity had grown by 8 per cent per annum throughout the 1950s, and by 1963 this
showed “no sign of slackening.”304 Escom constructed the Komati Power Station at this
point, situated midway between Middelburg, Witbank and Bethal. It was lauded as the
largest thermal station in Southern Africa at the time of its construction, with the
completed station consuming coal at the rate of 10 000 tons per day.305 Despite the use of
lower-grade ‘duff’ coal in the process of consumption, dumps continued to grow
throughout the district. Coal extraction retained a steady pace, but occasional contractions
of demand resulted in the “heavy dumping of surplus duff coal.” Such a reduction in
requirement took place from December 1961, and continued at least until 1963.
The low grade waste was prone to sporadic flaming. None of this was new to Witbankers,
but the profusion of the dumps led to new concerns within a growing populace. The
simultaneous growth of dumps and urban residence had the effect of radically altering
perceptions of the dumps which had previously been taken for granted within the
community. When children started using abandoned collieries as playgrounds,
community members began to complain. The abandoned sites were tempting to children
seeking unconventional revels in the disused shafts and unregulated coal mountains. One
particular instance of this was in the Outspan area of Witbank, where children were
“going down into the disused shafts and old workings” of the abandoned Tavistock
Colliery in order to collect coal and play games like ‘hide and seek’:
303 ‘Dusty column - Coal Dust in My Hair,’ Witbank News, July 15, 1960
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The danger of these children being buried in a ‘fall of earth’ or overcome by gases (was) ever present.
Some of them join (ed) a couple of ladders together and descend (ed) into these old shafts, if one should
slip from these ladders, there (was) no knowing what the result (would) be – perhaps death.306
The abandoned coal dumps had become crucial sources of energy for cooking food and
providing fuel for warmth for residents of the numerous locations excluded from Escom’s
distribution of domestic electrification. A new vocal group called for the prevention of a
“disaster” by sealing off the shafts “somehow before it (was) too late.” 307
Both the coal industry and local municipality had, until then, disregarded the
environmental effects of long-term coal-based pollution – with even less attention given
to the very real and physical dangers that existed at the surface. The Witbank Colliery
soon started taking measures to “reduce the underground production of duff coal”, such
that only 23 197 tons of saleable duff coal were dumped in 1964, as opposed to 63 164
tons in the previous year.308 Nonetheless, by the 1960s, the cumulative impact of coal-
based pollution had irrefutably changed conceptions of the coal industry and its
environmental legacy. Despite the incidence of innumerable environmental problems in
Witbank, the most overwhelming claim against the entire coal-based industrial complex
at this point regarded the proliferation of atmospheric pollution.
State, science and the question of pollution: 1961-1965
Can any person living in this fair country of ours imagine what it will look like in fifty years hence… no,
man’s imagination has not the scope to undertake a projection of such a vast scene of utter desolation.309
Knowledge of atmospheric pollution, from coal and a host of other sources, had become
more pronounced during the 1960s. Many felt that there was “no need to become panicky
about air pollution” because South Africa’s climate still had “the space and the wind to
swallow up or dissipate the mess that man (made) of his air.”310 On the other hand, the
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state had now recognized that action was needed unless authorities wanted to “wake up in
smog one day and have to spend millions cleaning it up.”311 Momentum had already been
generated in the mid-1950s with the appointment of a special committee to research
atmospheric pollution. The consequent formation of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Bill (APPB) had been a continuation of a select
committee of parliament unable to complete its work by the end of the parliamentary
session. Its work was largely driven by the work of the CSIR, which had lobbied with
urgency for a “technical investigation of certain specific aspects of air pollution in South
Africa.”312 This national study would involve an assessment of “the technical and
economic implications of the use of alternates to bituminous coal from the point of view
of smoke production.”313 More particular to Witbank, the study would explore the
“question of the diffusion of pollution.”314 This would require significant investment. An
estimated £15 000 would be required in the first year. Funding would be sourced from the
CSIR, urban local authorities affected by pollution, as well as the state. Many felt that it
would be “more equitable” if the research was mostly funded by the state.315
International pressure to tackle the problem of atmospheric pollution had led to the
formation of multi-national groupings such as the World Health Organization (WHO)
Meeting of Experts on Air Pollution, the United Nations for the Fight against Noise and
Smog (NANS) and the Congress of Nations ‘for the fight against pollution of the
atmosphere caused by exhaust gases of motorized vehicles’.316 Emphasis was placed on
the cumulative emission of pollutants; coal-based air pollution was merely one of many.
Hence, the numerous meetings of the Commission of Inquiry had included debates
around the relative gravity of particular sources of pollution. The inclusion of a wide
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variety of public constituents in debates thus illuminated the perpetually changing, and
often conflictual, conceptions of pollution.
Minutes of a meeting regarding ‘Evidence from the Select Committee on the Subject of
APPB’ that took place in March 1961 was revealing in this regard. Halliday had argued
that air pollution mainly took the form of smoke, “caused by a large number of things,
but mostly by the incomplete burning of coal.”317 He thus implored that this faulty
combustive process be remedied through greater efficiency; sufficient exposure to
oxygen and high temperature would facilitate the full combustion of fuel. The only
remnant would be “hot air, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide.”318 According to this
prominent CSIR scientist, the relative danger of smoke diffusion could thus be accorded
“on the basis of its blackness.”319 He cited “a large amount of research” that
“demonstrated that the blackness of smoke (had) a direct relation to the total quantity of
materials going up the stack.”320 On this basis, Halliday defended the clause of the APPB
which gave local authorities the power to create by-laws to deal with smoke. These by-
laws would thus impose restrictions for the emission of smoke “of above a certain
blackness for limited periods only.”321 Halliday’s specification that smoke control would
take place for limited periods reflected the weighty influence of industry in drawing up
the legislation. Even this internationally renowned authority on the prevention and
control of pollution was willing to accede that total smoke prevention was impossible
since “any factory or furnace or boiler burning coal must, from time to time, have the ash
removed and when this (was) done, you cannot avoid making smoke.”322 The production
of dark, undulating smoke in routine industrial processes was inexorable within the
confines of affordable technology. The Commission of Inquiry had been adamant that in
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the promulgation of the bill, control would be “secured by agreement rather than
compulsion.”323 Most important was to show that atmospheric pollution could be
controlled in the “selected areas…and that the cost of such control (would) not cripple
industry or the local authority.”324 This would necessitate the cooperation of state,
provincial and local authorities and various industrial role players.
The work of the Commission of Inquiry into the APPB was groundbreaking, but did not
resolve the entire problem of atmospheric pollution. When, during the March gathering,
Halliday was asked for his opinion “on gases coming from motor car exhausts being a
cause of cancer”, his “position here (was) similar to that of dust from mine dumps:
The National Committee did not attempt to deal with it because it did not know of any technical solution.325
Halliday’s response was terse, reflecting certain limitations in the drafting of the APPB.
The drafting of the APPB was, in fact, complicated by stiff debates around this limited
span of legal recourse around pollution. It had remained unclear which source of
pollution made the most severe contribution to atmospheric pollution. As emphasized by
Halliday, the scope of the Bill was thus limited to restrictions and guidelines for which a
known technical remedy could be found. There was no doubt that the combustion of coal
was a main contributor – it had topped the list of the 1948 Report of the Departmental
Committee of Enquiry on the Bacteriological and Chemical Pollution of Water Supplies –
but the scope of the problem of air pollution had expanded.
Two other main sources of atmospheric pollution had included diesel-based exhaust
fumes from motor vehicles and dust from mine dumps. The dialogue facilitated by the
meetings of the Commission of Inquiry had brought these problems to the surface. The
growth of consciousness around the relationship between environmental degradation and
public health had already been revealed in the formation of SANTA. This organization
focused on tuberculosis, which was directly affected by atmospheric pollution. More
323 ‘Cleansing Our Air’, Cape Times, August 17, 1963
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revealing of responses to changing conceptions of pollution was the formation of the
Anti-Diesel Pollution Society in Mayville, Natal.326 The organization aimed at raising
awareness of the dangers of diesel, specifically its relationship to lung cancer. This
organization was well represented at meetings of the Commission of Enquiry. It
emphasized the “very strong evidence” that revealed that the diesel engine was harmful
to health and argued that it was “not good enough” to pollute the air which South
Africans had “no choice but to breathe.”327 It was obvious to the organization that an
urgent “adjustment” to popular conceptions of diesel use was necessary.328 In a pamphlet
written by G.C. Myddelton entitled ‘Diesel Fumes and Lung Cancer’ he argued against
the mainstream view still held that saw little merit in existing scientific or medical
evidence connecting diesel fumes and lung disease.329 The pamphlet had been written in
response to a statement made by Dr. P.J. Lawther, Director of the Medical Research
Council Group for Research on Atmospheric Pollution, who had publicly denigrated the
“many ill informed attempts to incriminate the diesel engine” which, in his opinion, did
not “merit serious discussion.”330 Myddelton argued that the “possible connection
between diesel fumes and lung cancer certainly merit(ed) serious consideration.”331 The
Anti-Diesel Pollution Society was thus pivotal in reshaping the way atmospheric
pollution was conceived.
New knowledge presented by this group included expanding the scope of understanding
of air pollution – which had previously only been “equated with smoke…which (was)
obvious to the eye.”332 This association was thus revealed to be entirely misleading since
“all sorts of gases and vapours, many of them irritant and harmful, (were) completely
invisible and exist(ed) quite apart from smoke.”333 One set of carcinogenic chemical
constituents included the full variety of “aromatic polycyclic hydrocarbons,” the most
326 NASA, Town Clerk, Pretoria (1897-1975) (MPA) 1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A  Formation of the Anti-Diesel
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“famous” and “notorious” being benzpyrene.334 The measurement of benzpyrene was, in
fact, used as a “guide to the degree of general polycyclic hydrocarbon pollution.”335 At
this stage, the national incidence of lung cancer had risen dramatically, but no single
cause of the disease had been “scientifically demonstrated.”336 He felt that “every
possible factor should be investigated.”337 Myddelton was adamant that adhering to the
theory that there was only one cause was obscuring the fact that there may be other, and
far more powerful, causes of lung cancer.
Conceptions of pollution had become far reaching; coal-based pollution was now seen to
be central, but not singularly important, in the production of atmospheric pollution.
Numerous amenities of modern living, including the production of electricity, tobacco
and motor vehicles, were now being connected to the introduction of powerful
carcinogens into the atmosphere - but without definitive proof these remained largely
unregulated. Such questions certainly had the effect of expanding the scope of
understanding of pollution and its dire repercussions. Despite this, mining remained the
major source of pollution, with broad representation in the discussion of the Commission
of Enquiry.
The Commission was riddled with opposing viewpoints on the source of pollution and its
links to both environmental and health problems. Some members were more radical than
others. Mr. R. Mitchell, the town engineer of the Springs Municipality, was extremely
outspoken about the dust problem from mine dumps.338 He criticized the fact that the
dumps had not even warranted enough attention to be considered a problem, “so much as
being merely a nuisance.”339 Mitchell also corrected the misconception that mine dump
dust was a “local problem.”340 He unequivocally regarded this as a national problem,
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covering “the Witwatersrand proper, the Western Transvaal, the Eastern Transvaal from
Springs to Kinross and part of the Free State.”341 This certainly did not fit the description
of ‘local.’ He went on to argue that there were “more towns in South Africa affected by
dust from slimes dams at present, than there (were) towns with a smoke problem.”342 The
situation was simply getting worse with time, and would continue to degenerate to such a
degree that
in 40 or 50 years it (would) probably be impossible to live in the area…it is not the same as with other
forms of atmospheric pollution where pollution stops when the agency producing it closes down… the
reverse (was) rather true, because the real problem (was) created after a mine (had) ceased to function…the
slimes dams and mine dumps steadily erode as time goes on and as rain and weather conditions break up
the hard crust at the surface, so thick layers of dust become thicker and thicker. All dumps go through this
process although they may differ as to the composition of the material.343
Mitchell’s description was certainly true of the mine dumps circling the town and vicinity
of Witbank. He went a step further by arguing that this constituted a “far more urgent
problem than that created by smoke.”344 Dust was “more intensive and destructive.”345
His message was urgent, in that there was a
limit to the time within which such measures should be applied namely before a mine is closed down.
Otherwise, who is to be held responsible for such measures after the mine has closed down and who is
going to finance them?346
Mitchell’s argument must have frustrated the core group of the Commission of Inquiry,
who were already tasked with a massive set of concerns in tackling coal-based
atmospheric pollution. Despite his renegade attitude and incisive critique, Mitchell fell in
line when it came to the role of the mining industry. He deferred to this sector by
specifying that “he did not want to be interpreted…as being unfairly critical of the mining
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companies.”347 He even defended the damage already done by the industry by arguing
that the pollution by the mid 1960s had not been anticipated by them. The dust problem
had only started “when dumps were abandoned.”348
The Air Pollution Prevention Bill was approved by the Minister of Health on August 6,
1963. Copies were printed in both official languages and made available to individuals
and organizations to give time for comments on the Commission’s recommendations
before the draft legislation was introduced to parliament. By 1965, the Minister of Health
announced the promulgation of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA). Its
central objective was the control and amelioration of the “health and amenity
implications of air pollution.”349 The administrative powers of the APPA would be vested
in the Ministry of Health. Much of the work related to the implementation of the Act was
of an “engineering or a chemical engineering nature, or else…mechanical and
combustion engineering.”350 Thus, a National Air Pollution Advisory Committee was
established to assist the Department of Health with technical information and advice. The
Act in effect empowered the Minister of Health to take action over atmospheric pollution
by declaring any area to be a ‘controlled’ site in terms of the Act.
The human cost of the coal mining industry
Nobody will deny that… the air is rotten… they say you don’t have to smoke in Witbank, you just walk
outside and take a… deep breathe.351
The 1950s and 1960s saw tremendous changes in the way pollution was understood. Both
social and scientific connections were being made around the numerous environmental
and health implications of ongoing uncontrolled atmospheric pollution. Air pollution was
affecting the health of the environment, with indelible implications to the health and
general well-being of off-mine communities windswept by the dust and particulates
released in the process of industry. Often, these effects were indistinguishable.
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Throughout the Witbank coalfield, this was felt in terms of the health and general quality
of living of those nearby active or underground mines, smoke stacks of power stations,
dust-blown coal dumps and industrial sites.
Malcolm Suttill, an English engineer for whom Witbank had recently become home
through his recruitment by Anglo’s subsidiary, Highveld Steel & Vanadium, remembered
his initial arrival in the area in mid 1968. His first winter was spent in the single
compound accommodation made available for professional industrialists looking to
permanently settle in the town. He vividly recalled the misery of regular invasions of
black, gritty dust blowing out of the smoke stack of the Witbank power station. This
power station had closed by the time of his arrival, “but the tip was totally open.”352 His
single quarters were quite close to it:
in windy weather I mean there was all-sorts blowing off this… ash tip…horrible…and that continued for a
lot of years before they seemed to get some good grass on it and then they, they got rid of most of it and
um… it was horrible, it used to blow all over the place…. I can remember that (it) was so cold when the
wind blew in and seeing the wind blowing and then blowing this ash up as well… it was pretty horrible
living anywhere near that thing at the time… yes, that was bad.353
Suttill and his family had joined a wave of English technical experts and miners who
settled in the town during this time. He recalled that they were “quite concerned about the
health of (their) children.”354 Lungs in small children were more prone to damage as they
were not yet fully formed. Inhalation of excessive dust and smoke was particularly
unhealthy for this age group. He recalled that bronchitis, asthma and other lung-related
ailments were “a bit of an issue.”355 His diminution of the gravity of the health
implications echoed E.C. Halliday’s curious hesitation in proclaiming a clear link
between pollution and lung disease. During one discussion, he had been asked by a
member of the Commission of Inquiry whether he thought that “pollution of the air
352 Interview with Malcolm Suttill, Witbank, June 3, 2008
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
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adversely affect(ed) health to such an extent as to justify the introduction of machinery
for the control of industries.” In response to this, Halliday had argued that
the cautious attitude to adapt towards air pollution would be to say that it constitutes a hindrance to good
health…generally, when a person is ill, pollution of the air prevents him from getting well easily because
there is no doubt that air pollution restricts breathing, although less with some persons than with others.356
Proclamations made by scientists and health experts were not based on exhaustive
research. In fact, very little research had been conducted outside of the realm of
occupational health – particularly in relation to environmental exposure. The question of
absolute knowledge had become significant in establishing the relationship between air
pollution and respiratory disease. Any level of doubt made it difficult for advocacy
groups to isolate blame to any of the ‘scheduled industries’, including energy, steel and
mining.  In May, 1965, the Star published a letter from H. Nelson, a Medical Officer of
Health. This formed part of a cautionary discourse around polluted air and its
ramifications. While he was aware of its possible effect on young children, very little was
known “about what effect it (could) have on the unborn child.”357 Most pre-natal deaths
observed by him were “due to prematurity and atelectasis of the lungs,” but he was “quite
unaware of polluted air being the cause of either of these.”358 The limited conception of
air pollution was clearly linked to a lack of knowledge. Without being equipped with
medico-scientific proof of the relationship between air pollution and coal mining, little
could be done, and Witbank continued to change. Ignorant of the long-term health effects
of smoke exposure, and largely reliant on an industrial economy, the majority of the local
population was forced to tolerate the unpleasantness of the smoggy town. Two companies
cited were Rand Carbide and Cyanamid. One of the complaints leveled at Cyanamid was
not about the smoke so much…we used to get what we called tomcat smell…they were making cyanide for
one thing. They were making some of the products going into pharmaceuticals as well, from sort of carbon
and nitrogen type products… and um, and some of that stuff…was… some of the early antibiotics… they
356 NASA, GES/1642/116/26D ‘Minutes of Evidence from the Select Committee on the Subject of the Air
Pollution Prevention Bill’, March 8, 1961
357 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A Letter from H. Nelson, Medical Officer of Health, to the assistant to
the Editor, Star, Johannesburg, May 12, 1965
358 Ibid.
- 105 -
were burning off some of their rubbish all the time. It was a constant thing… it was horrible… that was
really, really bad pollution… people wanted to move it was so bad and they wouldn’t own up to it and we
all got it….whenever the wind came in our direction it was horrible… we didn’t think that was detrimental
to health… (although) it was affecting our standard of living… it was that nasty.359 (My italics)
The APPA set a new precedent for environmental regulation, forcing industries to
measure their levels of air pollution. However, it was not simply the smoke from a single
industry that needed to be halted. Pollution in Witbank came with a myriad of sources.
The strength of the APPA was limited in dealing with the full impact of pollution. It
would remain difficult to relieve the grumblings of local residents complaining over the
aesthetic and olfactory pollution of their air.
Conclusion
In the decades following the Second World War, conceptions of coal-based pollution had
changed beyond recognition. Local and global experiences of acute pollution during the
1950s had raised awareness and fortified the call for research around atmospheric
pollution and water conservation, as well as the implementation of systems of control. In
many instances, research involved merely citing the appearance of industrial towns such
as Witbank, which not only produced at least half of the nation’s coal, but also hosted the
majority of its conversion into electric power. Witbank also hosted other industries,
creating an amalgam of smells and fogs which covered the town. Despite the fact that
pollution had been decisively conceived as something to be dealt with by the state,
measures remained restricted by the economic and political prioritization of coal mining
and industrial production. The following chapter will evaluate how far legislation
promulgated in the mid 1960s was implemented, and how these policies manifested
within the pre-existing industrialized ecology of the Witbank coalfield.
359 Interview with Malcolm Suttill, Witbank, June 3, 2008
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Chapter Four
Adapting to change: conceptions of pollution in Witbank: 1965 – 1978
Introduction
I am sure we can adapt to the dirt, pollution and noise… but that is the real tragedy – we can adapt to it.360
By 1965, the steady expansion of heavy industry, particularly the establishment of
Highveld Steel and Vanadium in the town compounded environmental problems in the
town and surrounding veld land. After two decades of debate over the scope of its
mandate, the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA), South Africa’s first major
legislation on pollution, was finally passed. Monitoring the prevention of pollution
became a competency of the mining department of the state, but this did little to change
the gravity of coal-based pollution. As a result of growing international interest, the
opening of Richard’s Bay Coal Terminal and the introduction of open cast mining
methods, coal production had grown exponentially by the late 1970s.  Pollution was now
no longer ignored by the state – but economic growth made it impossible to prevent.
Responses of government, industry and civil society stakeholders to new protective
legislation such as the APPA and the amended Water Act of 1966 reflected new
conceptions of pollution and highlighted the need for new ways of monitoring pollution.
This chapter addresses the effects of these new conceptions on Witbank between 1965
and 1978, when the Witbank coal industry was swung in a new direction by the
successful implementation of opencast mining methods in the region.
Responding to the APPA: 1965-1968
The implementation of the APPA changed the nature of legal control over the
environment. Local and national authorities became regulatory bodies for the control of
air pollution. Disciplinary measures were set in place for contravention of APPA
360 Dubos, R. ‘Mere Survival is Not Enough for Man’, Life (Special Environmental Issue), 49, 3, August 3,
1970
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regulations. This included, on first conviction, a fine not exceeding R200, or a prison
term not exceeding six months. A second conviction resulted in a fine not exceeding
R1000, or up to one year of imprisonment.361 The Act thus recognized and reconceived
the liability of industry for pollution they had created. Despite this breakthrough, some of
its terms remained vague, reflecting certain difficulties in implementation.
In terms of monitoring private industry, the APPA relied on the ability – or the capacity –
of local authorities to enforce control measures, and punishments were rarely meted out.
According to Sections 14(1) and (11) the Minister of Health was empowered to grant
local authorities jurisdiction to control atmospheric pollution by smoke.362 This would
include the right to “enter upon premises and to inspect fuel burning appliances.”363
Action against coal-based smoke pollution could be taken at four levels, including
making use of powers without promulgating regulations; promulgating only one or two
regulations; promulgating a considerable number of regulations – and promulgating
regulations and establishing a “smoke control zone.”364 Lack of clarity over defining
what level of pollution was ‘reasonably practicable’ led to conflict of interest between
various stakeholders.
In Witbank, the ability of the local authority to ameliorate smoke conditions was
obstructed by the fact that power stations had been added to the “schedule of noxious
industries.”365 This meant that they came under the control of the Chief Officer and not
the local authority. Smoke officials were thus required to report concerns to the Chief
Officer who would then deal with the power station. This was conceived as helping the
361 NASA, Transvaal Council for the Development of Peri-urban Areas (1936 - 1981) (TRB) 2/4/93
Circular (No. 9 of 1966) to all local authorities in the Republic – regarding the Atmospheric Pollution
Prevention Act of 1965, re: ‘Standard Smoke Control Regulations’, August 12, 1966
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
364 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Circular (No 21 of 1966) from Department of Health to All Local Authorities in the
Republic, re: ‘Four Levels at which Local Authorities could operate Part III of the APPA’, December 22,
1966
365 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 E.C. Halliday, ‘Address on Air Pollution Prevention’, Walmer Town Hall, March
10, 1967
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local smoke official, supposedly relieving him of the burden of dealing with factory
owners.366
The state was now responsible for the adequate implementation of air pollution
prevention methods of scheduled industries. Understanding of pollution was now guided
by definitions laid out in the APPA – particularly relating to the definition of ‘scheduled
industries’ subject to government control. The establishment of the National Air Pollution
Advisory Committee was seen as a crucial component for effective policy
implementation. Gradual implementation of the APPA was seen as the most effective
way of adapting to shifting environmental conditions. The implementation of the Act was
thus guided by a principle of tiered application. Explaining the strategy behind the
‘gentle’ process, E.C. Halliday argued that
as time goes by the situation cannot get better, it must get worse…if you pass an Act and you start taking
advantage of the Act, you can do it gently; you don’t have to be so severe as you would have to be if you
had to control and try to reduce smoke nuisance at a stage where the smoke concentration had become
worse, where you had to have a very much more violent reaction and be very much harder on the general
public.367
One of the first tasks of the newly formed National Air Pollution Advisory Committee
was to standardize maximum smoke density.368 It was thus necessary to develop a
“prescribed instrument for measuring and comparing…smoke emission with the
standard.”369 Without this, “any enforcement action would be based on personal
opinion.”370 Critics challenged the methods used to measure the density of smoke based
on the imprecision of the method. The scientific basis for determining reasonable
maximum smoke density was that smoke emissions could not appear to be “of a shade
equal to or darker” than the second shade on Ringelman’s Chart.371 This chart was one of
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid.
368 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A Letter from Chief Traffic Officer to Town Clerk, Medical Officer,
Pretoria, 1965
369 Ibid
370 Ibid.
371 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Memorandum from Secretary of the Department of Health to All Local Authorities
in the Republic, re: ‘How to determine the density of smoke’,  February 10, 1967
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a number of rudimentary methods specifically developed “to determine whether smoke
emissions (were) excessive or not.”372 The chart was held in position by a first person at
an “appropriate distance” from the second person, who acted as the observer. The chart,
representing different shades of grey, would then be held “so that the top of the stack
appear(ed) over the edge of the chart so that the observer (could) compare the blackness
of the smoke with that of the squares on the chart.”373 A second method involved optical
instruments, and was known as the “miniature smoke chart.”374 The small monocular
instrument was aimed at the top of the chimney or smoke stack.375 The images would
then be adjusted so that the filters could be seen with an image of the smoke in the clear
space beside them. This made it possible to compare the darkness on the chart with the
darkness of the smoke. Testing did not take into account smoke emitted during the start-
up or overhaul of a fuel burning appliance, as well as any breakdown or unforeseen
disturbance of factory appliances. These diminished the efficiency of the process of
determining permitted maximum smoke density.376
The lack of general expertise in the field of smoke and general pollution control was a
latent burden for the implementation of the APPA. In a 1966 national circular from the
Department of Health to all competent local authorities, the “real problem” was seen as
being the lack of experienced personnel.377 Even when the operator of the boiler causing
unduly black smoke emissions was requested to comply, “considerable difficulty” was
often encountered within the factory or power station.378 The Department of Health thus
recommended to local authorities that owing to a lack of technical skills, “purely legal
action, such as sending a demand to the owner, (was) not likely to have the required
372 Ibid. Other devices on the market during this time included the British Telesmoke, and the US Mine
Safety Appliance Company’s Smokescope. They were generally measured against the Ringelman Chart,
which was regarded to have a “high accuracy.”
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid. A monocular is a magnifying glass device for use through only one eye.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
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effect.”379 The owner, suddenly forced into a system of smoke control, was, in any case,
unlikely to be equipped. The employment of a smoke control officer within larger local
authorities with more sophisticated industries was seen as “indispensable.”380 The local
authority had a right to say whether or not an industry could build a factory on a certain
site – if they allowed it they could “cause their own area of jurisdiction more or less
trouble.”381 Hence, additional technical staff with genuine expertise in pollution
mitigation and prevention was highly recommended. Despite this, Halliday advocated a
policy of compromise and settlement, arguing that
the important thing (was) if possible not to get to the Court Case…it means you’ve failed. An Inspector
who gets to that stage has lost his friendship and now has got a real enemy and is in big trouble. If you can
persuade, push or encourage the industrialist to reduce his smoke output without a Court order, he is doing
very much better.382
The APPA was thus “not designed to make a sudden change.”383 This placed pressure on
local authorities who were urged to get “experience” with small concerns before trying to
declare smoke control zones.384 In Witbank, the void of environmental control measures
in the town was made more explicit, as were the financial implications of implementing
such controls. The difficulty of enforcing legislation was compounded by a number of
factors, including the strength of the industry, South Africa’s ongoing reliance on coal as
a staple source of energy, and the scientific uncertainty around defining ‘reasonably
practicable’ methods of pollution reduction.385
The mandate of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act of 1965 gave power over only
certain industries designated as ‘scheduled.’ One major critique of the Act was the way in
which it conceived industry: ‘scheduled’ industry was generally understood to be
379 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Circular (No 21 of 1966) from Department of Health to All Local Authorities in the
Republic, re: ‘Four Levels at which Local Authorities could operate Part III of the APPA’, December 22,
1966
380 Ibid.
381 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 E.C. Halliday, Address on Air Pollution Prevention, Walmer Town Hall, March 10,
1967
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“carrying out certain processes…mostly producing strategic materials which involve(d) a
certain amount of secrecy.”386 Such prescriptions made monitoring and reducing smoke
emissions difficult.
Responsibility for air pollution from other sources, including non-scheduled industries,
still fell upon local authorities, who also had to control domestic smoke and diesel
exhaust fumes. In a letter to the Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Health
concerning the definition of ‘noxious and offensive gases’ to be included in the Act,
Halliday argued that it was beyond practicability to include “all the different gases the
health officials wish(ed) to put in.”387 For the purposes of the APPA, the proposed
definition included a host of substances, when in gaseous form, including “hydrocarbons,
organic nitrogen sulphur or halogen compound, beryllium, chromium, mercury, varidium
(and) dust from asbestos processing.”388 Prevention was understood in relation to the
‘best practicable means’ that could be taken to abate pollution.
This policy had been successfully followed in Britain, setting a useful precedent for
South Africa. Item 15 of Part 2 of the APPA declared that no fuel burning appliance was
to be installed “in or on any premises” unless it was “reasonably practicable” that the
appliance could be “operated simultaneously without emitting dark smoke or smoke of a
colour darker than may be prescribed regulation.”389 Part IV related to dust control,
whereby relevant authorities would “take the prescribed steps or (where no steps ha(d)
been prescribed) adopt the best practicable means for preventing such dust from
becoming so dispersed or causing such nuisance.”390 This even applied to the height of
chimneys and smoke stacks, which were to be “as far as practicable…sufficient to
prevent smoke or any other product of combustion from becoming prejudicial to health or
a nuisance to occupiers of premises in the surrounding areas.”391 Following the ‘best
practicable means’ ultimately meant demonstrating to the inspectorate of the Department
386 Ibid.
387 NASA, GES/1639/116/26A, Halliday, E.C. General Physics Research Laboratory, CSIR to Mr. Marr,
Parliamentary Secretary, Department of Health, (undated)
388 Ibid.
389 NASA, GES/1643/116/26E Part II, Item 15, ‘Control of Noxious or Offensive Gases’, January 22, 1965
390 NASA, GES/1643/116/26E Part IV, ‘Dust Control’, January 22, 1965
391 Ibid.
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of Health that “taking into consideration the technological remedies available, local
conditions and the company’s financial position, it (was) doing the best it (could) to abate
pollution.”392 This also meant refining budgets to include the cost of environmental
fallout.
E.C. Halliday, architect of the APPA, had anticipated resistance from the mining industry
over the added cost of controlling smoke pollution.393 He argued firmly that members of
the National Air Pollution Advisory Committee should not represent any “particular
industrial group” as this would create “some degree of compulsion to support their
‘constituency’.”394 It would thus be the job of the non-technical members of the national
air pollution prevention task force to tackle resistance from this influential sector, forcing
them to adapt to new regulations.
Communication between state and industry representatives was crucial at this point in
order to comply with new industry standards. These challenges were reflected in
correspondence between the Department of Health and the Collieries Committee of the
Chamber of Mines in June 1965, whose interest was founded on the effect that the APPA
provisions would have on the coal industry, particularly Witbank, where
the control of air pollution (was) recognized by all responsible persons and bodies as desirable…at the
same time, it present(ed) difficult problems which (could) best be solved with the cooperation and goodwill
of all interested parties.395
The Collieries Committee emphasized the importance of ongoing coal production, being
the “only indigenous source of fuel in the Republic,” supplying 90 percent of national
fuel needs.396 Since most large industrial users were able to comply with smokeless
combustion techniques, such users were not regarded as an obstacle.397
392 Clarke, J, Our Fragile Land, p. 47
393 NASA, CT/719 Memorandum (related to the application of the APPA), June 28, 1965
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The blame for ongoing smoke emission was leveled at “small industrial concerns” – and
most of all with domestic users, whose total combined coal consumption was 4.8 million
tons, equal to around ten percent of the annual national tonnage of fuel consumed each
year.398
As a cheap staple fuel source, coal was popular for heat and energy in segregated African
townships throughout South Africa. This included the locations surrounding Witbank,
which would “completely disappear under smoke” during the dry barren winter months
of the Highveld.399 With almost no investment in infrastructural development of these
locations, it was difficult for the state to enforce pollution control measures, or even to
switch to electricity or gas, such that even local authorities had “given up this idea.”400
This environmental racism was plainly accepted by the Act, revealing the partiality of the
its scope. This meant that there was no “nice solution” for controlling such pollution.401
Witbank in the ‘pollution game’: 1971 - 1978
In Witbank, energy production was still the backbone of the town’s local economy. The
APPA now required each municipality to “ensure the burning of solid fuel smokelessly in
all Municipal undertakings.”402 It also placed pressure on the Witbank municipality to
assert control over emissions. Debates arose over whether it was possible to replace, or at
least supplement, coal consumption with an alternative solid smokeless fuel. The
financial burden was emphasized by the Collieries Committee of the Chamber of Mines.
398 Ibid.
399 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Halliday, E.C. Address on Air Pollution Prevention, Walmer Town Hall, March 10,
1967
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401 Ibid. Reference to ‘Bantu’ locations surrounding Witbank was based on the provisions of Section 2(1) of
the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, which had determined Witbank’s location as being
“the land situate(d) within the area of jurisdiction of the urban local authority of Witbank, which (had) been
defined and set apart as a Bantu residential area and Bantu village.” See NASA,
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It argued that the minimum production cost of such a shift would be R4 per ton over and
above the cost of the coal which it would replace. This would thus involve consumers in
a minimum additional cost of nearly R20 million per annum.403 Considering local
reliance on the coal industry, the Committee felt that this would be catastrophic for the
local economy.
The use of anthracite, a hard, solid combustible fossil fuel, was thus advocated by the
South African Anthracite Producers Association. A pamphlet produced by this
association soon after the APPA was passed, explored the benefits of burning anthracite,
a harder version of coal. Compared to bituminous coal, anthracite was relatively free of
impurities, making consumption more efficient. Anthracite usually burned evenly,
making it necessary to refuel only every twelve hours. Anthracite could thus be “relied
upon…at whatever time during the day or night.”404 Replacing coal with carbon-rich
staples such as anthracite threatened the relative monopoly of the coal industry over a
rapidly growing energy sector. The best way to minimise Witbank’s coal-based pollution
would be to develop mechanisms which enabled smokeless consumption.405
Comparisons between the quality of South African carbon-based fossil fuel and more
mature coal industries in the United Kingdom and Europe were common. South African
anthracite, mined from the Vryheid region of Northern Natal, was compared to “Welsh
Dry Steam Coal”.406 Such parallels were not restricted to the quality of coal, but also
extended to popular perceptions of environmental dangers and hazards. Mature in age
and experience, the British industry had placed “a lot more attention to the environment
earlier,” and Witbank’s imported skilled personnel were usually familiar with the
“pollution game.”407 This included hired officials of the local Highveld Steel and
Vanadium factory. With its patented synthesis of iron and vanadium to produce
reinforced steel, Witbank’s Highveld Steel and Vanadium was, in many ways, a strong
403 Ibid.
404 NASA, CT/103/116/26 ‘The Burning of Anthracite’, a pamphlet produced by the Anthracite Producers
Association, 1965
405 Ibid.
406 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69 D1/37/A, Letter from chairman of SA Anthracite to Town Clerk, Pretoria, May
12, 1965
407 Interview with Malcolm Suttill, Witbank, June 3, 2008
- 115 -
candidate for environmental control by the APPA. Employing hundreds by the late
1960s, it represented a significant growth trend for local industry.
The process at Highveld was unique: vanadium would be used to make beams smaller,
with the same strength.408 As a subsidiary of Anglo American, Highveld was expected to
maintain international industry standards related to controlling pollution. Within the
company, there existed a “bit of grumble…about looking after the environment,” but it
was never considered to pose a threat or “major situation.”409 By 1967, there was little
question of the significance of the Air Pollution Research Group, a state-subsidized trust
set up to support the implementation of the APPA. The centrality of the CSIR in the
continued control and management of the fund was underscored at the sixth general
meeting of the body in October of that year, where the CSIR sought to obtain inclusion of
the basic budget of the Air Pollution Research Group in the general parliament grant
made to the CSIR. N. Stutterheim, vice president of the CSIR, argued for this move based
on the fact that the “group (was) now largely supported by the CSIR out of other
revenue.”410 A request was thus made to dissolve the Standing Committee of
Contributors to the Air Pollution Research Fund to facilitate incorporation into the CSIR.
The financial report of the Air Pollution Research Group (APRG) of the CSIR for the
second quarter of 1967, specifically April until July, reflected that the CSIR contribution
of R4943, which was more than the contribution of R4943 from external bodies.411 The
APRG budget for 1968-1969 projected more than R30 550 coming from the CSIR
contribution.412 The CSIR argued for greater control over the work of the APRG; in any
case, the onus fell on them.413
Another active body was the Solid Fuels Advisory Bureau, which held a conference in
Johannesburg in February, 1968, to assist municipalities with the practical application of
408 Ibid.
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the APPA.414 This featured a range of speakers, including the Medical Officer of Health
from Johannesburg, the Director of Environmental Sciences Library of the Chamber of
Mines, an economist from Wits University, industrial representatives, as well as two Air
Pollution Control Officers, and even a number of delegates from the Witbank
municipality.415 Chaired by E.C. Halliday, the proceedings revealed shifting conceptions
of the relationship between pollution and public health, the economic cost to South Africa
and to the consumer, as well as effective use of the APPA. It also covered new techniques
in combustion and gasification, as well as ways in which to establish and operate an
industrial environmental control section. The seminar ended off with a workshop on how
to measure pollution, what levels of control to use, when and how to implement such
controls, approving appliances and effectively using smoke indicators such as the
Ringelman Chart.416 Symposiums also targeted specific industries, including one held in
August, 1968, for the South African Institute of Foundrymen.417 This symposium was
appropriately technical in nature, dealing with the control of gaseous emissions from iron
and steel foundries, assessment of dust and fume inside factories and foundries,
evaluating the value of fabric filter dust collectors, as well as understanding foundries in
relation to dust diseases. The initiative brought together speakers from the Air Pollution
Research Group, under E.C. Halliday. Concerns over the relationship between smoke and
lung disease were presented by Dr. J. Webster, head of the national Pneumoconiosis
Research Unit.
Such visible interventions by the CSIR dramatically changed the way coal-based
pollution in Witbank was understood, but this did little to dispel the idea that achieving
an APPA clearance certificate was “nothing more than a license to pollute.”418 Another
general shortcoming was that no set standards had been laid down, so that the “sole
arbiter of whether a factory is applying ‘the best practicable means’ (was) the chief
414 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A Letter from S. Thomas, General Manager, Coal Bureau, Solid Fuels
Advisory Bureau, Johannesburg, to the Medical Officer in Pretoria, re: Seminar: ‘The Practical Application
by Municipalities of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act of 1965’, February 15, 1968
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.
417 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A Reminder Notice, SA Institute of Foundrymen, Air Pollution
Symposium, CSIR, Pretoria, August 1, 1968
418 Clarke, J. Our Fragile Land, 1974, p. 47
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officer of the Industrial Hygiene Division of the Department of Health.”419 Without laid-
out standards, the credibility of the APPA was undermined, “so it (was) purely a rule of
thumb decision by one man.”420 With only five inspectors to control 745 industries
operating more than 1000 scheduled processes, “it (was) inevitable they (were)
overworked.”421 In addition, inspectors conceived of themselves as “advisors…first and
foremost, (so) they tend(ed) to get pretty pally with polluters and address(ed) them by
their first names.”422
Such shortcomings paved the way for an independent air pollution lobby from the civil
sector, which was visibly active by 1968. By March an action committee was formed to
establish an environmental non-governmental organisation to fight against atmospheric
pollution. The chairman of the committee, J.L. Easterbrook, argued that the proposed
‘Clean Air Society’ would provide a forum for “airing differences of opinion between
controllers and controlled.”423 It would also ensure that industries, organisations and the
general public were “equipped to speak publicly when it was necessary that a lead should
be given to public thinking.”424 After all, the existence of environmental legislation
certainly did not mean that pollution would be “simply removed.”425 Such an association
would, in fact, benefit industry, providing a “channel” to facilitate the implementation of
air pollution control. The Clean Air Society would serve as a “buffer” between
government authorities and scheduled industries who feared making direct enquiries “lest
unfavourable attention be directed to their activities.”426
Opposition to the formation of such a group came from the Coal Bureau and the Air
Pollution Research Group, who felt that the Clean Air Society was redundant. Countering
such claims, Easterbrook argued that the society provided a unique opportunity for
419 Ibid.
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communication between stakeholders. Easterbrook referred to Witbank’s immense
problems of pollution, specifically the outlying residential zone of Clewer which formed
part of the local municipality. Here, local air pollution had become a matter of serious
concern. Clewer’s natural water resources were already compromised, particularly the
water mine pollution of the Brugspruit stream before it entered the Olifants River
destined to the Loskop Dam.  With the arrival of numerous factories in the vicinity of the
district by the late 1960s, pre-existing conditions of pollution in the area already affected
began to spiral.427 Community representatives, namely the regional secretary of the Clean
Air Society, were adamant that “grave measures should be adopted as a requirement.”428
South Africa’s Chief Medical Officer had even committed to investigating Clewer’s air
pollution problem and to take measures to resolve the problem.
This pressure from the civil sector forced the Transvaal Board for the Development of
Peri-urban Areas to investigate the issue. Upon closer inspection, the Board found that
the major local polluter was Highveld Steel and Vanadium, close to Clewer on the
northern side of Witbank. This industrial enterprise periodically emitted smoke which
looked like “red smoke clouds.”429 The properties of the smoke were harmful, raising
concerns over the poison gases contained in Highveld’s scheduled processes.430 Wind
blowing “dangerous” smoke and particulates into Clewer meant that the community had
to regularly “endure” these conditions.431
By 1968, the definition for “noxious or offensive gas” was extended, and published in the
South African Government Gazette.432 It aimed to more clearly sketch out the content of
smoke emitted from industrial and mining concerns. The more scientifically precise
definitions included polycyclic hydrocarbons, smoke, grit and dust. Most notably, the
427 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Memorandum, from Regional Secretary, Action Committee, Clean Air Society, re:
Air Pollution in Clewer’, May 31, 1968 (Translated from Afrikaans)
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid.
430 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Letter from the Transvaal Board for the Development of Peri-Urban Areas re: ‘Air
Pollution in Witbank’, June 7, 1968 (Translated from Afrikaans)
431 Ibid.
432 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 ‘Extension of definition for noxious and offensive gas’, Government Gazette, No.
2117, July 5, 1968, p. 11
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amended definition reflected the idea that not only visible smoke pollution was
dangerous.433 By October 1968, the Chief Medical Officer of Health (MOH), who had
visited Highveld Steel and Vanadium the previous month, wrote to Mr. Visser, then-
General Manager of Highveld.434 He informed him that processes at Highveld had now
been included under a second schedule of industries subject to the regulations in the
APPA. He emphasized the need to more closely monitor carbon dioxide, and suggested
that “in view of the particularly hazardous nature of this gas a few canaries would
possibly serve a useful purpose.”435 He also argued that because of the high vanadium
content of Highveld’s ore, representing the “whole world consumption about 30 years
ago,” there was a dire need for monitoring.436 The MOH further recommended the
introduction of “periodic vanadium estimation in urine of employees” as the toxic effect
of the element had not been established.437 The MOH was also concerned with how
Highveld managed its iron ore dust, sewage and sludge disposal – as well as the way it
controlled pollution when installations broke down. This alluded to the “massive amounts
of red dust and smoke” emitted during emergency shut-downs or repairs.438 By that
December, Highveld had restored its smoke prevention devices, but the process had
begun to draw attention to the need for more civil participation in the protection of
Witbank’s local natural resources. These were being compromised by coal-based
pollution, as well as growing awareness of “poisonous gases” that were becoming fully
recognized as “harmful to people and animals” with which they came into contact.439
The Clean Air Society continued to function during the 1970s, and eventually became
known as the National Association for Clean Air. This group recognised the link between
clean environment and public health, and even hosted a conference in October, 1972,
433 Ibid. The extended list defining noxious and offensive gas included “fumes containing iron, nickel,
aluminium, magnesium, molybdenum, titanium, tungsten, selenium, potassium, sodium, silicon, calcium,
phosphorous and compounds, carbon monoxide, acetylene, benzene, aminos, pyridine (derivatives),
polycyclic hydrocarbons, smoke, grit and dust.”
434 NASA, TRB/2/4/93 Report to Action Committee of the Clean Air Society, re: Air Pollution in Clewer,
November 13, 1968
435 NASA, TRB 2/4/93 Assistant Secretary Report to Action Committee of the Clean Air Society re: MOH
inspection of Highveld, December 6, 1968
436 Ibid.
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entitled ‘Smoke, the Citizen and Control.’440 It soon aligned with organisations such as
the Institute for Public Health, whose first newsletter gave advice to both domestic and
industrial coal users regarding air pollution. The newsletter identified that “smog or
smoke-filled air (was) the cause of the lowering of the resistance of our bodies to colds,
bronchitis and other chest ailments.”441 The newsletter advised domestic coal users to
replace the ordinary coal stove with a smokeless one, to use anthracite or oil burning
heaters, and not to burn refuse.
Awareness campaigns drew attention to the plight of those suffering from dust-related
disease, including tuberculosis sufferers. The medico-scientific link between air pollution
and lung disease had not been proven, but there were clear indications that “it certainly
aggravate(d) their symptoms and increase(d) the frequency and severity of asthma
attacks.”442 The belief that early childhood exposure to heavy atmospheric pollution
contributed to a “lowered pulmonary reserve capacity in adults” meant that children from
Witbank “suffered a greater risk of developing lung disease as adults than children raised
in cleaner communities.”443
The acknowledgement of the relationship between lung disease and coal-based pollution
was no doubt alarming to members of the community. Already faced with ample
evidence of the degradation of quality of air, the pollution of local water supplies seemed
too onerous to face.
440 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69 D1/37/A Symposium of the National Association for Clean Air, August 22,
1972
441 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A Newsletter, Institute for Public Health, September 12, 1972
442 ‘Pollution and your health’, EPA, 1976
443 Ibid.
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Silent spring: mine water pollution in Witbank
Like air, water is not limitless, nor free, nor somehow immune to the pollution which affects other aspects
of the environment.444
The recognition that pollution was not only based on what was visible to the eye changed
conceptions of pollution, and, in many ways, revolutionized responses to it. The Institute
of Public Health continued to remind coal users to “be pollution conscious.”445 This
attitude went beyond pollution from any specific source, and began to serve as the basis
for responses to water pollution as a result of exposure to effluents found in industrial
undertakings or produced as a result of mine water pollution. Some of these changes are
reflected in the amendments made to the Water Act of 1965 throughout the 1960s.
The Water Act set in motion new debates of mine water pollution, and its first
amendment was enacted in 1961. It specified that anyone wishing to start an industrial
undertaking had to advise the Secretary of Water Affairs of the “nature and the method of
purification of the waste water, effluent or waste” which would be produced.446 It also
specified that water use for industrial purposes which, on average, exceeded 50 000
gallons per day had to apply to the Minister for a permit.
By 1966 another amendment was made, mainly affecting the nature of responsibility held
by local authorities regarding water rights. The Commission of Enquiry into Water
Matters created the Water Research Commission (WRC) in 1966 to “fund strategic water
research.” This had a profound effect on the way water pollution was conceived, and
exposed new knowledge about pollution which had “previously been classified and thus
out of the public domain.”447 One of its first research projects involved the analysis of
444 Ibid.
445 NASA, MPA/1/4/7/3/69/D1/37/A Newsletter, Institute for Public Health, September 12, 1972
446 NASA, TES/2743 10/188 Letter from S.S. Morris, Cape Town City Engineer, to Town Clerk, Cape
Town, re: Water Amendment Bill, 1969
447 Turton, A. ‘SA water and mining policy: a study of strategies for transition management’, April 20,
2009, received draft copy from author
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human health implications from polluted groundwater. This paved the way for further
amendments in 1969, including a section giving consent to local authorities to “take over
the rights to water from a public stream from an owner of property within its area of
jurisdiction, subject to compensation being paid.”448 It was anticipated that this change
would help local authorities obtain water supplies. Section 23A of the third clause of the
amendment, which was soon promulgated as Act No. 77 of 1969, provided the Minister
of Water Affairs the right to take “steps against farmers” whose agricultural activities
polluted public or private water.449 These new harsh terms of regulation upon farmers
reflected a considerable shift away from previous state protectionist policies. It
highlighted new influences affecting the agenda of state support. Growing reliance on
multinational industry for trade and expansion within the mining sector set in motion a
period of exponential growth in production and pollution in the Witbank coalfield. This
growth would invariably have environmental impacts, but the town was not in a position
to resist this. The over-reliance of Witbank’s economy on coal production reinforced the
idea that pollution was not something to be prevented, but rather to be managed. Such
ideas were increasingly being met with continued resistance from a growing international
environmental movement which had, by then, drawn more attention to new ideas around
pollution – including the existence of the greenhouse effect and the long-term impact of
water acidification.
Local scientists and policy makers were not isolated from the global body of ideas around
water pollution. Correspondence between departments suggests profound governmental
awareness and keen interest in global environmental control measures. These included
scientific interventions in the mineral composition of water to supposedly remove
impurities.450 South African research initiatives were lauded internationally, and South
African scientists participated in gatherings of the International Association for Water
448 NASA, TES/2743/10/188 Letter from S.S. Morris, Cape Town City Engineer, to Town Clerk, Cape
Town, re: Water Amendment Bill, 1969
449 Ibid.
450 One example included the February, 1978, Silver Institute Letter (Information on Silver for Industry)
which outlined the attempt of Swiss scientists to electrolytically add “a minute quantity of silver ions to the
water…toxic to bacteria but harmless to higher organisms.” See NASA, DCD 2415 27/2/3/7 Letter from
Secretary for Commerce to Secretary for Planning and the Environment, re: enclosed information on ‘silver
as a water purifier,’ February, 1978
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Pollution Research.451 The work of the South African Water Research Committee
changed how water pollution was understood, but the rhetoric of water pollution
prevention did little to ameliorate the exploitative strategy of industrially-oriented water
management. It reflected a significant adaptation to a new reality of reduced water quality
and availability.
By the early 1970s, environmental concern had spilled over into mainstream media. The
Star’s Cleaner Air, Rivers and Environment (CARE) campaign during this period was the
platform for a new legion of environmental journalists to draw attention to the way in
which the apartheid state had “subdued the land, fenced in its creatures and harnessed its
wild rivers.”452 Environmental journalist John Jordi argued that
it was a massive task at first – foolhardy almost…but now we have emerged totally victorious. And it might
be our trouble: our victory was too total. In places nature has capitulated leaving behind poisoned, lifeless
streams; exhausted infertile soil; and each spring becomes more silent.453
James Clarke, another Star journalist, argued that “even if one could magically wave a
wand” to make the mine dumps disappear, including those of Witbank, the veld and river
beds were so “impregnated” with mine dump sand that it would take another century
before the contaminated soil recovered.454 Clarke referred to another phenomenon related
to water pollution, Eutrophication, whereby a water source such as a dam or lake begins
to “die” because of oxygen starvation after its plant life becomes boosted, or over-
stimulated, by the fertilizing properties of certain pollutants.455
Debate around water pollution soon became as contentious as the still-ongoing
negotiations around mitigating atmospheric pollution. Val Bolitho, regarded by
environmental specialists during the 1970s as a “top brain on water purification,” argued
that there was now a “very real danger of disturbing the ‘pollution equilibrium’ to a
451 NASA, URU/6123/1893 Letter from Executive Council, Department of the Prime Minister, re: Dr. G.J.
Stander, vice president of the Water Research Committee, December 1, 1971
452 Jordi, J. The Star, 10 March, 1970
453 Ibid.
454 Clarke, J. Our Fragile Land, p. 62
455 Ibid. p. 64
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disastrous degree.”456 This term implied the perceived balance between “man’s capacity
to pollute and nature’s to purify.”457 This referred to the diminishing capacity of the
environment to receive pollution and absorb it. Harsher measures by the state against
major polluters were strongly advocated, leading to the amendment of Section 23 of the
Water Act in 1974.458
South Africa’s policy of separate development, specifically the Group (Urban) Areas Act,
compromised this pollution equilibrium. Unless it was permitted by the Minister of Water
Affairs, Clause 29 of the Water Amendment Act of 1975 stipulated that “no township
(could) be established on riparian land” unless it was permitted by the Minister of Water
Affairs.459 The definition of “riparian” land was “not all that easy to apply” as the
definition was, in itself, vague.460 Riparian land, according to the Act, referred to land
bordering a ‘public stream.’461 This was defined as a
natural stream which flows in a known and defined channel…even if the channel is dry during any period
of the year and even if its conformation has been artificially changed… one would have great difficulty and
would, in fact, require expert knowledge to know whether a stream was a public stream.462
The Niemand Commission, created specifically for the purpose of “speeding up” the
declaration of black townships, was thus faced with the challenge of demystifying vague
legal definitions. It opposed the amendment, which sought to direct all township
applications pertaining to land “bordered by a stream or water” to the Department of
Water Affairs.463 This would prolong the decision making process, running contrary to
456 Ibid. p. 65
457 Ibid.
458 NASA, TES/2743/10/188 ‘Amendment of Section 23 of Act 54 of 1956, as amended by Section 3 of
Act 45 of 1972’, ‘Papers dealing with water research’,  1974-1975
459 NASA, TES/2743/10/188 Letter from Mr. Collins, Town Clerk, Johannesburg, to Mr. Strydom, United
Municipal Executive, Pretoria, 1975
460 Ibid.
461 Riparian rights generally denote the legal rights of the land owner on a river bank. With regard to the
Water Amendment Bill of 1975, this applied to legal rights granted under an original grant or deed of
transfer, or state land.
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the commission’s mandate of speeding up township proclamations.464 It seemed that the
“best way” to make Section 23 work was to “bring out a narrower definition of riparian
land.”465 This formed one of numerous tense debates around accurately defining natural
resources in line with their capacity to withstand pollution.
Such contention resulted in the further amendment of the Water Act in 1975, where the
purpose was specifically to “further define a certain offence regarding the pollution of
water.”466 Only Clause 29, which dealt with “the establishment and extension of
townships on riparian land likely to be inundated by public streams, attracted
comment.”467 In Witbank, the cost of developing dense residential housing near water
flowing downstream from active and abandoned coal mining operations was placed upon
the African population in townships dotting the coalfield. Long term water acidification
would result in constant shortages and reduced quality of supply.
Debates around environmental legislation were thus conceived and defined according to
principles fundamentally at odds with pollution prevention. South African environmental
protection was determined by a policy of selection and exclusion: apartheid inalienably
prejudiced those not classified as white by denying them access to public health and
access to information around pollution and environmental health. Policymakers had
admittedly ‘given up’ the idea of ameliorating the conditions of townships caught without
access to services such as irrigation and electricity demonstrating the prejudicial
conception of what was then regarded as ‘reasonably practicable.’
464 NASA, TES/2743/10/88  United Municipal Executive presentation on ‘Report of the Bills Committee
on the Water Amendment Bill,’ February 12-13. 1974
465 NASA, TES/2743/10/188 Letter from Mr. Collins, Town Clerk, Johannesburg, to Mr. Strydom, United
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466 NASA, TES/2743/10/188  Water Amendment Bill of 1975, February 26, 1975
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Amendment Act of 1975
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The city of coal: 1970-1978
…people are leaving this place because… of this pollution… we are losing good people… this pollution is
killing…468
By 1970, the limitations of pillar-and-bord production were determined by the nature and
depth of rock strata overlying the coal, as well as the thickness and composition of the
coal seam itself. Opencast mining had become a viable alternative, especially with the
development of more efficient earth moving and excavating machinery.469 The “dreadful
waste” of mounting coal dumps incurred by contemporary mining methods would be
“avoided.”470 This technical innovation was thus seen as being “particularly suitable” for
South African coal.471 The introduction of open cast mining in 1971 thus triggered a
dynamic shift in the nature of production in the Witbank coalfield.472 Open cast mining
was seen as being both more effective and economical. By comparison, pillar-and-bord
was seen as ineffective: opencast required less engineering dexterity, and produced more.
The method involved the use of large earth-moving machinery which removed the land
surface, removing plants and denuding fragile topsoil. The ecological ramifications of
extracting coal in this way were severe.
Variants of opencast mining methods had been in operation in Britain since 1942. The
method had first been employed in the United States during the 1940s, where it was seen
as far more convenient for removing thick seams of coal trapped in the steep ranges of
the North American terrain. As methods developed, strip mining became increasingly
more employable; it was easier and more profitable most of the time – and by the late
1970s, a variety of techniques had been developed to suit the specific formation of
diverse coalfields worldwide.473 This method made liberal use of explosives to access
468 Interview with Kaizer Mabena, Thushanang, Emalahleni, June 4, 2008
469 ‘Opencast Coal Mining Practical in Republic’, Witbank News, July 9, 1965
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472 Ibid.
473 Mitchell, J.G. ‘When Mountains Move’, National Geographic, March, 2006, p. 108
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seams. The reduced capital cost of this method allowed for greater strategic intervention
in engineering, leading to exponential growth figures in the local market.
By 1976 the South African mining industry experienced massive expansion as a result of
engineering developments such as open cast mining, coupled with the construction of
Richard’s Bay Coal Terminal. Witbank coal demand was also stimulated by the “oil
revolution” created by the Oil-Producing Export Countries (OPEC) embargo of 1973,
which had increased the price of oil from approximately $2 to around $35 per barrel by
the end of the decade.474
One early opencast mine included the R200 million Rietspruit mine, which began
operations in 1978. The success of monitoring and evaluation of coal-based pollution of
local major polluters like Rand Carbide was significantly undermined by the exponential
growth of the coal industry within the first decade after the APPA was promulgated.475
Knowing the environmental impact of underground mining, opencast mining was
conceived as somewhat safer, as the process of rehabilitating the land after mining took
place was considered to be easier. Topsoil and broken rock from explosives were piled up
on one side, and after the layer of coal was removed, the land was supposedly left “the
way it was.”476 Companies would often plant black wattles around the mines, so “no one
(could) see that there (was) no rehabilitation.”477 The “back-fill” of soil and rocks broken
from solid underground layers resulted in a trench which was “never as compact.”478
Land would generally sink as it settled, leaving a visible depression in the land;
eventually, it filled up with water and overflowed, setting in motion the long-term
process of water acidification known as acid mine drainage (AMD).479 AMD referred to
the reduced pH level of water retained in mines. When the underground water eventually
seeps out of the mines, it leaches the soil, picking up minerals such as manganese and
474 Hudson, Michael S. ‘To play the hegemon: fifty years of US policy towards the Middle East’, The
Middle East Journal, 50, 3, 1996, p. 333
475 Rand Carbide began to implement pollution control measures in 1974. ‘Rand Carbide sets the record
straight’, Witbank News, July 14, 2000
476 Interview with Mohammed Dindar, Kwachibikulu, Mpumalanga Lakes District, June 26, 2007
477 Interview with Christelle Paul, Lake Chrissie, Mpumalanga Lakes District, June 26, 2007
478 Interview with Malcolm Suttill, Witbank, Emalahleni, June 3, 2008
479 Interview with Mohammed Dindar, Kwachibikulu, Mpumalanga Lakes District, June 26, 2007
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mercury. These particles, commonly known as total dissolved solids (TDS), pose a threat
to public health when ingested.
Both local and international capacity to ‘adapt’ to pollution was becoming limited over
the course of the 1970s. The broader impact of pollution on public health could no longer
be ignored. The strength of the environmentalist lobby was consolidated with the
emergence of statutory bodies such as the EPA. This body understood environmental
disease to be the “disease of the century” and argued that environmental protection “must
become the most important ingredient in any national health program.”480 In South
Africa, organisations such as the South African Council for Conservation and Anti-
Pollution vilified the “apathetic attitude of officialdom,” reflecting significant cleavages
between the state and civil society over environmental policy.481 Pollution was still seen
as something to which society could, and should, adapt, particularly in line with growing
energy requirements. By 1978 the Secretary for Environmental Planning and Energy
argued that the cost of energy derived from fossil fuels would continue to increase.482
Conclusion
Environmental conditions in the Witbank coalfield have steadily deteriorated, and will
continue to do so, into the twenty-first century. However, conceptions of coal-based
pollution had changed dramatically by the late twentieth century, particularly owing to
the growing incidence of land decay and poor health. This chapter has demonstrated these
changes through making reference to Witbank, where stakeholders had little choice but to
adapt to new regulations governing pollution. This included both the introduction of
industrial pollution control measures and the emergence of a more visible civil sector
which made recourse to the APPA to affect local change. Despite the growing opposition
to severe levels of coal-based pollution in the region, the control and prevention of
pollution was obstructed by the continued economic centrality of coal.
480 ‘Pollution and Your Health’, p. 1
481 ‘Why not put that dam weed to use?’ Daily News, November 21, 1978
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Image 6: A resident of the Old Coronation Colliery informal settlement transporting bags of coal gathered
from the ash heap of the abandoned pre-war coal dumps of the Coronation Colliery outside of Witbank,
Emalahleni, June 2, 2008
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Image 7: Exposed mine pit at the abandoned site of the Transvaal & Delagoa Bay Colliery, situated not far
from the industrial complex bordering the town of Witbank, June 2, 2008
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Postscript
‘Act local, think global’: environmental justice in the Witbank coalfield, 1978-2009
This thesis has placed changing conceptions of coal-based pollution in historical context.
The narrative ends in 1978, when the switch to opencast provided exponential growth
opportunities to the local industry, resulting in previously unprecedented scales of coal
production, sales and related pollution. Issues around coal-based pollution have continued
to gain momentum, causing significant levels of public concern. The study has provided a
framework for understanding the complex and strained politics related to contemporary
environmental justice in South Africa and, more specifically, in Witbank. This postscript
briefly explores the environmental politics specific to Witbank, further demonstrating the
relevance of this town as a unit of historical study. It addresses the need for a greater
understanding of pollution and its role in South African energy politics.
Both local and global demand for coal had grown exponentially by the end of the 1970s,
with seventeen separate active coalfields situated within the Witbank district.483 The
region had become South Africa’s “energy nucleus,” contributing to the majority of
Richard’s Bay’s rising export figures, with 24.9 million ton coal export in 1980 and 25.7
million ton coal export by 1981.484 By 1981, Witbank’s opencast Rietspruit mine had
already earned R300 million in foreign currency.485 Opencast did not entirely replace
underground production, and pillar and bord techniques were refined to enable more
efficient rates of extraction. In fact, by October, the long-established Witbank Colliery
had sold its highest ever monthly tonnage, over a million tons.486 By the middle of the
decade, the proximity of new residential areas to abandoned mines had increased
exposure to unrestricted, and often dangerous, sites. In response to a number of residents
falling into burning pits close to dumps, efforts were made from this point by the
483 Witbank News, November 6, 1981, p. 25
484 Chairman’s statement, Witbank Colliery, Ltd. Witbank News, November 20, 1981, p. 59 By 1981,
Witbank Colliery had become a subsidiary of the Barlow Rand Group.
485 ‘Rietspruit lets the money roll’, Witbank News, December 11, 1981
486 ‘More than a million in October’, Witbank News, December 11, 1981
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Witbank town council to fence in the burning ground.487 This did not satisfy a growing
opposition of local residents, whose lives were overwhelmingly affected by coal-based
pollution.
By 1980 Witbank’s pollution was reconceived in line with racial inequity.488 These
understandings linked coal-based pollution to the disproportionately high prevalence of
diseases such as tuberculosis by the “black working class…as compared to the other
economic sectors of the population.”489 Findings in Witbank have revealed that few
residents understand the full implications of coal-based pollution. Many see it “as this
normal thing - staying around a mine.”490 Contributing to the health implications of coal-
based pollution is the pervasive lack of services and education to residents of informal
settlements near sites of past mining activity. An evaluation of the impact of coal-based
pollution in the Witbank district has demonstrated the dangers of ongoing South African
coal mining activity. By 2000, tests showed that the quality of water flowing into the
Witbank Dam was too polluted for use in power generation. Water had to be pumped
from the Komati and Usuthu Rivers to the Witbank area.491 With limited effect,
numerous experimental rehabilitation projects have attempted to prevent rising
underground water from workings, eliminating risk factors related to AMD.492 South
African scientists have predicted that the rising incidence of AMD running over the
Witbank coalfield could take up to five hundred years to normalize.493 In spite of such
predictions, it is almost impossible to tell what the “exact impact will be until it actually
hits.”494
487 ‘Children safe at last,’ Witbank News, October 2, 1981, p. 1
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Image 8: Residents collect pieces of low-grade bituminous coal found along the ash heap of abandoned
mine dumps of the old Coronation Colliery. Isaac Mampane is on the right. Behind the dump, the edges of
the old Coronation Colliery informal settlement can be seen. They were constructed over the subsided land
on top of the collapsed, burning coal seam abandoned by the mining company for over sixty years. This
poses significant health risks for residents. June 2, 2008
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Conclusion
This thesis has focused on evolving understandings of Witbank coal from a valued
commodity and source of energy to a destructive source of coal-based pollution. By
focusing on changing ideas of pollution, the thesis has traced responses to these changing
conceptions by the State, local industry, the civil sector, as well as Witbank’s local
residents. It sought to answer the central question of how coal-based pollution was
understood in light of visible environmental damage, as well as scientific knowledge of
these changes. The study has concluded that changes in understanding were strongly
influenced by the appearance of pollution, but this did little to affect change within the
framework of rapid and intensive urbanization.
Finding a comprehensive explanation for pollution remained a central challenge in
producing this study. It was necessary to explore what was meant by pollution. An
historical assessment of evolving ideas of coal-based pollution required some sense of its
existence. This study has revealed the relationship between broader understanding of, and
responses to, the pervasive problem of coal-based pollution. The first chapter has
demonstrated this by depicting the early existence of coal trade in the town, as well as
early observations of coal’s properties. Reference to early twentieth century legislation
has shown how coal-based pollution was conceived by law, and how this directly
influenced regulations over industrial emissions and effluent. Archival references have
revealed limited conception of the destructive capacity of industrial activity in the early
twentieth century. Reports of tests conducted to test the quality of coal during combustion
reflected a superficial understanding of its chemical composition. Such gaps in
understanding reveal the way in which early signs of coal-based pollution were, to a large
extent, ignored. Where attention was given to pollution in early legislation, regulations
imposed were tentative, and rarely implemented. The first chapter provides an analysis of
this early phase of coal, when the scale of coal production expanded to such an extent
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that new signs of pollution drew further attention to the destructive properties of the fossil
fuel.
The establishment of Escom and Iscor in Witbank by the mid-1930s, as well as the steady
militarization of South Africa, further marginalised existing concerns about coal-based
environmental damage. These industries facilitated the growth of a steel market in
Witbank, leading to unforeseen growth in the coal industry. The second chapter focuses
on the patterns of this growth, exploring the relationship between industrialization and
energy production, particularly in stimulating the scale of coal production. It thus
demonstrates the development of different perspectives of Witbank’s coal-based
pollution within the context of a more developed industry.
With the diversification of industry in the Witbank region, coal mining activity expanded,
with severe implications for the local ecosystem. The integrity of land surfaces at coal
mining sites was compromised by the unorthodox nature of coal production during the
Second World War. Sound engineering principles of popular pillar-and-bord mining
methods were discarded in the war-time acceleration of industrial production. This
shaped the way in which coal-based pollution came to be understood during and after the
war years. The most significant indication of these changes was the time and energy
devoted by the state to the research of bacteriological and chemical pollution.
The third and fourth chapters reveal significant shifts in the way in which coal mining
was associated with pollution. This was mainly as a result of physical evidence of air
pollution, destruction of land, and the indefatigability of underground fires. The third
chapter provides a summary of internal debates around the growing appearance of
environmental changes as a result of ongoing coal mining activity. Coal-based pollution
of isolated areas where underground fires raged beneath the sunken and desiccated land
surface did not pose a problem to the local authorities of Witbank; neither did it disrupt
economic activity, warranting attention by state or industry. The appearance of acute
levels of atmospheric pollution by the early 1950s throughout South Africa was more
difficult to ignore.
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The second half of the twentieth century saw attempts both to define and monitor
pollution. What became clear was the need for improved understanding of the
phenomenon of coal-based pollution. The third chapter thus describes the process by
which conceptions of coal-based pollution were brought into the realm of public
discourse through the work of E.H. Halliday and the CSIR, as well as preliminary
discussions on the APPA. Reference to documentation related to the creation of the Act
reveal how much more closely definitions of pollution were founded on scientific
understandings of pollution, particularly the impact of coal combustion. This again
develops the overall argument of the thesis by reflecting how greater understanding of
coal-based pollution resulted in growing concern from local residents.
The fourth chapter deals with responses to the promulgation of the APPA, coupled with
rapidly changing perceptions of environmental concerns. As South Africa’s first
environmental legislation directly tackling issues of pollution, the APPA set a precedent
for renewed interest and altered perspectives on coal-based pollution. This had enormous
ramifications for the way in which Witbank industry functioned. Local collieries and
factories were now required to conform to environmental control and monitoring by the
State, and also to introduce efforts geared towards environmental mitigation. This
changed the way the local coal industry approached pollution, but did little to halt the
scale of growth experienced by the coal industry by the late 1970s. The fourth chapter
evaluates the efficiency of regulations introduced with the APPA, particularly in light of
continued growth in the scale of Witbank coal production. With the introduction of
opencast mining, the scale of coal production grew exponentially, in spite of more fully
developed conceptions of the environmental implications of this activity, particularly in
the already-compromised Witbank environment.
This thesis has provided an historical analysis of changing ideas around coal and its
environmental impact. It thus contributes to the growing body of knowledge on climate
change. Its value is emphasized by the continued importance of coal in South Africa as a
staple source of energy, in spite of common knowledge of its dire environmental
- 137 -
implications. Recent claims that “declining coal reserves” are the root of energy problems
in South Africa reflect considerable changes in the way coal has been understood as a
natural resource.495 Contemporary attitudes towards coal-based pollution remain fraught
with misrepresentation and prevarication. Processes of pollution thus require further
study in South Africa, as relatively little is known about the full extent of environmental
impacts of early twentieth century coal mining. This thesis, therefore, is a first attempt at
opening up the enigma that surrounds the environmental impact of coal mining in South
Africa.
495 ‘Eskom to make coal stocks go much further’, Business Report, April 24, 2008
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